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ABSTRACT 
This thesis establishes the evidential value of thumbnail cache file fragments 
identified in unallocated space. A set of criteria to evaluate the evidential value 
of thumbnail cache artefacts were created by researching the evidential 
constraints present in Forensic Computing. The criteria were used to evaluate 
the evidential value of live system thumbnail caches and thumbnail cache file 
fragments identified in unallocated space. Thumbnail caches can contain visual 
thumbnails and associated metadata which may be useful to an analyst during 
an investigation; the information stored in the cache may provide information on 
the contents of files and any user or system behaviour which interacted with the 
file. There is a standard definition of the purpose of a thumbnail cache, but not 
the structure or implementation; this research has shown that this has led to 
some thumbnail caches storing a variety of other artefacts such as network 
place names. 
The growing interest in privacy and security has led to an increase in user’s 
attempting to remove evidence of their activities; information removed by the 
user may still be available in unallocated space. This research adapted popular 
methods for the identification of contiguous files to enable the identification of 
single cluster sized fragments in Windows 7, Ubuntu, and Kubuntu. Of the four 
methods tested, none were able to identify each of the classifications with no 
false positive results; this result led to the creation of a new approach which 
improved the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments. 
After the identification phase, further research was conducted into the 
reassembly of file fragments; this reassembly was based solely on the potential 
thumbnail cache file fragments and structural and syntactical information. In 
both the identification and reassembly phases of this research image only file 
fragments proved the most challenging resulting in a potential area of continued 
future research. Finally this research compared the evidential value of live 
system thumbnail caches with identified and reassembled fragments. It was 
determined that both types of thumbnail cache artefacts can provide unique 
information which may assist with a digital investigation. 
ii 
 
This research has produced a set of criteria for determining the evidential value 
of thumbnail cache artefacts; it has also identified the structure and related user 
and system behaviour of popular operating system thumbnail cache 
implementations. This research has also adapted contiguous file identification 
techniques to single fragment identification and has developed an improved 
method for thumbnail cache file fragment identification. Finally this research has 
produced a proof of concept software tool for the automated identification and 
reassembly of thumbnail cache file fragments. 
Keywords:  
File carving, evidential value, contextual analysis, fragment identification, 
fragment reassembly, forensic computing, and cybercrime  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In computing, the term thumbnail is used to define a small representation of a 
larger file. Thumbnails were originally created for visual data, such as an image, 
but they have developed to include audio and multimedia formats. Thumbnails 
are used in a variety of applications and operating systems to assist with the 
identification of various source files. For example, when browsing directories 
thumbnails can provide greater detail on the content of the file than the file 
name alone.  Visual thumbnails are also widely used by websites to assist a 
user in browsing the content. 
 
Whilst the use of visual thumbnails can enhance the usability of applications, 
they can be resource intensive to generate, particularly if a directory contains a 
large number of files which require the generation of thumbnails. A thumbnail 
cache allows visual thumbnails and their associated metadata to be stored. The 
cache prevents unnecessary re-rendering and therefore reduces the use of 
system resources. Such caches are of particular significance to forensic 
examiners as they can contain: metadata, a visual thumbnail of the original file, 
and potentially can provide information about the user’s activity.  
 
There is no standard implementation of a thumbnail cache, therefore software 
applications and operating systems each use the basic concept in their own 
way. This can be a source of confusion for forensic examiners as thumbnail 
caches which look structurally similar may not represent the same activity, and 
may therefore have a different evidential significance. In addition to the 
expected visual thumbnails and associated metadata, thumbnail caches may 
hold other unexpected pieces of information; such as network places and drive 
allocations [Chapter 6].  
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1.2 Justification 
The thumbnail cache can provide an analyst with information about potential 
system and user activity. This is highlighted in cases such as United States V. 
Vosburgh [2010] and R v Ross Warwick Porter [2006] where the information 
contained within the thumbnail cache and the user behaviour that led to its 
presence on the system are important evidential concerns (See Chapter 4).  An 
analyst interprets each artefact in the context of the system: by reconstructing 
the behaviour of the system it is possible to identify how events occurred and 
prove or disprove the hypothesis relating to the case. This process of contextual 
analysis suggests that the Forensic Computing community needs to be aware 
of both the structure and behaviour of an artefact in order to interpret its 
significance in a case. The thumbnail cache does not have a generic 
implementation and therefore understanding the unique structure and behaviour 
of each thumbnail cache can assist with interpreting the behaviour it represents. 
 
The growing interest in privacy and increased understanding of technology has 
led to an increase in user awareness of system files. For example, information 
about thumbnail cache can be found on sites such as YouTube [2013], 
Facebook [2013] and Twitter [2013], which highlights the growing interest 
amongst users in understanding system files. This has led to users attempting 
to disguise their behaviour by deleting system and user files which contain 
potential evidence of their activities. Therefore it is becoming increasingly 
important to look for crucial evidential artefacts that may be present in 
unallocated space.  
 
Files in unallocated space may become partially or completely overwritten, 
which may leave only fragments of the file on the system.  Most file carving 
techniques focus on recovery of complete contiguous files; little research has 
been conducted into retrieving and reassembling individual file fragments. One 
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potential difficulty is the identification of a file fragment with the small amount of 
information they contain. The potential importance of thumbnail cache files and 
their varied structure suggests that research into retrieving and understanding 
the evidential value of these fragments could assist in providing additional 
artefacts in a case. These additional artefacts may alter or corroborate an 
existing event reconstruction and help to ensure a suitable conclusion is 
reached. 
 
1.3 Aim 
Understanding and recovering the data contained within the thumbnail cache is 
a relevant problem in the forensic computing community. As the level of 
understanding of a general computer user increases it becomes more likely that 
a user who wishes to conceal evidence of his activity will attempt to remove 
relevant data from his system. If the user simply deletes relevant artefacts the 
data will remain resident on the storage device until the clusters they occupy 
are reassigned to new data; therefore it is likely that clusters containing relevant 
artefacts may exist on the system in unallocated space. The aim of this 
research is to evaluate the evidential value of thumbnail cache file fragments 
identified in unallocated space. 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
Operating system thumbnail caches can provide important sources of evidence 
in a forensic computing investigation. Therefore the research hypothesis is 
 
Thumbnail cache file fragments identified in unallocated space contain artefacts 
of evidential value that may provide potential evidence when the thumbnails 
have been deleted from the live thumbnail cache of the system. 
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1.5 Methodology 
This research aims to evaluate the evidential value of thumbnail cache file 
fragments identified in unallocated space. In order to meet the research aims 
the problem is broken down into smaller research areas; figure 1.1 provides a 
breakdown of the areas of research. This section identifies the general 
methodology for this thesis; each section of this research has specific 
methodologies which are described throughout this thesis. First, a review of 
related literature is conducted to assist with the development of a methodology 
for this research [Chapters 2 and 3]. It will then be necessary to define the term 
“evidential value”; this definition can be used to develop a set of criteria which 
can be used to evaluate the artefacts identified during this research [Chapter 
4]; the definition can then be used throughout the remainder of the research to 
evaluate the results of the various stages.  
 
 
Figure 1-1:A breakdown of the proposed methodology for this research 
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This is followed by a structural and behavioural study of common operating 
system thumbnail caches [Chapters 5 and 6]. This study provides information 
on the evidential value of a complete thumbnail cache in the context of a 
complete system. The structure and syntax identified during the initial study 
provide detailed information to assist with implementing file fragment 
identification techniques for the different thumbnail cache types [Chapters 7 
and 8]. After the identification phase methods are implemented to assist with 
reassembling the identified fragments; artefacts are then extracted from the 
reassembled fragments to identify the range of information available [Chapter 
9].  
 
The results of the structural and behavioural study are compared with the 
evidential value of the thumbnail cache fragments identified and reassembled 
from unallocated space [Chapter 10].  The comparison of evidential value 
identifies which types of artefacts are likely to be found in each location and 
their potential evidential value during an analysis. This is followed by a critical 
evaluation of the methodologies employed during this research [Chapter 11]; 
finally this thesis concludes with the research conclusions and potential future 
work [Chapter 12]. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
This section sets out the structure of the remainder of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 establishes a working definition for the term Forensic Computing and 
identifies the processes involved in this field. Forensic Computing, or Digital 
Forensics as it is sometimes referred to, can be defined as the process of 
analysing a digital device with the resulting analysis being potentially produced 
in a Court of Law as evidence. This Chapter also describes the most common 
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implementations of operating system thumbnail caches and discusses available 
literature on their implementations. 
 
Chapter 3 highlights the requirement to breakdown the aim of this research into 
smaller focused areas in order to determine the validity of the hypothesis; the 
objectives of the components of this research are described. This is followed by 
an overview of the potential considerations for this research. One of the most 
significant considerations for this research is the requirement to evaluate 
methodologies and results by appropriate forensic standards. Finally, the 
software tools used during this research are described. 
 
Chapter 4 identifies the criteria which determine the evidential value of an 
artefact and establishes how the criteria can be applied to evidence relating to a 
thumbnail cache. This chapter explores the term evidence and evaluates how 
evidential value is assessed in court; the criteria established for assessing 
evidential value in general are then applied specifically to the thumbnail cache 
to create a specification which can be used to evaluate the results of this 
research. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the structure and behaviour of the thumbnail cache 
implementations used in the Linux distributions Ubuntu and Kubuntu. The 
structural study highlights that whilst both thumbnail caches were implemented 
based on the same open desktop specification there are in fact small but 
important differences. The behavioural study identifies common user 
interactions with the system that would result in changes to data within the 
thumbnail cache; it also describes the changes that occur on the remainder of 
the system. The changes to the data can be used to identify possible user 
activity which has occurred on the system. 
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Chapter 6 describes the structure and behaviour of the windows 7 operating 
system thumbnail cache. Within this research: audio, visual, and media 
thumbnails were examined; interestingly it was determined that audio and 
media thumbnails do not generally store data within the thumbnail cache. The 
research also found situations where Windows 7 made use of Thumbs.db files; 
it was also noted that the thumbnail cache stores other kinds of data including 
allocated drive letters and network place names. The thumbnail cache structure 
in Windows 7 looks similar to the implementation used in Windows Vista, 
however it was noted there were key structural changes which included the 
removal of dates and times. 
 
Chapter 7 identifies the most common file carving techniques; it describes the 
implementation of four common approaches adapted for single fragment 
thumbnail cache identification. Each technique is evaluated using the thumbnail 
cache structures identified in Chapters 5 and 6. This research divided the 
identification of thumbnail cache fragments into four classifications; two 
classifications achieved 100% accuracy with no false positives in the test set. 
The implemented methods achieved poor results on identifying image-only 
fragments from the thumbnail cache and therefore this required further separate 
research. 
 
Chapter 8 describes a hybrid approach created for the identification of 
thumbnail cache file fragments. As a result of the evaluation of the four methods 
implemented in Chapter 7,it was noted that no single method managed to 
identify all the thumbnail cache file fragments without any false positives. A new 
hybrid approach was implemented to improve the identification statistics. This 
chapter also further examines the problem of identifying image-only thumbnail 
cache file fragments; this research focuses on JPEG file fragments. The images 
in the thumbnail caches studied during this research are stored in standard 
image formats; therefore a fragment which contains only image data from the 
thumbnail cache has the same structure as a standard image fragment. This 
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chapter evaluates possible image fragment identification methods; this research 
enables an approach to be created to improve the accuracy of identifying 
potential image-only thumbnail cache file fragments. The aim of this chapter is 
to maximise the number of file fragments available for the reassembly process; 
this led to a substantial number of standard image fragments being falsely 
identified as thumbnail cache fragments. It was determined that having a large 
number of false positives for the image category was preferable as it makes 
successful reassembly more likely. 
 
Chapter 9 describes the research conducted into methods of reassembling the 
thumbnail cache file fragments identified in Chapters 7 and 8. A general 
reassembly model was constructed based upon the methodology for 
reassembling a jigsaw puzzle. Each file type used in the thumbnail caches’ 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6 was then separately considered to assist with 
the reassembly and validation of the file fragment sequences produced. This 
Chapter concludes with a description of the artefacts identified from data set 3 
which contained data taken from unallocated space using the implemented 
identification and reassembly approaches. 
 
Chapter 10 evaluates the evidential value of both complete and deleted 
fragments of operating system thumbnail caches. The evidential value of the 
thumbnail caches identified in Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the fragments 
recovered and reassembled at the end of Chapter 9, are evaluated against the 
criteria set in Chapter 4. This chapter highlights the fact that some artefacts, 
such as thumbnail caches from previous windows installations, can only be 
recovered from unallocated space. It also highlights the increased evidential 
value of using complete and deleted fragments of thumbnail caches together to 
increase understanding of the system’s activity. 
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Chapter 11 evaluates the methodologies implemented during this research; it 
provides a critical overview of the research which has been undertaken and 
highlights any areas which could be improved. Each section of this research is 
individually evaluated; this is followed by a critical evaluation of the research as 
a whole. One of the main strengths of this research is the comparison of 
multiple file carving techniques to ensure a high number of thumbnail cache 
fragments were identified. A question remaining open from this research is the 
further evaluation into the identification of fragments which only contained 
image data; however in Chapter 12 this is considered as an area for further 
potential work. 
 
Chapter 12 provides a summary of the contributions and conclusions reached 
in this research; this is followed by an overview of potential future research. 
 
1.7 Contributions 
This research establishes a working definition for the term evidential value and 
creates a set of criteria to establish the evidential value of artefacts relating to 
operating system thumbnail caches. The criteria are used to compare the 
evidential value of complete thumbnail caches, which are part of the current 
operating system, to thumbnail cache file fragments identified and reassembled 
from unallocated space. This research identifies that there are potentially useful 
thumbnail cache artefacts which can only be found in unallocated space, such 
as thumbnail caches from previous operating system installations. 
 
This research also describes both the structure and behaviour of popular 
implementations of operating system thumbnail caches. Each operating system 
implements the thumbnail cache differently; therefore an analyst needs to be 
familiar with the differences between implementations and their effects in order 
to extract meaningful artefacts [Morris, 2010; Morris, 2011a]. Research is also 
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conducted into establishing relationships between the thumbnail cache and 
other artefacts on a system, allowing the artefacts relating to the thumbnail 
cache to be put into context of other system events [Morris, 2011b]. 
 
During this research current file carving approaches are compared and 
evaluated on their ability to identify thumbnail cache file fragments [Morris, 
2013]; this evaluation led to the creation of a new hybrid approach specifically 
refined for each type of thumbnail cache. The hybrid approach performed 
significantly better at identifying the various thumbnail cache file fragments than 
any single method. 
 
This research also developed reassembly methods for reassembling thumbnail 
cache file fragments; these methods can reassemble both complete and partial 
files. The reassembly methods used the unique structural and syntactical 
characteristics of each file type to create an accurate approach to reassembling 
the fragments; once the fragments are reassembled it is possible to extract the 
various artefacts within the file and then add them to a contextual analysis of 
the system. 
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2 Related Research 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies potential opportunities for research within forensic 
computing; it also reviews literature relating to the evaluation of the evidential 
value of thumbnail cache file fragments in unallocated space. Research relating 
to data carving and reassembly are discussed in Chapters 7,8 and 9.In this 
Chapter, Section 2.2 defines the term forensic computing, and describes the 
field’s development; this leads on to a description of the methodologies used 
within the field. The section concludes with an overview of current opportunities 
within the field.  
 
Section 2.3 looks at data and information, starting with how information is 
stored; this is followed by a review of metadata and its importance in Forensic 
Computing. Section 2.4 looks specifically at the thumbnail cache, discussing 
how thumbnails are used within computing and why they are useful. This is 
followed by a more detailed examination of five common operating system 
thumbnail caches and a summary of their forensic significance.  
 
2.2 Forensic Computing 
Forensic computing is thought to have originated in the late 1980s [Hannan, 
2004], research and development in the field is generally driven by market 
requirements [Noblett, 2000]. This is partially due to the rapid growth of 
technology throughout society and the limited resources available for analysts 
to perform investigations; therefore research is generally conducted to enable 
the analysis and understanding of current casework. 
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The definition of Forensic Computing has been the subject of debate; Hall 
[2005] compared a variety of definitions that are in use; for example Garber 
[2001] describes the subject as:  
“the analysis of hard drives, CDs, floppy disks, zip and jazz disks, flash memory 
cards and other forms of storage media to uncover evidence of crimes”. 
One of the most common aspects identified throughout the definitions Hall 
examined is the requirement to ensure the preservation of both the physical and 
digital evidence [Hall, 2005]. Forensic Computing has been shown to have 
different professional and academic concerns to those found in computer 
science [Cooper, 2005]; the field has more similarities with the professional and 
academic concerns of Forensic Science. Whilst there are many definitions 
available for Forensic Computing, it can still be defined as a sub-discipline of 
forensic science [Hall, 2005]. The Oxford English Dictionary [OED, 2011] 
defines forensic as “relating to or denoting the application of scientific methods 
and techniques to the investigation of crime”; therefore Forensic Computing 
could be considered to be the application of the principles of forensic science to 
digital devices.  
 
The investigatory process aims to prove or disprove a hypothesis, using 
methods which can be presented in court; the hypothesis generally relates to 
the actions of an individual. An analyst needs to handle the digital media in a 
suitable way to ensure this objective is fulfilled. The focus of forensic computing 
is to investigate an event after it has occurred through acquiring, analysing and 
reporting any evidence recovered from digital media [Hannan, 2004]. 
McKemmish [1999] identified four key components of forensic computing in 
terms of their involvement with digital evidence. These are: (i) identification, (ii) 
preservation, (iii) analysis and (iv) presentation; each component having its own 
procedures and requirements.   
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Generally individuals, including some from the scientific community, have pre-
conceived opinions of the activities involved in a forensic analysis [Palmer, 
2002]. The stereotype of forensic science is predominantly the study of human 
corpses, which can be partially traced back to the media's interpretation of the 
discipline. Whilst awareness of the discipline is increasing, the current lack of 
public awareness about forensic computing can be an advantage.  
 
Within Forensic Science there is a constant requirement to produce evidence 
which is admissible in court [Palmer, 2002]; this permits it to be used in 
establishing the validity of the hypothesis being disputed in the case.  The 
forensic examination of digital media is based on scientific methods; this 
ensures that objective and justifiable methods [Noblett,2000] are used for 
analysing evidence.  In Forensic Computing, data are usually stored in binary 
which an analyst must interpret to extract information. The interpretation of the 
data requires an analyst to understand the storage structure of the media, and 
of individual files, in order to apply an appropriate and accurate context to allow 
the binary to be interpreted correctly [Palmer, 2002].  
 
Every analysis method has an error rate, which needs to be measured and 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results [Palmer, 2002]. 
Understanding the nature of the errors allows the data to be presented in a way 
which reflects its accuracy. As the field develops, information on error rates may 
be discovered; this information can be used to increase understanding and 
improve techniques. For example, Dr Soloman was an early expert witness in 
forensic computing, who typically used evidence relating to the system clock 
[Gold, 2005]. It has since been established that time and date information may 
not always be accurate and this increased understanding of computer 
behaviour has modified how such information may be used in the field.  
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2.2.1 Methodologies 
A computer can be considered an individual crime scene and should be treated 
accordingly [Carrier, 2005]; therefore a suitable methodology should be 
employed during its investigation. This section discusses current approaches to 
conducting investigations in forensic computing and the development of 
methodologies due to advances in technology. 
 
Depending on the crime being investigated it is important to ensure the 
evidential value is preserved; therefore it needs to be handled by the 
appropriate agency. In an incident response guide, Microsoft [2007] produced a 
table detailing who to contact for the most common types of crime. The incident 
response guide is not well publicised and therefore companies may not be 
aware of who is appropriate to contact if an incident occurs; this may lead to 
evidence being mishandled.  Different organisations have different priorities 
during an investigation; the primary objective for law enforcement when 
completing a forensic analysis is prosecution. However prosecution is a 
secondary concern for companies and the military. Both the military and 
corporate organisations are primarily concerned with ensuring they can 
continue to operate. It is important for them to identify the damage caused by 
the incident to ensure appropriate action is taken to resolve the situation. 
 
Carrier [2005] discussed eight different organisations who are involved in 
independently developing definitions and standards for forensic computing. This 
highlights the requirement for organisations to work together to unite the field 
with standardised terminology and methodologies for what can be considered a 
global problem.  Performing a forensic analysis that would result in admissible 
evidence is considered a task that most IT departments are under qualified to 
do [Forte, 2006]. An IT technician may be given authority to perform an analysis 
or seize equipment without being aware of the constraints involved in 
performing forensic tasks. This is particularly likely when the incident is first 
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thought to be a disciplinary offence within an organisation and at a later date 
evidence is discovered which results in it becoming a criminal investigation.  
 
In order to examine digital media for the purpose of extracting evidence it is 
necessary to ensure the individual is authorised to do so [Microsoft, 2007; 
Reed, 2005]; without authorisation to examine the device any evidence 
collected is not legal and therefore cannot be admitted in court. Therefore the 
technician may inadvertently harm the reliability of any evidence recovered. 
Both IT professionals and forensic analysts need to ensure they only perform 
activities they are trained to do and fully understand [Greenfield, 2002]. 
Educating professionals in securing evidence and contacting appropriate 
personnel would reduce the number of cases that are dismissed due to 
inadmissible evidence [Carrier, 2003a].  
 
It has been suggested that any methodology for the analysis of digital evidence 
should be defined in stages which are based on how the information is created 
rather than being based on existing techniques [Carrier, 2003b]. This would 
require removing any preconceptions about forensic computing methodologies 
and focusing on the behaviour of digital evidence.  Creating a methodology 
based primarily on the evidence being analysed is likely to lead to a greater 
understanding of the evidence and the retrieval of a greater volume of 
information. 
 
Ciardhuain [2004] discusses the change in approach to methodologies around 
2004 when instances of encrypted media were increasing; this led to a shift 
from focusing on dead machines to performing a live analysis where 
appropriate. A thirteen step model was proposed by Ciardhuain which broke the 
forensic process into clear stages. This included the transportation of evidence 
and proving the hypothesis; this allows each part of the investigation to be 
clearly documented and gives an opportunity to provide specific training for 
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each stage. One of the most critical steps of an investigation is imaging the 
digital media [Stephenson, 2003], as any analysis is performed from an image 
to ensure the original evidence is preserved. It is therefore necessary to protect 
the original evidence during imaging whilst ensuring an accurate image is 
acquired.  
 
Windows operating systems have been shown to leave a variety of traces that 
can greatly assist a forensic investigation [Greenfield, 2002]. Greenfield looks at 
common sources for finding forensic artefacts in Windows, suggesting that 
operating system guide books can provide useful insights into how and where 
information is likely to be found. It has been suggested that the new features 
found in operating systems such as Windows Vista [Hayes, 2009], may impact 
the way forensic examinations are conducted, particularly with the introduction 
of technology such as BitLocker [Hargreaves, 2008]. If encryption is used on a 
machine it would significantly impact the investigation by potentially making the 
evidence inaccessible. Having encryption tools resident within an operating 
system does not mean they will have a significant uptake with the general 
public; therefore traditional analysis of artefacts on unencrypted systems is still 
important. 
 
When considering creating an overall methodology for forensic computing 
investigations, or specific parts of the process, it is necessary to ensure that it is 
chosen based on the characteristics of the problem [Bogen, 2005]. Selecting 
and creating appropriate methodologies will maximise the retrieval of admissible 
evidence and the use of resources. Unsafe practices are occurring throughout 
investigations due to a lack of standardisation and definitions, which make it 
difficult to create appropriate new tools to assist with the analysis of machines 
[Carrier, 2006]. Therefore defining the problem allows for tools to be created 
which satisfy the necessary requirements, thereby improving the analysis 
process.  
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2.2.2 Tools used in Forensic Computing  
During an investigation, tools play an important part in obtaining and analysing 
data; anything an analyst uses to assist him during a case can be thought of as 
a tool. Tools could be physical or software, however it is beyond the scope of 
this research to discuss physical tools in depth. There are two categories of 
software used by an analyst: those for researching the behaviour and structure 
of an object and those used for identifying evidence; some tools may be used 
for both purposes. This section examines software tools that are currently 
available and discusses the requirements for creating a new forensic tool. 
 
A virtual machine is a software version of a computer; it enables a virtual 
instance of a computer to be customised and used like a standard machine. 
Within a virtual machine it is possible to customise the hardware and software. 
It is also possible to limit how the virtual machine interacts with its environment, 
For example by restricting input devices or network access. Virtual machines 
are commonly used by forensic analysts to determine the behaviour and 
structure of files and software [Penhallurick, 2005], as they provide a safe test 
environment where the analyst can monitor and control the variables being 
assessed.  One of the main advantages of using a virtual machine is the ability 
to easily replicate the machine, which assists an analyst in ensuring the same 
basic configuration is used throughout an experiment. A virtual machine can 
also be used to obtain a live view of a hard drive image that has been acquired 
[Bem, 2007]; this can provide an analyst with information about the layout of the 
system that may not be immediately obvious from the image alone.  
 
Live boot CDs can allow an analyst to view and analyse a hard drive without 
altering it, specific forensic versions of the Linux operating system, such as 
Penguin Sleuth and Helix, have been created [Forensics Wiki, 2013].Such CDs 
provide appropriate tools for an analyst in a live boot format to enable them to 
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obtain and analyse evidence [Helix, 2011]. Forensic live boot CDs do not 
automatically mount the media and ensure write access is only granted if 
specifically selected in order to protect the reliability of the evidence. The set of 
tools provided are useful both during the analysis of a case and when an 
analyst is performing experiments; they allow the media to be analysed in an 
appropriate way.  
 
A common open source forensic tool used by analysts and found on live boot 
CDs is the Sleuth Kit. It allows a forensic analysis of a variety of different file 
structures including NTFS and FAT systems [Galvao, 2006]. The Sleuth Kit 
provides tools that can assist in finding forensic artefacts both in case work and 
experiments. Whilst the Sleuth Kit is a command line set of tools, a graphical 
interface is provided in the form of the Autopsy browser, this assists analysts in 
accessing the tools they require, making it easier to understand the 
functionality.  
 
A closed source forensic tool commonly used by analysts is Encase, this tool 
encompasses a wide range of forensic applications such as the ability to write 
object-orientated scripts, analyse files and generate reports [Guidance 
Software, 2011]. Encase is an intuitive tool that provides the analyst with a wide 
range of functionality; however it is a closed source application and does not 
provide the complete information on files it has recovered. Therefore an analyst 
needs to be trained in how to interpret and verify its results using another 
method. File recovery, also known as file carving is discussed further in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Hexadecimal [Hex] editors like Winhex are a useful tool when performing a 
forensic analysis and when trying to establish the structure of data 
[Fleischmamn, 2008]. Viewing data in a hex editor allows an analyst to see the 
file as it is stored and allows the analysis of individual fields to identify their 
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structure and behaviour. Winhex provides an analyst with various tools, such as 
the ability to create scripts and templates to make working with large files 
easier; it also contains a data interpreter which converts selected hex into other 
formats [Casey, 2004]. Such tools make working with hex easier and less time 
consuming, allowing an analyst to concentrate on their analysis. They are often 
particularly useful in analysing unknown binary file structures as they provide an 
interface to examine, compare and deconstruct files. 
 
There is significant debate within the forensic community about the relative 
merits of open and closed source software. Whilst both have been shown to 
meet the requirements for tools used to produce evidence, open source tools 
have been shown to do this more comprehensively [Carrier, 2002]. Whilst the 
source code is not available for closed source tools any tool used during an 
analysis should use documented procedures; the results of a tool should also 
be corroborated using another method to provide independent verification. 
Creating a new open source method allows analysts the opportunity to explore 
the source code used and fully analyse the tools behaviour. Carrier suggests 
that this should be accompanied by written documentation on the procedures, 
to supplement the analyst’s understanding.  
 
Ensuring that any new tool created uses a layout that is similar to existing 
forensic tools will make it easier to train analysts in its use [Richard, 2005]. The 
tools interface should also conform to the standard layout of functions used by 
the operating system, making it intuitive to use. Providing the analyst with 
information about the processes being performed by the software and its status 
will ensure they are aware of its behaviour.  
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2.2.3 Current Opportunities  
Forensic computing is a relatively new field which is growing at a fast pace and 
encompasses a wide range of devices. This rapid growth is due to society's 
expanding development and use of technology; each technology has the 
potential for misuse and may therefore be the subject of an investigation. In this 
section the opportunities that have been created for forensic computing 
research will be discussed. 
 
The increased use of storage media may provide a greater chance of 
recovering information for a case. However It is impractical, given the limited 
time, equipment and financial resources forensic analysts have available, to 
analyse every cluster of a large storage device by hand [Hama, 1996].This can 
result in information not being found particularly if it resides in partial fragments 
of unallocated space. The use of multi partition systems or RAID drives does 
not impact on the ability to identify information in unallocated space; the impact 
on identifying information relates to whether the file is compressed or encrypted. 
Any fragment which is part of a file structure which is uncompressed and 
unencrypted may be identified by an analyst using standard identification 
techniques discussed in Chapter 7.Therefore a current opportunity for research 
is to create methods to automate the retrieval of information; this enables 
resources to be maximised and to reduce the information that an analyst must 
initially review by hand. 
 
With the use of the internet, network storage and portable media, evidence of a 
crime could be present in multiple locations across the globe [Berinato, 2007]. 
The distribution of data can cause problems in collecting and analysing 
evidence as it may be difficult to retrieve evidence from media in a different 
geographical location. The media may be in an unknown location or not even 
known to exist. Whilst it is impractical to retrieve all distributed data, the ability 
to show relationships between the main device and devices used in conjunction 
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with it are important aspects of an investigation. Further research is required on 
forming the relationship between devices; the relationship can show that they 
were used together and how information passed between the two. Time and 
date information within both the devices can also assist in event reconstruction. 
 
The development of operating systems like Windows Vista provide new 
challenges for analysts [Hargreaves, 2007], including the use of new encryption 
technologies [Woodward, 2006]. Despite the initial concern from the forensic 
community over the impact of Bitlocker, the existence of it does not suggest that 
it will be used by a significant proportion of users. Given the limited resources 
available for research into technology it is appropriate to examine those which 
are required for casework. This approach can lead to problems if a case 
requires the understanding and ability to extract evidence from such technology 
and that level of understanding is not yet available. Key components of new 
operating systems that have been altered in new versions, such as the recycle 
bin and thumbnail cache, provide interesting research opportunities 
[Hargreaves, 2007] as they are likely to provide evidence in a substantial 
number of cases and therefore the ability to understand their behaviour and 
develop methodologies to extract information from them in a variety of 
circumstances is useful to the forensic community. 
 
Most techniques used by forensic analysts to analyse data are not standardised 
[Meyers, 2004]. As discussed further in Chapter 4, techniques are generally 
developed which meet the constraints of the team involved in the investigation. 
Standardised techniques for analysing and retrieving data from digital media 
would improve the ability to find and analyse evidence consistently and would 
assist in communicating the methodologies to lay individuals.   
 
Forensic computing research tends to concentrate on methods of retrieving 
information to present in court. It is also appropriate to investigate anti-forensic 
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techniques, in order to fully understand how the information on the media being 
analysed by an analyst may have been manipulated [Harris, 2006]. Whilst the 
types of anti-forensics currently employed have largely been established, their 
effect on the system, possible ways of reversing their effect and minimising 
potential damage have yet to be fully explored. Anti-forensic techniques can 
have a similar effect to those found in data deleted by the use; partial data may 
exist in fragments still on the system. Identifying, reassembling and establishing 
the reliability of data fragments can assist analysts in retrieving artefacts from 
both deleted data and anti-forensic techniques. 
 
2.3  Data and information 
Physical items such as hard disk drives, CD-ROMs and USB drives store data 
that is utilised by both the computer and user. This section explores: the 
information contained in such devices, the methods used in storing the data, 
how this data may be corrupted and the retrieval of corrupted files. This section 
defines data as a binary pattern which when interpreted in an appropriate 
context; information can be extracted from the data for use by the system or the 
user.   
 
2.3.1 Storing information 
A user’s habits and requirements are generally reflected in their file usage 
[Douceur, 1999] which allows an analyst to identify the type of user and the 
function of the storage media under examination. The content of a file tends to 
correlate with its type; in addition the average age and lifetime of files does not 
tend to vary across different types of user. This suggests that information about 
the file type is more likely to be relevant than information about the user when 
trying to identify file fragments.  
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An important question for each artefact an analyst identifies is its position within 
the file system structure; he must identify the storage structure of the devices. 
For example thumbs.db files can be found throughout a Windows XP operating 
system and in order to establish the meaning of a particular instance of the 
cache it is necessary to establish its relative location [Hurlbut, 2005]. This is 
forensically significant as it provides an understanding of where any evidence 
came from in relation to the rest of the information being stored. It is equally 
important to clarify where a deleted file was in relation to other files on the disk. 
However, this can be difficult for an analyst when the folder containing the 
deleted file is no longer on the disk; in this case the file is known as an orphan. 
Hurlbut investigates methods of identifying this particular class of deleted files 
with relative success. For a visual thumbnail it is important to establish a 
relationship to the original file the image it relates to; this can provide important 
information about the original file, such as the file path or associated dates and 
times. 
 
It would not be an effective use of resources to examine every piece of stored 
information in every investigation; therefore it is necessary to reduce the 
amount of information to be analysed. Whilst this ensures value is obtained 
from the resources it may also lead to some important information being missed 
[Hama, 1996]. Hama suggested one method of refining the information is to 
ignore anything that is unlikely to be relevant to an investigation; for example, 
standard libraries or images that come with the operating system or commercial 
applications. Whilst this does reduce the number of files for consideration, care 
must be taken to ensure that files which are discounted as a result of such pre-
processing have not been altered by a criminal aware of such procedures. Files 
can also be discarded on the basis of their extensions; however any method 
would need to check that the header and contents of the file match the 
extension. Any unused space on the storage media would need searching for 
deleted or partial files. Finally string searches can be useful in locating 
information, but the results can vary significantly based upon the keyword used.  
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Kerr [2006] identified that an analyst will require a significantly longer time to 
analyse a computer than the user would have taken to carry out the actions 
under investigation. This means that with the increasing size of storage media 
significant resources are required to carry out a thorough examination. 
However, increasing the number of analysts used during investigations is 
unlikely to be effective. Improving the methodology currently being employed by 
standardising analysis techniques will enable the use of available resources to 
be maximised. The use of resources could be maximised if analysis techniques 
were standardised by developing techniques which make the most efficient use 
of computer and personnel time; however it could be argued that each 
individual forensic team is likely to develop approaches which maximise their 
personal set of resources. The development of analysis techniques is also likely 
to improve the results of analysis by ensuring a methodical approach is adopted 
instead of each analyst analysing a machine in their own way.   
 
NTFS file compression may provide problems for analysts as not all tools 
employed can retrieve information stored in this way [Sanderson, 2006]. A file 
compressed in this way can be composed of both compressed and 
uncompressed sections, making it difficult to interpret when the Master File 
Table (MFT) is not available. Generally documents like those produced in Word 
are highly likely to be compressed whereas JPEGs are unlikely to be 
compressed in this method, due to the high rate of compression already 
employed in that format. Interestingly if a document is compressed using NTFS 
compression when it is deleted, then it will remain in this state after deletion 
[Sanderson, 2006]; this suggests such compression techniques must be taken 
into consideration when carving files, especially when no MFT information is 
available.   
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For this research it is necessary to understand the structure in which the 
thumbnail cache is being stored and how this can be affected; this ensures the 
evidence extracted is put into the appropriate context. Since a thumbnail cache 
contains at least a single file, it will need to be stored on a storage medium to 
be used; therefore understanding the structure used on storage media will 
assist in retrieving information from the cache. 
 
2.3.2 Metadata 
Metadata is commonly defined as data about data; it is information which is 
used to understand the original data and assist with the systems function 
[NISO, 2001]. Metadata can be resident within files or found in related files such 
as caches, it can also be found in components of the operating system. Ruhnka 
[2008] suggested that metadata can be important in judicial proceedings as it 
can establish information about files; for example the creation time and author. 
This information is useful for establishing where a file originated and how it 
came to be at its present location. Metadata can form an integral part of a file, in 
such cases it maintains its relationship with the document at each new location, 
both on the machine and external media. Removing the metadata resident in a 
file, can often prove difficult and requires specialist tools [Castiglione, 2007]. 
 
When an analyst is working on a case they only have the system from which to 
complete their analysis [Buchholz, 2004]. This makes metadata a useful source 
of information as it can provide information such as times and dates in relation 
to the files. Creating a timeline of activity can provide an added dimension to the 
evidence. Buchholz defines the forensic value of a system as “the possibility to 
draw conclusions about events on the system from the data”. This definition 
focuses on the need to have reliable information. Current operating and file 
systems were not designed with forensic practitioners in mind, and are therefore 
focused on the needs of the user; this can make the retrieval of information 
which satisfies evidential requirements difficult. An analyst is often trying to 
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answer questions such as who, what, when, where, why and how. However 
these cannot all be answered using the information available from the digital 
devices; whilst approximations can be made with experience, the lack of 
certainty can significantly impact upon the value of the evidence. 
 
The average user is only aware of the obvious information displayed by a 
computer, and may have no idea that metadata is stored [Byers, 2004]. 
Documents such as Microsoft Word have been known to store a variety of 
metadata including information from previous versions of a document. This 
information is retrievable and can provide an insight into the time line of a 
document. The Internet provides a vast amount of information and access to 
resources; these include tools which assist the user in uncovering hidden 
information in files [Kwon, 2008]. The retrieval of hidden data can assist an 
analyst in identifying where documents were created and their development, 
these can be useful evidential artefacts. 
 
If a user is engaging in criminal activity they are likely to attempt to hide their 
activities, and also to hide the fact there is hidden data present on the system 
[Park, 2009]. If a user hid information but did not adequately cover their tracks 
then an analyst may find evidence that hidden information was present and 
search specifically for it. In some formats such as Microsoft Office 2007 files, 
parts of the file which are not in a structure recognised by the software are 
ignored when processing it; this means a user could potentially hide information 
in a file without affecting the functionality of it. This unknown data moves with 
the file, and could be discreetly transmitted.  An analyst could identify data 
hidden using this method by validating the structure and syntax of the file.  
 
Modification, access and creation (MAC) times of a file can give the analyst an 
insight into how the files arrived in their current location. Seven rules have been 
created based on these times which aid the analyst in their analysis [Chow, 
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2007], which assist in building event timelines as they elaborate on the 
relationships between MAC times. They can also elaborate on the user and 
system behaviour effects on the file’s state. Chow reviews the value of the 
thumbnail cache, in relation to these rules, for establishing information relating 
to the viewing of such files [Chow, 2007: Scenario 9]. This suggests that the 
thumbnail cache can be used to assist in building timelines of activity on a 
machine. MAC times are sensitive to manipulation [Waghorn, 2003] and require 
careful consideration by analysts to ensure they maintain their validity, not just 
because of accidental clicking on a file, but ensuring there are no traces of 
programs specifically designed to alter MAC times, and that the BIOS time is 
set as expected.   
 
2.3.3 Event Reconstruction 
Digital investigations use the same five key phases as those used in traditional 
physical investigations; preservation, surveying, documenting, searching, 
reconstruction [Carrier, 2005]. Reconstruction in digital investigations involves 
analysing the information recovered from a system and constructing events 
from it; the events can be ordered to show how the information recovered came 
to exist in its present state. An event can be defined as an incident that changes 
the state of one or more objects; in a digital investigation, an event can be 
thought of as an action that changes one or more of the bits in which the 
information is stored.  
 
In a case, event reconstruction can assist in proving or disproving guilt by 
establishing the order in which events occurred. Once events have been 
reconstructed, characteristics can be used to determine whether the actions 
were committed with intent [Carney, 2004]. For example, analysing times can 
give an indication of whether an action was the result of a piece of software or 
the user, since the user will have slower reaction times than the machine; there 
would need to be larger gaps between events than a machine would require.  
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However whilst this technique currently assists analysts it is possible that 
criminals may use such knowledge; when creating their software they may 
make the times involved in the events further apart to simulate human 
interaction. The thumbnail cache also shows user involvement as most caches 
of this type only add information when it is viewed by the user. Whilst the times 
stored within the thumbnail cache vary in meaning they can be a useful source 
of information for event reconstruction, providing information on when a file was 
created or in some caches when the entry was added.  
 
To reconstruct a set of events to form an accurate timeline, an analyst needs to 
establish the time interval in which each event may have occurred. Time is a 
construct which is said to have been established to assist the functioning of 
society [Duren, 2002]; in forensic computing this construct allows an analyst to 
define when events happen, to create an order in which events were completed. 
To enable a global definition of time it is necessary to establish a ‘trusted’ time 
to which events can be related, this is known as UTC time. Such a system is 
particularly useful in establishing the order of events in forensic computing; it is 
possible an event relevant to a case could have occurred anywhere in the 
world. Therefore it may be necessary to link activities between two or more time 
zones. Since it is difficult to measure time exactly, an event is often modelled as 
an instantaneous action in event reconstruction models [Gladyshev, 2004]. An 
analyst needs to understand how time is modelled to ensure he understands 
the relationship between the time shown and its meaning.  
 
Whilst timestamps are generally recognised as showing periods when the user 
has been active, they can also assist in identifying periods of inactivity [Stone-
Kaplan, 2003]. Inactivity can be important in establishing the behaviour of the 
user who created the evidence and also in linking evidence to a particular user, 
for example the inactivity may correlate to when a user’s family were at home 
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and therefore he did not have private access to a machine.  During event 
reconstruction an analyst attempts to minimise the time period during which an 
event may have occurred [Gladyshev, 2005]; minimising the time allows a 
series of events to be grouped together to assist with establishing what caused 
each change to the system and when the change occurred. It is not always 
possible to establish the time an event occurred; forming relationships between 
events can determine the time period they occurred in. Relationships show the 
cause and effect of each event occurring therefore knowing the times of some 
events in the chain allows an analyst to propagate this information through the 
chain of events he has established and update the possible times other events 
could have occurred. 
 
Information on the time zone can be found in the registry [Boyd, 2004]; should a 
user change the time zone multiple times it can be difficult to standardise the 
times found on a machine [Weil, 2002]. This could provide an element of 
uncertainty in the event reconstruction of the evidence; in such cases it would 
be necessary for an analyst to minimise the possible time frame in which the 
changes to the system were made by the user. This would assist in 
standardising the times for the remaining events.  
 
When Windows displays times for files the adjustments it makes are inaccurate. 
For example, when displaying times in the summer, times for files altered in the 
winter are inaccurate; this is due to daylight saving time differences [Stone-
Kaplan, 2003]. An analyst must therefore calculate the times independently to 
ensure they are accurate. Dynamic date and time stamp analysis uses 
information that is independent of the standard MAC times to correlate the 
actual times [Weil, 2002]; such correlation is the equivalent of an analyst using 
multiple tools to check his findings and provides additional accuracy to the 
evidence being presented. A check list for time and date evidence has been 
created [Boyd, 2004], which aims to ensure such information is dealt with 
consistently by analysts to ensure the reliability of the evidence is maintained.  
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Event reconstruction can be modelled using finite state machines [Gladyshev, 
2005]. However in order to construct each model it is necessary to spend a 
significant amount of time analysing the information to produce the states and 
identify the relationships; it is also time consuming to evaluate files in this way. 
However it is useful for identifying the order of events and can provide 
assistance in identifying impossible sequences of events, therefore it is 
necessary for an analyst to assess the potential reward from using such a 
system against the high use of resources.  
 
Neural networks have also been used for event reconstruction [Khan, 2007]; 
with a recurrent neural network achieving the highest accuracy of those tested. 
However accuracy overall improved when the complexity of the data set was 
increased; providing a more realistic model of the file types likely to be 
encountered during an analysis. If the neural network is not presented with 
realistic data, such as a cross section of files it is likely to encounter when used 
on a suspects hard drive, then its ability to function on an actual hard drive may 
not be as high as its ability during testing.  
 
Zeitline is an event reconstruction method, which stores events in chronological 
order to make it easier to identify patterns and group events together to create 
larger more complex events. The ability of this package to model complicated 
events makes it very useful to an analyst however it relies heavily on user 
interaction and may therefore require too many resources for some 
investigations. 
 
2.3.4 Corrupting data 
Corruption can be the result of deliberate manipulation of data by software, 
such as the deletion of files, or the result of a virus; however the reliability of 
 
 
Page 31 
 
  
data may be affected by the behaviour of the user [Casey, 2006].  Not every 
user is reliable in their actions; they may not act as expected, for example a 
user may use a log on name other than their own to provide the appearance of 
another user committing a set of tasks. Since the user is often an unknown and 
unseen factor in the equation it can often add several degrees of separation 
between the analyst and the real results of an analysis.  An analyst needs to 
learn to account for the uncertainty the user brings to an analysis and qualify 
the results accordingly. However Casey [2006] has shown the negligibility of the 
user’s actions; as it is possible for an analyst to analyse the available evidence 
and present the available information regardless of the user’s behaviour. 
 
Whilst data may be corrupted through purposeful actions, a degree of 
accidental destruction of the data is often unavoidable; for example, employees 
who are inadequately trained may input inaccurate information or delete the 
wrong files [Ozdemir, 2002]. Such accidental destruction can be a significant 
problem for organisations, and therefore employees may not voluntarily report 
such behaviour, causing further reliability problems for the data and the 
organisation. Possible ways of managing this are discussed by Ozdemir [2002], 
however human error will always play a role in the corruption of data; any 
system for mitigation is unlikely to completely remove the problem. Since the 
user has no active involvement with the thumbnail cache, except for altering the 
original file, user error is an unlikely cause of corruption of the data. However 
the individuals who create software which reads and writes to the thumbnail 
cache may cause the corruption of data within the cache, for example, by not 
providing the information required by the cache in the correct format.  
 
Hard drive failures can be caused by both physical and operational errors. 
When a physical sector is defined as faulty it is not possible to read and write to 
it without specialist equipment; the computer can generally identify failures and 
keep a record [Elerath, 2007]. Operation failures are generally not fixed which 
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makes them difficult to identify, and can affect the reliability of information being 
read or written to the storage media, making it corrupt.  
 
Both users and IT professionals are often unaware of the information being 
stored on a hard disk. Joukov [2006], discusses common misconceptions; for 
example, most users believe simply deleting a file removes it, when in fact the 
file is still retrievable. Explaining misconceptions to uses improves their 
understanding and may directly influence the precautions they take to secure 
their data. Secure overwrite systems are often used to ensure files are deleted 
adequately; fortunately for forensic analysts, these systems generally neglect 
metadata that is not stored with the file.  
 
When deleting files, temporary files are often overlooked; these files may 
contain as much sensitive information as the files the user is deleting 
[Zetterstrom, 2002]. It is suggested that to ensure sensitive information is not 
recoverable the best options are to sand the disks in the hard drive or put it in 
acid, whilst these may seem drastic it is likely they would completely destroy the 
original file system [NIST, 2013]. Various tools are available to corrupt 
information, and although they may not be as comprehensive they would 
remove a significant portion of the information.  
 
2.4 Thumbnails and the Thumbnail Cache 
A Visual thumbnail can be defined as a small graphical representation of a 
larger object [Microsoft, 2002]; a thumbnail cache is generally considered to be 
a collection of these images stored with associated metadata. The primary 
purpose of the thumbnail cache is to prevent the rendering of a new version of a 
thumbnail unless the source object has altered. This section discusses the 
applications of visual thumbnails within computing and the benefits of using a 
cache to store the images.  This is followed by an overview of the way the 
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thumbnail cache is implemented in five well known operating systems and a 
discussion on the forensic significance of thumbnails and the thumbnail cache.   
 
2.4.1 Visual thumbnails and their applications in computing 
Thumbnails are generally used to allow a user to browse and make a visual 
selection of an object, when a thumbnail is selected it can provide the user with 
the full sized version. This section discusses how the operating system, web 
and software use visual thumbnails to improve their usability. 
 
Operating systems use thumbnails when displaying directory contents, to assist 
the user in identifying and browsing their files. Individual files can be shown as 
visual thumbnails; this provides a graphical interpretation of at least part of the 
source files content. In earlier systems thumbnails were usually of graphical file 
formats. A large variety of software such as Microsoft Office Documents, and 
Adobe Portable Document Format now support the creation of thumbnails by 
allowing the first page of documents to be seen. Despite the increased support 
for the creation of thumbnails the implementation of thumbnail caches is not 
consistent across operating systems or software applications; this discussed 
further in the next section. 
 
Search engines like Google [Google, 2013] use visual thumbnails to assist 
users in locating relevant information, for example when they are searching for 
images. Thumbnails allow for a larger number of images to be shown on the 
screen, which makes browsing for relevant content easier. Dziadosz [2002] 
showed that displaying text and a visual thumbnail assists users in making 
decisions about the relevance of web sites to their objective. This may reflect 
the increase in information available to the user when they are making their 
decision; the user has two different sources of information which may provide a 
more detailed overview of the website. The research also established that users 
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make less conservative judgements about the relevance of websites when 
presented with a visual thumbnail. The visual thumbnail provides the user with 
an opportunity to assess the layout of a webpage and identify characteristics 
which may show whether it is suitable such as colour and graphics. 
Photographic software such as Photoshop and iPhoto contain thumbnail caches 
which assist in the viewing of large quantities of images.  These caches are built 
to provide quick access and minimise the use of system resources 
 
2.4.2 Operating system Thumbnail Caches 
In Windows XP, thumbnail caches are located in every directory which has 
been viewed using the thumbnail display option in Windows explorer (providing 
the option to cache thumbnails has not been manually turned off by the user). 
Each thumbnail cache consists of a single binary file called ‘thumbs.db’, which 
uses the OLE2 container format [Roukine, 2012]. Each thumbnail cache stores 
information on the files within that directory, and may continue to store the 
information after the files have been deleted. A variety of files types may have 
associated visual thumbnails stored in the thumbnail cache, such as Microsoft 
Office Documents, these show the first page or slide of these documents. The 
thumbnails are stored within record entries in the catalog stream of the OLE2 
container; the records are stored in a red-black binary tree structure, which 
allows fast access to each thumbnail when the operating system requires it.  
 
The maximum size of a single visual thumbnail stored within the thumbs.db 
cache is 256 x 256 pixels; the size is not large enough to read individual lines of 
text but it can allow a match to be made with the layout of the original 
document.  The thumbnail cache also contains various metadata such as file 
name, path and modification time; the metadata can assist in showing a 
relationship between the creating file and the thumbnail. The OLE2 structure is 
also used with the Microsoft Office Suite (versions 6-12). From Office 
2007saving in the binary structure was an option, an XML structure was also 
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available for office documents; therefore users may still create files using the 
original OLE2 structure. It is likely that any identification of thumbs.db fragments 
will have similarities with those from office documents making them a likely 
source of false positives, however it may be possible to generalise the methods 
used for identification to include these structures. 
 
Vista introduced a new thumbnail cache format, which centralised the holding of 
thumbnails for each user. This centralised cache consists of six files; each 
object has a record in the index file which has references for up to four different 
sized thumbnails of the object, each stored in a file for their size range, the 
purpose of the sixth file is not yet known. The four image files hold thumbnails 
which are up to 32 x 32, 96 x 96, 256 x 256 and 1024 x 1024 pixels in size. The 
introduction of larger thumbnails provides the opportunity for a more detailed 
image, which can show readable text, enhancing their forensic value. To show a 
relationship between the original object and an entry in the thumbnail cache it is 
necessary to establish the path where the object resided when the entry was 
created or modified. The path information is not stored in the cache itself, but 
the windows.edb file [Douglas, 2009], whilst the remainder of the metadata is 
located in the cache. Windows 7 uses the same centralised six file thumbnail 
cache format as Windows Vista, but as yet it is unclear if the structure, its 
interaction with the rest of the operating system, and the resulting forensic 
artefacts, will be the same.  
 
Ubuntu 10.10 uses Nautilus for file management, thumbnails are stored as 
images in a centralised folder, and thumbnails can be stored for a variety of 
image formats and PDF files [Ubuntu, 2010]. Open Office [2012] created a 
script which allows thumbnails for open office documents to be created and 
stored, increasing the variety of images found in the thumbnail cache. A unique 
feature of Nautilus’ thumbnail implementation is the creation of audio 
thumbnails; putting your mouse on an audio file will result in the file playing, 
allowing the user to browse in a similar way to image formats. Further 
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investigation is necessary to establish whether the audio thumbnails leave any 
forensic artefacts on the system. With Nautilus implementing a separate folder 
to store thumbnails in standard image formats, carving for visual thumbnails in 
slack space is a standard image carving problem, with the carving and 
reassembly of any metadata or audio thumbnail fragments being a separate 
problem. 
 
OS X can display files in a thumbnail view, however this is not on by default, 
and little documentation exists about how it is implemented. When the user 
selects to view thumbnail size images, they can choose the size of the image, 
therefore the forensic value of these images will vary depending on the size 
selection.  
 
2.4.3  Forensic significance 
Whilst the function of a thumbnail cache has been defined, the interpretation of 
the structure varies considerably between implementations. This means that 
each thumbnail cache structure will have a different forensic value and the data 
stored within it may not represent the same series of events. The images stored 
within the thumbnail cache are forensically useful in the analysis of a wide 
variety of crimes, as each image can represent a wide variety of file types and 
information. 
 
 For cases involving illicit images it can be necessary to show the authenticity of 
an image [Kornblum, 2008]; to establish whether it is a genuine unaltered 
photograph. If an image has been altered, and the quality of that section is 
lower than the remainder of the photograph it is possible to identify significant 
differences in the wavelet statistics [Lyu, 2005]. Given the quality of editing 
software currently available, the difference in quality of manipulated areas of 
photographs may not be significant enough to use this methodology in the 
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future. It is possible to establish the creation method of an image based on the 
noise and colour interpolation coefficients within it [McKay, 2008]; in the 
thumbnail cache this could provide validation that a thumbnail was created 
using the appropriate method for that cache and has not been manipulated or 
planted. 
 
In Windows XP, the thumbnail cache files are only created when a user views a 
directory in windows explorer and views the files in filmstrip or thumbnail mode 
[Hurlbut, 2005]. Therefore the existence of a Thumbs.db file suggests that the 
file was present in a directory which at some point was viewed in thumbnail 
mode. Mercuri [2010] described a situation where the Thumbs.db could have 
originated in a directory on a different machine which at an earlier point in time 
contained images which were added to the Thumbs.db file. The directory if 
copied to another computer would potentially copy across the Thumbs.db file 
which would still contain records relating to the images. The images in question 
were not on the current computer and the user may have no knowledge of their 
original existence. Mercuri’s example is taken from her defence work on the 
case of Vosburgh [Mercuri, 2010], and highlights the importance of establishing 
the context for the images contained within the thumbnail cache. 
 
Further research is required to establish the situations where other operating 
systems cache images and to find out if there is a relationship between viewing 
a file and its addition to the cache. Where thumbnail caches are created in the 
relevant directory they may be found on external or networked media; this can 
be used as supporting evidence that the media was used in collaboration with 
the machine and viewed by a user. Where the thumbnail cache is centralised, 
the existence of entries for external or networked media can also assist the 
analyst, particularly in cases where the media itself is damaged or cannot be 
located as it would provide information on the contents of the media and show it 
had at some time been connected to that machine.  
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Thumbnail caches contain metadata, such as the original files modification time, 
location and name [Hurlbut, 2005]. This information is useful to corroborate 
other metadata sources related to the file; this is particularly useful when only 
fragments of the original file are available. The metadata and associated visual 
thumbnail are not always removed from the cache when the original file is 
deleted or moved. This can provide the analyst with information about the event 
timeline for a file and can also be useful when producing evidence from deleted 
files. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed research related to this thesis; this began with an 
overview of the field of Forensic Computing. The methodologies and tools used 
in this field were examined along with current opportunities for research. It was 
identified that artefacts in new operating systems such as the changes to the 
thumbnail cache were of interest to analysts and therefore understanding their 
structure and behaviour is an area for current research.  
 
It was also noted that anti forensic techniques may be employed to remove 
sources of potential information, therefore an area of current research would be 
to identify and analyse any potentially useful fragments remaining on the 
storage media. This Chapter examined data and information, focusing on how 
information is stored and the forensic implications of metadata. It is important to 
understand both the structure of the thumbnail cache and the storage media to 
ensure an artefact is analysed in its original context.  
 
Finally operating system thumbnail caches were discussed, it was highlighted 
that whilst the general purpose of a thumbnail cache is defined each operating 
system implements the construct in its own way. As well as the difference in 
 
 
Page 39 
 
  
structure and syntax the user and system behaviour which leads to artefacts 
being present in the thumbnail cache differs significantly between 
implementations.  
 
The next Chapter discusses the problem definition for this research and 
proposes a methodology for its completion. 
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3 Research Objectives, Considerations and Tools 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This research aims to evaluate the evidential value of thumbnail cache file 
fragments identified in unallocated space; in order to achieve this aim the 
research must be broken down into smaller research tasks. This Chapter 
defines the objectives for this research and discusses the potential 
considerations and tools to be used in the completion of this research.  
 
3.2 Objectives 
The following objectives for this research are based on the related reading 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the problem definition described in Chapter 1: 
 
 Define the term evidential value 
The term evidential value is used in the hypothesis as a method of 
assessing the artefacts recovered from both live and fragments of 
thumbnail cache files. In order perform this assessment it is first 
necessary to establish the definition of the term evidential value; a set of 
criteria which can be used for the assessment of this term on the 
artefacts would also be required. 
 
 Identify the structure and behaviour of an operating system 
thumbnail cache 
Whilst the identification of an artefact may provide a piece of information, 
it is the user or system behaviour which caused the artefact to be in its 
current state which provides the context. The ability to show both sets of 
information provides insight into the meaning of the artefact and also can 
assist an analyst in establishing the events that occurred and their 
meaning. 
 
 
Page 42 
 
  
 
 Identify existing file carving techniques 
File carving as described in Chapter 7 is the process of extracting a set 
of data which meet specific criteria from unallocated space. In order to 
recover thumbnail cache file fragments it will be necessary to implement 
a file carver; identifying existing techniques will provide a starting point 
for the recovery of thumbnail cache files. 
 
 Evaluate the results of existing file carving techniques on 
identifying and reassembling thumbnail cache file fragments 
If a single file carving method was used to retrieve thumbnail cache file 
fragments and the results were used to establish the evidential value, the 
method may impact the results. By implementing a variety of existing 
techniques the results can be compared in order to maximise the 
recovery of file fragments. 
 
 Develop an approach to improve the ability to identify and 
reassemble thumbnail cache file fragments in unallocated space 
In addition to comparing the results of existing methods any resulting 
research gaps will be explored by attempting to improve the accuracy of 
file carving the fragments should it be necessary. 
 
 Extract and reassemble thumbnail cache file fragments using the 
developed method 
The research hypothesis focuses on file fragments, the file fragments 
require identification which will result in classification. Attempting to 
reassemble the various fragments into their original files will assist in 
providing context to individual artefacts. 
 
 Evaluate evidential value of thumbnail cache file fragments 
identified in unallocated space 
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The file fragments identified and reassembled during this research will 
require assessment by the criteria established to assess their evidential 
value in order to identify the validity of the hypothesis. 
 
 Compare and Contrast the evidential value of the complete 
thumbnail cache with thumbnail cache file fragments 
In order to assess whether file fragments contain artefacts not found in 
live thumbnail caches it is necessary to compare and contrast the results 
of assessing their individual evidential value. 
 
3.3 Potential Considerations 
During an investigation there are various evidential constraints that impact the 
way in which an investigation is conducted and the handling of evidence. The 
majority of these constraints are concerned with ensuring each artefact is 
admissible in court and the evidential value is maintained. Some constraints are 
organisation specific and as such are mainly beyond the scope of this research; 
relevant constraints to this research and their impact on evidential value are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Any methodology created during this research needs to provide adequate 
logging features to enable an analyst to verify the results produced. 
Methodologies created during this research must take into consideration the 
need to have results which can be repeated; therefore each method should take 
into account how an analysis may be performed by hand to retrieve the same 
information. The logging system would need to provide enough information to 
make the results repeatable; the information needs to be displayed in a clear 
and understandable format.  
 
Finally a substantial constraint on this research is time and resources; therefore 
consideration should be made into the number of variables to be examined 
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throughout this research. Within this research it has been decided that the focus 
will be on artefacts most likely to assist in an investigation; the methodologies 
created can then be generalised to other less frequently observed artefacts.  
 
3.4 Tools 
Throughout this research the most commonly used tool will be a virtual 
machine, specifically VMWare Workstation version 7 [2011]; the virtual 
machines will originally be created as part of the structural and behavioural 
studies and will then be used as file fragments for the identification and 
reassembly research. The use of a virtual machine will enable a clean baseline 
of each operating system to be created which can be specifically manipulated 
for each individual experiment. The results of each experiment can then be 
compared with the original baseline virtual machine to identify the differences. 
The use of flat virtual hard disks means the hard disk was equivalent to a 
standard uncompressed hard drive image and can therefore be examined using 
tools and methodologies that would be used during a typical analysis.  
 
Procmon [Microsoft, 2012b] will be used during the experiments in Windows 
systems to log the processes being called; the logs will be stored in CSV format 
and the results will be examined in Procmon and Excel to identify potentially 
interesting processes. Procmon results may provide significant insight into the 
processes being called when thumbnails were being created and displayed. 
 
A hexadecimal editor called Winhex [Fleishmamn, 2008] will be the primary tool 
used in the examination of the virtual hard disks; the Winhex software allows 
the file system of the disks to be viewed, which will assist in locating and 
reading artefacts in the live file set.  Functionality, such as templates and basic 
scripting, will be used to assist in ascertaining the structure of the thumbnail 
cache and related files; once the templates are created they will be applied to 
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each experiment to identify structural changes to each file.  The inbuilt data 
interpreter allows data to be analysed by selecting a set of bytes and looking 
through the various values calculated for different data types.  
 
Standard analysis tools such as FTK [Access Data, 2012], Autopsy [Carrier, 
2011], and Encase [Guidance Software, 2011] will also be used to examine 
hard disks to assist with establishing relationships between the thumbnail cache 
and other system artefacts. The tools will also be used to identify the 
information displayed about the thumbnail cache and compare it to the actual 
behaviour replicated during the experiments. 
 
This research also requires the storage of significant amounts of test data to 
enable training and testing of file fragment identification and reassembly 
methods. Each virtual hard disk created during the experimentation phase in 
Chapters 5 and 6 will be stored on two 2TB hard drives which will become the 
corpus data for this study. On the corpus drive the data will be stored in its 
original hard drive form as well as in separate fragments which will be classified 
by type; each fragment will contain metadata as a header which will store data 
about the hard drive the fragment came from and its original relative position on 
the drive. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the objectives for this research; the thumbnail cache 
has been shown to be a source of potential evidence. The increased user 
awareness in hiding their behaviour makes it more likely that files containing 
potential evidence are located in unallocated space. In conducting this research 
it is necessary to be aware of potential evidential constraints which may impact 
on a potential digital analysis. It is also necessary to ensure any methodology 
created has adequate logging of its behaviour to enable an analyst to 
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corroborate the results. Time constraints will impact upon this research; 
therefore this research will focus primarily on three operating system thumbnail 
caches. Finally this chapter provided a breakdown of the tools which will be 
used during this research. The next chapter focuses on the first objective of this 
research, defining the term evidential value. 
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4  Defining Evidential Value 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This research aims to identify the evidential value of thumbnail cache file 
fragments identified in unallocated space; in order to evaluate the evidential 
value it is first necessary to define this term and construct a set of criteria by 
which thumbnail cache artefacts can be evaluated. This chapter examines the 
constraints on evidence which may affect the construction of criteria; this is 
followed by the creation of a set of criteria which will be used to evaluate the 
results of this research. 
 
4.2 Evidential Constraints 
In an ideal world, an analyst would be able to establish the exact series of 
events that occurred on a computer from the first time it was switched on. Every 
deleted file would be recoverable and all the necessary evidence to prove or 
disprove a series of actions had been committed would be retrievable. However 
there are unavoidable constraints which may impact the evidence presented in 
court. 
 
This section looks at a cross section of the constraints which impact forensic 
investigations, and summarises their potential impact on this research. It begins 
with a discussion on admissibility and legal constraints, this leads into sections 
on evidence, reliability and procedures. The constraints identified in this section 
are then used to create a set of criteria for establishing the evidential value of 
thumbnail cache artefacts in the following section. 
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4.2.1 Legal Constraints 
The law can be defined as “the rules of a legal system”[Griffiths, 1979]; since 
society adapts alongside the development of law it is suggested they may have 
a symbiotic relationship. For a forensic analyst the legal framework ensures 
evidence is handled in a fair and appropriate manner. The legal framework also 
allows an analyst to understand what constitutes the evidence required for 
conviction. 
 
To be guilty of an offence it is generally necessary to prove that a physical act 
was committed (actus reus), and that there was a guilty mind (mens rea) [Reed, 
2005]. A guilty mind is generally defined as acting with intent; therefore an 
analyst is not simply looking for the evidence of the crime, such as abusive 
images of children, but is trying to establish whether they were intentionally put 
on the system or are present without the users consent. This highlights the 
requirement for an analyst to show the system behaviour which led to an 
artefact being in its current state as well as the artefact which demonstrates an 
act occurred. 
 
When a user is completing an activity, they will use any technique they feel is 
appropriate to fulfil their objectives. A forensic analyst must follow appropriate 
methodologies when looking for evidence of a user’s actions; this ensures any 
findings can be used as evidence. There are numerous resources on legislation 
regarding acquiring computer based evidence that document what evidence 
can be collected and appropriate methods for obtaining it [Thomas, 2004]; 
Forensic Computing methodologies are discussed in Chapter 2. Whilst such 
legislation constrains the actions of those investigating a case, it also ensures 
that the evidence being examined after acquisition has not been altered and is 
likely to be admissible in Court; the methodologies assist in preventing breaks in 
the chain of evidence that may prejudice the outcome of a case. 
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In Jurisprudence, admissibility is the term used to describe evidence which is 
allowed to be presented in court. For a piece of evidence to be considered for 
admission in court it must be shown to be reliable and relevant to the case 
[Kenneally, 2004]. The definition of relevance was restated in R v Nethercott 
[2001]: 
 
“any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other according to the 
common course of events one either taken by itself or in conjunction with other 
facts proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-
existence of the other” 
 
In order to show digital evidence is relevant it needs to have probative value; 
evidence needs to provide information which supports or refutes the case’s 
hypothesis. The ability to refute or accept a hypothesis in a case may rely on a 
combination of related artefacts which when considered together show an 
action or series of events which impacts on the likelihood of the hypothesis. In a 
criminal case it is generally the Judge who is responsible for determining 
whether evidence meets the criteria for relevance and is admissible [Ramjohn, 
2009]. Whilst most evidence which can be shown to meet the definition for 
relevance is considered admissible there are situations where relevant evidence 
is excluded; these are known as exclusionary rules. The weight given to each 
piece of evidence is generally determined by the Jury when considering its 
importance in relation to the rest of the information in the case [Taylor, 2012] 
 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) [1984] section 69 states the 
situations where evidence found from a computer would be deemed 
inadmissible in court; these are exclusionary rules of evidence. It states it is 
necessary to confirm the accuracy of the relationship between the original 
evidence and that documented in an analyst’s case report. This is reflected in 
the ACPO guidelines [2010] which state it is necessary to minimise alterations 
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to the evidence and to ensure any action taken to retrieve evidence can be 
justified. To ensure compliance with the act, any technique used to retrieve the 
evidence must therefore be justifiable and its full effect on the system 
understood. The ACPO guidelines [2010] are one of the most important 
guidelines to ensure the admissibility of Forensic Computing evidence in the 
UK; these guidelines cover procedures to assist in ensuring admissibility and 
are discussed in depth in the procedural constraints section of this chapter.  
 
4.2.2 Evidential Constraints 
During an investigation an analyst analyses the evidence to produce a report; 
the report details any information found that may be relevant to proving or 
disproving the investigation’s hypothesis. In Forensic Computing evidence 
consists of both physical media and the digital information stored on it. 
 
The structure and format of storage media varies between manufacturers, this 
affects the methodology used; each device type will need handling in a specific 
way to ensure the most thorough examination is completed [Meyers, 2004]. If 
incorrectly identified or handled, data may be lost, and in the worst case the 
media may become unrecoverable. 
 
Disk corruption may be physical or digital [Casey, 2008], with each requiring the 
use of suitable methodologies and equipment. It is necessary for the analyst to: 
identify the condition of the media, take appropriate action to ensure the data is 
not altered unnecessarily, and ensure the maximum amount of available data is 
recovered with the available resources. Recovering the data does not 
guarantee it will be interpretable; for example it may be possible to recover a 
sector of data, but may not be possible to identify the information it represents.  
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It has been suggested that to fully understand the behaviour of any part of the 
operating system a thorough analysis of the source code would be required, 
and that this is currently impossible [Pan, 2007].This has led to a requirement 
for analysts to perform their own experiments in order to understand an artefact 
and the system behaviour it represents. As well as being aware of the 
structures used in the storage of information on digital media, it is necessary for 
digital analysts to understand the software or method they are using to recover 
and analyse the data [Ball, 2007]. Software used by analysts must maintain the 
validity of the data by ensuring the results maintain a relationship with the 
original data; therefore the information analysed is an accurate representation 
of the state of the information stored on the hardware at the time of acquisition. 
 
4.2.3 Reliability Constraints 
Reliability can be measured in terms of the consistency of the results produced. 
In the case of digital evidence, consistency can be shown to be the ability to 
repeat a methodology with the original evidence and obtain the same results. 
Whilst this is generally possible with a dead machine, live forensics 
methodologies are not usually repeatable as the original evidence is altered in 
the process of performing the acquisition [Hargreaves, 2009]. 
 
In order for evidence to be considered reliable there is a requirement to show a 
justifiable relationship between the original evidence and the information being 
presented in Court. This relationship would need to be based on: the scientific 
analysis of the evidence, the extraction of information, and the analysts 
performing the actions; the reliability of the evidence could be compromised by 
any of these components [White, 2010]. Evidence reliability is not limited to the 
process of handling evidence, but also to the way in which evidence was 
generated. 
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To ensure the evidence is accurate and reliable an analyst must only give 
evidence based on the originally acquired material [Ramjohn, 2009]. Any 
evidence submitted to the court must have a scientific basis, with appropriate 
justification for the methodology employed to recover it. A process can be 
considered to follow the scientific method when a hypothesis is formed based 
on the problem to be solved and tested through a process of data observation 
and experimentation [OED, 2011]. 
 
Evidence retrieved from digital media may be presumed to be inaccurate if the 
original media is altered, and this can cause legal problems [Casey, 2007]. Any 
tool an analyst has used to extract information which they produce as potential 
evidence must therefore be reliable. It is therefore good practice to validate any 
findings using multiple tools [ACPO, 2010]. This helps to ensure the reliability of 
any evidence retrieved by ensuring the same results are produced by multiple 
tools designed for the same purpose. Checking the results with a second tool or 
by hand reduces the probability of a mistake occurring during the analysis.  
 
A popular defence to computer crime is the Trojan Defence [Harley, 2010]; the 
Trojan defence suggests the computer is not working properly. The ability to 
form relationships between artefacts can assist in establishing whether the 
system was acting as expected and maximise the corroboration of the 
information [Sansurooah, 2006]. It is also necessary to establish the reliability of 
individual artefacts at the structural and contextual levels. By establishing the 
structure and syntax of an artefact it may be possible to determine information 
about the system activity which led to its creation [Morris, 2010]; relationships 
can then be formed with other system artefacts to corroborate the information 
obtained.  
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4.2.4 Procedural Constraints 
The procedures used by forensic analysts reflect the legal requirements for 
admissible evidence. Since evidence recovered may be required in legal 
proceedings, it is necessary to ensure the data are handled in a way which 
does not compromise its integrity. The primary procedural constraints adopted 
by most UK analysts are the four principles given in the ACPO guidelines 
[2010], which state 
 
“Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents 
should change data held on computer media which may subsequently be relied 
upon in court 
 
Principle 2: In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access the 
original data held on a computer or on storage media, that person must be 
competent to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and 
implications of their actions. 
 
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer-
based evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party 
should be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result 
 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation [the case officer] has 
overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered 
to” [ACPO, 2010: page 3] 
 
Whilst these guidelines are not legally binding, they constitute good practice as 
they provide a set of general principles aimed at maximising the admissibility of 
evidence. The need to show a relationship between the original media and the 
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evidence being extracted is crucial to showing the reliability of analysts findings, 
the ACPO guidelines provide the principles necessary to ensure the reliability is 
not compromised. 
 
Principle 1 highlights the importance of ensuring the original data has not been 
altered, as it allows the methodology used by the analyst to be tested by 
another analyst. By using an image of the original media and the same 
methodology it is possible to establish if the result is repeatable. 
 
Comparing the hashes of different sources is one way an analyst can show a 
relationship between information; another way is by creating an audit trail 
[ACPO, 2010]. Clearly documenting the steps taken to retrieve the evidence 
being used in court allows the analyst to show that any information produced in 
his report as evidence is accurate and reliable; this is reflected by principle 
three. Audit trails help ensure consistency in the approach taken as the act of 
documenting actions encourages the analyst to consider his behaviour to 
ensure it is justifiable.  
 
Following the ACPO good practice guide [2010] will ensure the reliability of 
evidence is maintained, particularly with regard to being competent and able to 
justify any action taken. The audit log suggested by the ACPO guidelines in 
principle 3 allows for results to be reproduced, which is an important scientific 
method for ensuring the reliability of any evidence found. Principle four 
stipulates who is ultimately responsible for ensuring the principles are adhered 
to. In a large case it may be difficult for a single individual to monitor every 
action being carried out, therefore it is necessary for each analyst to be 
responsible for their own actions and ensure they follow the principles.  
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To minimise the possibility of fraudulent evidence being admitted, authentication 
procedures are required to analyse the chain of evidence [Kenneally, 2004]. 
The analysis must account for any movement of the evidence, or interpretation 
of the data. This may be a physical change such as from the custody of an 
individual to another; or it may be a change in the interpretation of the data, for 
example locating and extracting deleted files. Justification for any action taken 
which alters the state of the original evidence needs to be provided to show an 
analyst understands how the evidence being presented in their report was 
obtained [National Center for Forensic Science, 2003]. The documentation of 
these actions shows clearly what has happened to the data and assists with 
establishing that any evidence produced is an accurate representation of the 
original data.  
 
To ensure the ACPO guidelines are complied with, it is necessary to understand 
the consequences of any action performed ensuring the relationship with the 
original data is maintained. It is also necessary to justify the behaviour of the 
software being used during examinations, to ensure that any changes made to 
the evidence do not affect its integrity [ACPO, 2010]. In the UK, the ACPO 
guidelines are a significant part of a good practice approach to investigating 
computer crime. However as computer crime is a global problem and may 
involve several legal jurisdictions in a single case it may also be necessary to 
consider what constraints affect procedures elsewhere in the world. The USA 
has produced a set of guidelines based upon their legal requirements [NIST, 
2004], which when compared to the UK’s guidelines highlight the common 
theme of ensuring the integrity of the evidence by producing a clear chain of 
evidence. 
 
4.2.5 Human Behavioural Constraints 
A forensic computing analyst examines digital media, from which they produce 
evidence related to the issue under investigation. Whilst it is not their job to 
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analyse human behaviour, it can still have an influence over the evidence found 
and presented in court. This influence can be divided into the actions of three 
groups; the defendant, the analysts and legal personnel. 
 
A wide variety of crimes can be committed which may involve computer based 
evidence [Bainbridge, 2007], it is therefore important to understand the crimes 
being investigated to ensure appropriate evidence is reported should it be 
found. 
 
Any action on a computer leaves a trace; the amount and location of that 
information varies, and the average user is not aware of how to find and remove 
such traces. As with any subject, there is a wide range of ability in computer 
use, Smith [2008] looks at seven of the common misconceptions in computing, 
of particular interest is the notion that files are deleted once placed in the 
recycle bin. 
 
The reason why a crime is committed is as individual as the person committing 
it; however the underlying motivations are generally similar [Dreyfus, 1998]. An 
in-depth discussion of criminal reasoning is beyond the scope of this research; 
however the varying ability of the defendant to manipulate technology in order 
to commit a crime is an important consideration. Having anti-forensic tools on a 
user’s system may hold significant weight in an investigation as it may show an 
intent to obfuscate information. 
 
The use of Anti-forensic techniques is increasing [Forte, 2006], these generally 
involve: zero foot printing, data obfuscation, and data hiding. Tools for anti-
forensic practices can be found on the internet along with instructions for their 
use; however the effectiveness of such tools varies greatly. Lio [2006] identified 
4 main goals of anti-forensics, of which the primary aim is to avoid prosecution 
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for their crimes; therefore anti-forensic tools aim to remove artefacts which 
relate to system activity. 
 
As well as the technical skills and procedures of analysts, consideration should 
be given to the support they are given. It has been documented that continual 
exposure to harmful material, such as images of child abuse, can cause 
significant stress and discomfort for forensic practitioners [ACPO, 2010].An 
individual repeatedly subjected to violent images may find themselves 
desensitised to their effect [Anderson, 1998], this can lead to a distortion of their 
morals; reducing their comprehension of the serious nature of the materials they 
are reviewing.  It has been recommended that analysts have access to 
appropriate psychological support, to ensure their mental wellbeing. Carnagey 
[2007] has shown that continued exposure to violence can cause 
desensitisation; therefore it is necessary to ensure analysts minimise exposure 
to harmful material to minimise desensitisation. Automating activities is one 
method of limiting exposure to potentially harmful material. 
 
Limited resources also make it desirable to automate tasks, such as fragment 
identification, than to have each fragment manually examined [Noblett, 2000]. A 
higher level of accuracy can result from automation, as the large amount of 
storage media would make it difficult for an analyst to identify all the available 
fragments for a particular file type. 
 
For this research this section has identified a key requirement of automating the 
methodology which will assist in minimising the use of resources. The use of 
anti-forensic tools also leads to a requirement to ensure artefacts recovered are 
from a system which was working properly. 
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4.3 Criteria for evaluating the evidential value of thumbnail 
cache artefacts 
This section identifies criteria for evaluating the evidential value of thumbnail 
cache artefacts. Evidence relating to the thumbnail cache can be initially broken 
into two kinds of evidence: evidence relating to the activity of the system, and 
evidence relating to the activity of a user. Both types of activity can assist in 
creating an event timeline of the overall actions of the system which allows 
artefacts to be put into context assisting the analyst to evaluate their hypothesis. 
The sub-sections below describe the criteria for evaluating the evidential value 
of thumbnail cache artefacts that were determined from the related research 
discussed earlier in this Chapter; the important points of each set of criteria are 
highlighted. 
 
4.3.1 Provenance of Artefacts 
Data provenance can be shown by ensuring the results can be replicated. Any 
method used throughout the analysis process should be justifiable and have 
understandable consequences that the analyst can explain. The process used 
should be a scientific method and requires clear documentation to provide other 
sources with the opportunity to replicate the experiments to corroborate the 
results. 
 
In more detail: 
 Results are considered replicable when they are documented sufficiently 
that another analyst could conduct the experiment again and achieve the 
same results. 
 An action is defined as justifiable if it can be shown how the results were 
obtained and the effects on the original data are understood. 
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 A process is defined as having understandable consequences when at 
each stage of the process the results and their relationship to the original 
data can be explained. 
 The process can be considered to follow the scientific method when a 
hypothesis is formed based on the problem to be solved and tested 
through a process of data observation and experimentation.  
 Clear documentation is defined as something which another analyst 
could read, understand and use to repeat the described processes. 
 A result can be corroborated when the documentation is clear enough to 
allow the process to be repeated and therefore the results can be 
verified. 
 
4.3.2 Interpretation of Results 
It is important to establish if the artefacts being analysed were created while the 
machine was working properly. If an artefact was created during the proper 
operation of the system it is simpler to establish the behaviour it represents. If 
the artefact was created outside of the system’ 
s proper operation then the anomalous behaviour the artefact represents may 
not be what the analyst expects. A single artefact on its own provides limited 
information about its meaning; by forming relationships between multiple 
artefacts it is possible to maximise corroboration of the information available to 
the analyst. In order to improve the likelihood of all relevant artefacts being 
recovered it is necessary to ensure that the maximum amount of data is 
retrieved therefore increasing the likelihood of retrieving artefacts with probative 
value. Due to the large amounts of data an analyst may encounter it may be 
necessary to use a documented automated methodology. 
 
In more detail: 
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 In order to determine an artefact was created while the machine was 
working properly it is necessary to determine the system behaviour which 
led to an artefacts current state. 
 In order to establish the behaviour an artefact represents it is necessary 
to form relationships with other artefacts to identify potential system 
activity. 
 A relationship between artefacts can be defined as an association 
between artefacts; the relationship may provide corroboration or 
supplementary information that enhances what is known about the 
system activity. 
 Maximising corroboration can be defined as verifying and providing 
additional information the artefact with other alternative sources of 
information. 
 The maximum amount of data retrieved is defined as the identification 
and reassembly of all thumbnail cache file fragments used during the 
research. 
 Automation is defined as a scientific process which has been 
implemented to minimise the interaction of an analyst. 
 
4.4 Process Criteria 
This chapter has identified criteria which can be used to evaluate the evidential 
value of thumbnail cache artefacts; some requirements emerging from the 
discussion of evidential value suggest constraints outside the scope of this 
research, but which apply to any investigation in which the results of this 
research were applied.  They are documented below, for completeness. 
 
4.4.1 Provenance of Artefacts 
In order to ensure the original data to be preserved the analysis is generally 
performed on a verified image of the original storage media. 
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4.4.2 Legal and ethical constraints 
Given the definition of relevance restated in R V Nethercott [2001], each 
collection of artefacts must assist with providing or disproving the central 
hypothesis of the case; therefore the artefacts must have probative value. The 
previous sections of this Chapter have shown that some forms of evidence may 
not be admissible under the exclusionary rules; therefore any methodology 
created must ensure it does not prohibit the evidence from being admitted. It 
has been shown that exposure to certain kinds of material can have a negative 
impact on the welfare of an analyst; therefore any methodology created should 
attempt to minimise exposure to potentially harmful material. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion this chapter has identified potential constraints on the evidence 
produced by an analyst. This was followed by the creation of a set of criteria for 
assessing the evidential value of evidence relating to the thumbnail cache; 
these criteria are used in Chapter 10 to evaluate the thumbnail cache artefacts 
identified during this research. The next chapter describes a study of the 
structure and behaviour of Ubuntu and Kubuntu thumbnail caches which will be 
used as a baseline for comparison with the artefacts retrieved from unallocated 
space later in this research. 
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5 The Structure and Behaviour of the Operating System 
Thumbnail Cache Implementations used in Ubuntu 
and Kubuntu 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies the artefacts recovered from the operating system 
thumbnail caches used in Ubuntu and Kubuntu and evaluates their evidential 
strength against the criteria established in Chapter 4.  
 
Kubuntu is an implementation of the Ubuntu Linux distribution that implements 
the KDE graphical desktop environment rather than Ubuntu’s default graphical 
interface. An open desktop specification for thumbnail caches specifies that 
each system should implement a single cache which can be utilised by both the 
operating system and applications [Finke, 2004]. The file managers used in 
both Kubuntu and Ubuntu base their thumbnail cache implementations on this 
specification; a file manager provides a graphical interface to the file system. 
The specification does not specify the user activity which leads to the thumbnail 
cache being manipulated. Therefore both file managers may implement the 
specification for the user activity involved in their systems differently; the 
forensic significance of the artefacts may be significantly different in each case.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows, first the basic methodology employed in 
this section is described [Section 5.2]. This is followed by an overview of the 
Linux thumbnail caches and a description of the artefacts found on a default 
installation [Sections 5.3 - 5.4].  Next, the structure of the thumbnail cache 
implementations used in Ubuntu and Kubuntu are identified; followed by an 
analysis of their behaviour based on user activity [Sections 5.5 - 5.6]. In 
Section 5.7 the artefacts found on the rest of the system which corroborate 
thumbnail cache information are identified. Section 5.8 explores how the 
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thumbnail cache responds to artefacts being altered, whilst Section 5.9 
identifies methods of forming a relationship between information in the 
thumbnail cache and an original source file. A brief discussion of artefacts 
relating to audio and media thumbnails is provided in Section 5.10; followed by 
a discussion of the strengths of the evidential artefacts identified during 
experimentation in Section 5.11. Finally, Section 5.12 provides a conclusion to 
this chapter. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
In order to compare the structure and behaviour of different implementations of 
the thumbnail cache it is necessary to establish the methodology which will be 
implemented during the research. This section describes the overall 
methodology employed in this chapter; investigations of different aspects 
require specific experiments which are described in the relevant section below.  
 
First research into existing resources relating to Linux and thumbnail caches are 
identified and evaluated, which ensures that any methodology created takes 
into account existing knowledge on the subject.  The related reading described 
in Chapter 2 identified that the thumbnail cache is stored in a hidden folder in 
the user’s home directory. The main directory is named .thumbnails and 
contains up to three sub-directories entitled fail, normal and large; the 
directories and files are standard Linux implementations of these constructs. An 
open desktop thumbnail cache specification exists [Finke, 2004]; however there 
is no information to suggest the extent to which operating system implements it. 
The specification provides a starting point for the experiments into establishing 
the structure and syntax of the thumbnail cache. 
 
In order to establish the structure and behaviour of the thumbnail cache and 
thumbnail records, it is necessary to perform a variety of experiments to assess 
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the way data changes. The experiments were performed on virtual machines, 
each with a 6GB hard drive, and the operating systems were downloaded in an 
ISO format from the Ubuntu website [Ubuntu: Lucid, 2010]. The installation 
used the default settings and no additional packages were installed, to replicate 
a typical user configuration. The virtual machines created were saved and used 
as baseline machines; each experiment used a virtual machine cloned from a 
baseline virtual machine. This enabled any changes in the data to be compared 
with the original configuration. For some experiments, experimental virtual 
machines were compared with each other as well as a baseline image, for 
example when looking at how modifying a file affects the data in the thumbnail 
cache. 
 
The virtual disk images are examined using a hexadecimal editor, and are also 
mounted to enable the examination of the live system files. The results are also 
compared with data available on the operating systems, such as source code, 
the open desktop thumbnail cache specification and Ubuntu forum posts. To 
permit the automated extraction of artefacts from the thumbnail cache, a Python 
program will be created to extract any relevant information such as metadata or 
visual thumbnails which are identified during this research. 
 
5.3 Thumbnail caches 
Figure 5.1 shows a screenshot of Nautilus is the file manager used in Ubuntu 
10.10, it provides a graphical interface to the system [Ubuntu: Lucid, 2010].  
Within the file browser windows, the default setting is to display visual 
thumbnails of files. However, not all file types display visual thumbnails by 
default, for example in Ubuntu 10.10 office documents [OpenOffice, 2012]. For 
files such as PDF and image formats, the thumbnails shown in the browser are 
of a large enough size to aid the identification of the original file.  
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The thumbnail cache itself is a hidden directory named .thumbnails, which 
consists of up to 3 files: fail, normal and large; however it is possible for an 
application or a user to store other data within the .thumbnails directory 
[Ubuntu: Lucid, 2010]. An MD5 hash of the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of 
the original file provides the unique key by which each entry in the cache is 
named.  The subdirectory normal, stores standard thumbnail cache records in 
the form of PNG images with the metadata embedded within each image 
making up the rest of the entry.  The normal thumbnail directory contents is 
defined to be images up to 128 x 128 in size; large contains thumbnail graphics 
up to 256 x 256 pixels in size. The fail directory, contains records which are 
faulty, this may be because the generation of the visual thumbnail was 
unsuccessful, or due to an error in creating the record.  
 
 
Figure 5-1: Ubuntu 10.10 and the Nautilus File Manager 
 
The directory .thumbnails can be found in the user’s home directory; therefore 
each user account has a single centralised thumbnail cache. The directory is 
hidden, and can contain up to three further directories; fail, large and normal.   
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5.4 Default Installations 
This section describes the artefacts relating to the thumbnail cache which are 
present on the default installation. An analysis of the artefacts created during 
installation and their initial state will provide a baseline for comparison with the 
experiments to be conducted.  
 
After analysis of the baseline virtual machines for both versions it was found 
that the thumbnail cache is not present. Searches were performed on mounted 
clones of the baseline virtual disks, to locate the thumbnail cache in the user’s 
home directory, however this proved unsuccessful. A hexadecimal editor was 
used to conduct searches for 'thumb' and 'thumbnails', and found several 
python scripts relating to the creation of thumbnails. One interesting result found 
when searching for ‘thumb’ was a hit for a file named ThumbnailFactory.pod; 
the main algorithm used for the creation of thumbnail records. It is necessary to 
know which algorithm is likely to have generated a record to ensure the correct 
context is applied when extracting data and to ascertain whether the record is 
valid. 
 
The analysis of the default installation shows that the thumbnail cache is 
created when it is required by a process and not at the initial installation of the 
operating system. It also shows that only one algorithm for thumbnail cache 
generation is installed by default on the operating system; therefore as no 
additional software will be installed any thumbnails created during these 
experiments will use the default thumbnail generation algorithm. Any additional 
thumbnail cache artefacts found during this research will have been added due 
to the activity in the experiments. 
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5.5 Identifying the structure 
This section identifies the structures used for the operating system thumbnail 
caches in Ubuntu and Kubuntu. The structures were identified through adding a 
selection of user files to the virtual machine’s hard disk in an attempt to produce 
visual thumbnails. Five hundred files were copied from a CD, preserving the 
directory structures, each operating system had the same files loaded. The 
directory structure is shown in Figure 5.2; a naming convention of [Set of 
directories | Level of directory | Number of directory on that Level] was applied. 
The structure permitted the evaluation of the behaviour in nested folders.  The 
resulting visual thumbnails were found to be stored in a thumbnail cache; the 
structures identified in the experiments were analysed to ascertain the 
thumbnail cache structure.  
 
Figure 5-2: Directory structure for experimental test files 
5.5.1 The thumbnail cache directory structure 
There is generally only one thumbnail cache present on the system which can 
be accessed by any software as required. During the experiments performed for 
this research it was noted that the expected thumbnail cache structure shown in 
Figure 5.3 was valid. 
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Figure 5-3: The structure of thumbnail caches in Ubuntu and Kubuntu 
 
The hexadecimal below was extracted from an Ubuntu operating system and 
shows the directory information for .thumbnails. In this example, the directory 
contains a single sub-directory named normal. The normal directory holds 
subrecords with visual thumbnails up to 128x128 pixels in size. Up to two 
further directories may be found in’ .thumbnails’: large and fail. The two further 
directories do not exist because they are only created when they are required 
by the system. 
 
08219B000   F5 03 02 00 0C 00 01 02  2E 00 00 00 1F 01 00 00   õ       .        
08219B010   0C 00 02 02 2E 2E 00 00  F6 03 02 00 E8 0F 0602       ..  ö   è    
  
06 – Number of characters in text string 
 02 – Flag type (Determines if it is a file or directory)– A directory 
 
08219B020   6E 6F 72 6D 61 6C 0000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   normal 
  
6E 6F 72 6D 61 6C – Text string denoting name of entry- “normal” 
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Figure 5-4: A figure showing the thumbnail cache subrecords which make up the 
complete record for the file z2nxaujt.jpg 
 
The thumbnail cache stores records; a record can be defined as a complete set 
of data relating to an original file. In the case of Ubuntu and Kubuntu, a 
thumbnail cache record can be defined as the set of files located in .thumbnails 
or any of its subdirectories which have the same filename and extension as 
each other. A subrecord for these thumbnail caches can be defined as a single 
file stored in the thumbnail cache. These files are stored in PNG format and can 
contain metadata about an original file and a visual thumbnail.  
 
If a file existed at the path “file:///home/slam/Pictures/z2nxaujt.png”, and had a 
visual thumbnail stored in both the large and normal sub-directories, the record 
for the original file would look like Figure 5.4.In the example the record consists 
of two subrecords; the subrecords form a complete record of thumbnail cache 
information about the source file.  
 
The following piece of hexadecimal is taken from offset 0x08219C020; it is part 
of a directory listing for the normal sub-directory. The directory contains both 
standard and incomplete subrecords.  An incomplete subrecord is one which is 
in the process of being completed and therefore information may be missing; 
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these can be identified by the addition of six further characters after the 
standard subrecord filename and extension.  
 
08219C020   35 34 32 31 66 66 66 65 39 37 32 66 31 31 37 335421fffe972f1173 
08219C030   64 30 32 32 33 36 32 34 31 34 33 64 66 62 31 31d0223624143dfb11 
08219C040   2E 70 6E 67 2E 57 4E 42  51 33 55    .png.WNBQ3U 
ASCII text string containing name of an incomplete subrecord 
file(5421fffe972f1173d0223624143dfb11.png.WNBQ3U) 
 
The filename is the concatenation of an MD5 hash of the source files URI and 
the extension ‘.png’. The extra extension ‘.WNBQ3U’ shows this file is 
incomplete. 
 
08219C050   2C 00 240138 39 63 66  38 63 38 31 30 33 34 65, $ 89cf8c81034e 
 24 - Size of text string containing the name of the file - 36 
 01 - Flag for type (shows if the entry for a file or directory) - file 
08219C060   34 31 30 39 34 63 63 64  66 30 62 38 36 62 33 3341094ccdf0b86b33 
08219C070   38 63 62 30 2E 70 6E 67  F8 03 02 00 2C 00 24 01 8cb0.pngø   , $  
ASCII text string containing name of file 
(89cf8c81034e41094ccdf0b86b338cb0.png) 
 
This file entry is for a complete subrecord as there is no extra extension. 
Therefore when examining the storage media after each experiment it is 
possible to distinguish between thumbnail cache sub-records which are 
complete and those which are not finished. This can assist with an investigation 
as a sub-record which does not have the extra 6 letter extension should be 
complete and comply with the expected structure and syntax; an incomplete file 
may not have all the information and may not be structurally valid. 
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5.5.2 The structure of a thumbnail Cache subrecord 
A thumbnail cache subrecord is stored in the standard PNG format, which is an 
open specification [Finke, 2004]. The structure can be broken down into a 
series of ‘chunks’, each of which has a defined structure.  
 
Each subrecord consists of the following chunks: 
A header signature  
IDHR (Header chunk)  
SBIT  
tEXt 
IDAT 
IEND  
 
A chunk consists of: 
4 bytes denoting the size of the data section,  
4 bytes denoting the chunks type,  
Variable Length data section,  
A 4 byte CRC value 
 
Each subrecord has a PNG file extension; the filename is an MD5 hash of the 
URI of the original source file. The header of a subrecord is in the standard 
PNG format, each file consists of a single image; therefore each sub-record 
contains one visual thumbnail. This is followed by the SBIT chunk, which 
defines the significant bits of the colours; generally this is set to 8bit, non-
interlaced, with full alpha transparency.  
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The tEXt chunks contain the metadata on the original file and the visual 
thumbnail; there are usually several tEXt chunks in each file. Each tEXt chunk 
holds a single piece of metadata in the form of a key and a value; the key 
specifies the meaning of the value. The keys may be inbuilt into the PNG 
format, specific for the thumbnail cache or for the file type. Thumbnail cache 
specific keys start with ‘Thumb’, all keys are written in ASCII, and are clearly 
defined making it simple for a forensic examiner to interpret them; for example 
‘Thumb:MTime’, is the key for the modification date of the source file. The 
modification time and URI of the source file are generally present in all 
subrecords. Other information, such as the dimensions of the original file and 
the number of pages it contained may also be present.  
 
The visual thumbnail itself is stored within one or more IDAT chunks, which are 
compliant with the PNG specification. Finally each subrecord file ends with an 
IEND chunk, which denotes the end of a file. 
 
The following is an example thumbnail cache record viewed in a hex editor; it 
has been annotated to show the structure and meaning of each byte.  
 
Start of PNG file 
00000000   89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A   
 89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A - PNG header  
This is the PNG file signature, it is 8 bytes long. It shows that the remainder of 
the file is in PNG format, conforming to the chunk structure described above. 
The signature also shows the file contains a single PNG image, which means 
that only one visual thumbnail is stored in this file. 
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Start of IHDR Chunk 
The IHDR contains information on the format of the visual thumbnail, including 
the size in pixels. This information is generally standardised for each thumbnail 
cache generation algorithm. For analysts the width and height of the image can 
be used to validate the visual thumbnail stored in the sub-record. The 
characteristics of the PNG image such as: bit depth, colour type, compression 
method, filter method and interlace method are standard PNG fields which hold 
information about how the visual image is processed and stored within the file. 
This information may assist with identifying characteristics of visual thumbnails 
generated with different algorithms.  
    00 00 00 0D49 48 44 52   ‰PNG        IHDR 
00 00 00 0D – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 13 
49 48 44 52 – Type of the chunk – IHDR – Image header  
00000010   00 00 00 8000 00 00 6708020000 0047 1D DD      €   g     G Ý 
 00 00 00 80 – Width of image in pixels – 128 
 00 00 00 67 – Height of image in pixels – 103  
 08 – Bit Depth – 8 
 02 – Colour type – True colour (Each pixel is an RGB triple) 
 00 – Compression Method used to compress the PNG image data 
 00 – Filter Method (pre-processing applied to image before compression) 
 00 – Interlace Method  
00000020   A6   
 47 1D DD A6 – CRC Value for Chunk 
End of IHDR Chunk 
 
Start of sBIT Chunk    
The SBIT Chunk shows the bit depth, throughout this research, only values of 
‘08’ for each colour were recorded. This is another standard PNG chunk and 
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holds information about sample depths; it can be used to recover the original 
image data if the file becomes corrupt.  
 00 00 00 0373 42 49  54080808DB E1 4F E0   ¦    sBITÛáOà 
 00 00 00 03 – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 3 
73 42 49 54 – Type of the chunk – sBIT – Significant Bits 
08 – Significant Red Bits 
08 – Significant Green Bits 
08 – Significant Blue Bits  
DB E1 4F E0 – CRC Value for Chunk 
   
End of sBIT Chunk 
 
Start of tEXt Chunk 
This tEXt chunk provides the width of the visual thumbnail in pixels. The text 
chunks store information in key pairs, the first string describes the content and 
the second string holds the value. In this case the key is 
“Thumb::Image::Width”. The key starts with ‘thumb’ which shows it is a 
thumbnail cache specific key; this key holds the width of the original image. The 
value stored in the second string is 787. This information could assist an analyst 
by providing characteristics of the original source file. 
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00000030   00 00 00 1774 45 58 7454 68 75 6D 62 3A 3A 49tEXtThumb::I 
00 00 00 17 – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 23 
 74 45 58 74 – Type of the chunk – tEXt – Textual Data 
00000040   6D 61 67 65 3A 3A 57 69  64 74 680037 38 37BE   mage::Width 787¾ 
 Keyword – Thumb::Image::Width – Thumbnail specific keyword relating to 
the image width 
 00 – Null Separator 
 37 38 37 - Text String – 787 
00000050   50 98 74  
 BE 50 98 74 – CRC Value for Chunk 
End of tEXt Chunk 
 
 
 
Start of tEXt Chunk 
This tEXt chunk provides the height of the visual thumbnail in pixels 
00 00 00 1874  45 58 7454 68 75 6D 62P˜ttEXtThumb 
00 00 00 18 – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 24 
73 42 49 54 – Type of the chunk – tEXt – Textual Data 
 
00000060   3A 3A 49 6D 61 67 65 3A  3A 48 65 69 67 68 7400   ::Image::Height  
Keyword – Thumb::Image::Height 
00 – Null Separator 
 
00000070   36 33 36B8 90 4B 43 
36 38 36 - Text String – 636 
B8 90 4B 43 – CRC Value for Chunk    
End of tEXt Chunk 
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Start of tEXt Chunk 
This tEXt chunk provides the URI of the original file to which this record relates, 
in ASCII text 
   00 00 00 2E 74 45 58 74 54   636¸ﾐKC   .tEXtT 
 0 00 00 2E – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 46 
 74 45 58 74 – Type of the chunk – tEXt – Textual Data 
 
00000080   68 75 6D 62 3A 3A 55 52  490066 69 6C 65 3A 2Fhumb::URI file:/ 
 Keyword – Thumb::URI 
 00 – Null Separator 
 
 
00000090   2F 2F 6D 65 64 69 61 2F  4B 49 4E 47 53 54 4F4E   //media/KINGSTON 
000000A0   2F 75 6E 74 69 74 6C 65  64 2E 62 6D 70 88 59 D0   /untitled.bmpˆYÐ 
 Location of original file – file:///media/KINGSTON/untitled.bmp 
000000B0   F0 
 88 59 D0 F0 – CRC Value for Chunk 
End of tEXt Chunk 
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Start of tEXt Chunk 
This chunk stores the last modification time of the original source file 
 00 00 00 1774 45 58  7454 68 75 6D 62 3A 3A   ð    tEXtThumb:: 
 00 00 00 17 – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 23 
 74 45 58 74– Type of the chunk – tEXt – Textual Data 
 
000000C0   4D 54 69 6D 650031 32  32 39 34 39 38 38 32 32MTime 1229498822 
 Keyword – Thumb::MTime 
 00 – Null Separator 
 Last Modification Time – 17/12/2008 07:27:02  
 
000000D0   09 40 36 5F  
 09 40 36 5F– CRC Value for Chunk 
End of tEXt Chunk 
 
Start of tEXt Chunk 
This tEXt chunk stores the software used to create the thumbnail cache 
subrecord. In this instance, it was the Thumbnail Factory, this is the most 
common method used in Gnome. An analyst can use this information to 
replicate user activity using the same thumbnail cache generation algorithm to 
identify actions which may have led to the artefacts current state. 
 
 
Page 79 
 
  
   00 00 00 2074 45 58 7453 6F 66 74    @6_    tEXtSoft 
 00 00 00 20 – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 32 
 74 45 58 74– Type of the chunk – tEXt – Textual Data 
 
000000E0   77 61 72 650047 4E 4F  4D 45 3A 3A 54 68 75 6D   ware GNOME::Thum 
 Keyword – Software 
 00 – Null Separator 
000000F0   62 6E 61 69 6C 46 61 63  74 6F 72 796F 44 55 E0bnailFactoryoDUà 
 Text Sting – GNOME::ThumbnailFactory 
 6F 44 55 E0 – CRC Value for Chunk 
End of tEXt Chunk 
 
Start of IDAT Chunk 
This chunk holds the visual thumbnail, in this case, the image is held in a single 
chunk. In larger visual thumbnails the image data may be held in several IDAT 
chunks. 
00000100   00 00 1B 7D49 44 41 5478 9C ED 9D 59 8C 1C C9}IDATxœíﾝYŒÉ 
 00 00 1B 7D – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 7037 
 49 44 41 54 – Type of the chunk – IDAT –  
 
00000110   99 98 FF 88 8C 3C EB 3E  BBBB BA FA BE 48 36 49   ™˜ÿˆŒ<ë>»»ºú¾H6I 
 
  …. Visual thumbnail …. 
 
00001C80   01 DE 00 5E 47A8 BA 31  9A 
 A8 BA 31 9A – CRC Value for Chunk 
End of IDAT Chunk 
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Start of IEND Chunk 
This is a standard chunk which signifies the end of the file. Therefore all the 
data for the sub-record should be contained above this point in the file. 
     00 00 00 0049 45 4E    Þ ^G¨º1š    IEN 
 00 00 00 00 – number of bytes in the chunks data field – 0 
 
00001C90   44 AE 42 60 82                                     D®B`‚  
 49 45 4E 44 – Type of the chunk – IEND – Image Trailer 
 AE 42 60 82 – CRC Value for Chunk 
End of IEND chunk 
 
End of PNG file 
 
5.6 Identifying the behaviour 
The previous section identified the structure of artefacts stored in Ubuntu and 
Kubuntu thumbnail caches. This section presents the experiments performed to 
identify the user behaviour which causes data in the thumbnail cache to be 
altered. Alteration to the thumbnail cache can be done in three ways: addition, 
modification or deletion of data. In order to establish when the three types of 
alterations to the cache occur, experiments were conducted to add files to the 
system, modify existing files and finally remove files. All files involved in the 
experiments were user created files, as these are the most likely to be added to 
the thumbnail cache. 
 
5.6.1 The creation of subrecords 
In order to establish when records are created, user files are added to the 
system. In this sub-section, four methods of adding files were used: USB stick, 
CD, downloading from email, and creating a file using pre-installed software.  In 
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order to establish if the software used to view the files affects the thumbnail 
cache, various methods of viewing files were also tried. This sub-section ends 
with a summary of the user activity which leads to information being added to 
the thumbnail cache 
 
Using different methods for adding files 
Using each of the four methods described above, a set of 10 user generated 
files were added to the system; the files were: copied from a USB stick, copied 
from a CD, downloaded from an email, and created using pre-installed software. 
For each experiment the user generated files were saved to the user’s 
documents folder and then viewed using the file manager to view the visual 
thumbnails for each file.  
 
In both Ubuntu and Kubuntu, files from the USB stick and the CD had two sets 
of entries in the thumbnail cache, as the images were cached when the files 
were browsed on the external and operating system volumes. The thumbnail 
cache subrecords relating to the files on the volumes contained the volume 
name as part of the URI. This may assist an examiner as it can provide extra 
information about the external media; the additional subrecords may also assist 
in creating an event timeline. Files downloaded from email, or created by pre-
installed software only appeared in each thumbnail cache sub-directory once.  
 
A follow-up experiment was performed for the addition of files using external 
media, with five hundred user files; the user files were stored in various 
directories and sub-directories created within the user’s documents folder. It 
was noted that using the file browser to view the files for different lengths of 
time produced different results; the number of subrecords created in the cache 
appeared to be dependent on the length of time the directory was viewed in the 
file browser. This is due to the system putting files into a queue for visual 
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thumbnail generation; if a directory is no longer being viewed in the directory 
before a file reaches the front of the queue it is removed as it is no longer 
required. Therefore visual thumbnails and their associated records are only 
created and modified for the directory whilst they are currently required by the 
system. 
 
Viewing the files using different methods 
An experiment was conducted where 500 JPEG files were copied using the 
terminal, from a USB stick to the user’s documents directory. The documents’ 
directory was then viewed for less than 5 seconds and then closed. The hard 
disk was then analysed and less than a fifth of the files (89) within the directory 
had associated records within the thumbnail cache. During the experiment only 
16 files were seen in the file manager; however the number of records created 
in the thumbnail cache was significantly larger than this. A second experiment 
repeated the method but left the file manager open for 10 minutes. After the 
second experiment there were records in the thumbnail cache for each of the 
500 files; 15 of these records were in the fail directory. The results of these 
experiments show that when the file browser is used, any file which is eligible to 
have a record in the thumbnail cache is added to the thumbnail generation 
queue; however files are removed from the queue if the directory is no longer 
being viewed in the file browser. 
 
A file is considered eligible when the file type is associated with a method which 
utilises the thumbnail cache; the file type is checked and if a thumbnail method 
exists for that type then the system uses the method to create or retrieve a 
visual thumbnail. Experimentation has shown this can lead to some files within 
a directory not added to the thumbnail cache. For example files created in 
Microsoft Excel did not create visual thumbnails, without the installation of 
additional software. 
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Each piece of software installed by default and listed in the Applications menu 
on the taskbar on Ubuntu and Kubuntu was examined to ascertain if user 
generated files could be opened or saved within them. Where this was possible 
several directories were viewed and the information added to the cache was 
noted. Each of the directories had not been viewed previously, which assisted in 
identifying which software used the thumbnail cache.  
 
In Ubuntu, subrecords are generally added to the normal directory, with each 
potential source file viewed in the file browser added to the thumbnail queue. 
Subrecords may not be created or updated if a directory contains a substantial 
number of files, which are potential thumbnail cache source files, and the 
directory is no longer being viewed in the file browser. This is because the files 
are taken out of the thumbnail cache queue when the directory is no longer 
being viewed. By default, potential thumbnail cache source files for Ubuntu are 
standard image formats and PDFs. 
 
Within Ubuntu, GIMP, a pre-installed graphics program can initiate the creation 
and update of subrecords to the normal directory when the user selects ‘open 
image’, and potential thumbnail cache source files are viewed as directories are 
being viewed. F-Spot, a photo management application, also causes 
subrecords to be updated and created when importing files; however these 
subrecords are only added to the large directory.  
 
In Kubuntu, both the large and normal directories are frequently used; therefore 
a greater amount of information is available to a forensic examiner, than that 
provided by Ubuntu. When the file browser is open, any potential source files 
are added to the thumbnail queue for both the large and normal directories. If 
there is only a single potential source file in the directory, only a large record is 
added on the first viewing. If, within the file browser, there are directories that 
contain potential source files, these may also be added to the thumbnail queue. 
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The information panel within the file browser is the reason for the creation of 
subrecords in the large directory, which enables the file to be previewed in a 
larger size. 
 
In Kubuntu, the image viewer Gwenview adds files to the thumbnail queue, 
when browsing directories in the main window of the application; however it only 
uses the normal thumbnail cache directory, and therefore the large directory is 
not modified. 
 
Within Kubuntu, it is interesting to note that there are circumstances where 
thumbnail subrecords are unexpectedly created. Partial subrecords within the 
cache are automatically generated for a selection of files in the first level sub-
directories of a directory being viewed in the file browser. An example is shown 
in Figure 5.5, which shows the Downloads directory being viewed in the file 
browser. When this directory is opened, each sub-directory is represented by a 
series of small thumbnails, such as those shown for ‘Test Folder’. These small 
thumbnails represent files present in the sub-directory, and to create them, the 
system creates partial thumbnails of files within the sub-directory. If the sub-
directory is hovered over with the mouse, the mini-thumbnails rotate through 
any files within the sub-directory that have thumbnail generation methods.  
 
Therefore from each first level sub-directory in a browsed folder, there may be 
subrecords created for up to the number of files which have thumbnail 
generation methods, even though the user has not browsed the sub-directory. 
Interestingly, partial thumbnail subrecords have two properties which allow them 
to be distinguished from subrecords created using standard methods. Firstly, 
there is a noticeable lack of metadata within the PNG, including no information 
on the last modified time and URI for the source file. This means there are two 
main methods of forming a relationship between a partial subrecord and the 
source file; the image stored in the subrecord and the MD5 hash of the URI 
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which is present in the subrecords filename. The second difference in partial 
subrecords is noticeable in the IDAT chunks, where upon comparison with a 
standard subrecord entry for the same file, it is noticeably shorter as the alpha 
values are missing. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: The directory 'Downloads' being viewed in the file browser within 
Kubuntu 
 
If within Kubuntu, the large thumbnail cache directory is viewed, the files within 
it are added to the thumbnail queue for the creation and modification of 
subrecords within the normal directory. These subrecords do not conform to the 
standard structure; instead they use the same structure as the partial 
subrecords. Potential thumbnail source files in Kubuntu by default are only 
image formats. Interestingly, thumbnails for text files are not available in the file 
browser. If a text file is selected within the file browser, a visual thumbnail is 
rendered in the information panel, but this is not stored in the cache.  
 
In both operating systems, potential source files viewed on the desktop are 
added to the thumbnail queue for subrecords to be added or modified in the 
normal directory only. However if the desktop is viewed in the file browser in 
Kubuntu, subrecords may also be created or modified in the large directory. 
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Circumstances where information is added to the thumbnail cache 
A subrecord in the thumbnail cache is created when a file is viewed in thumbnail 
view, in a browser window, at a URI, for which no subrecord currently exists in 
the normal or large directories.   
 
A new record can be created under the following circumstance if the following 3 
criteria are met: 
Case 1: No record available 
 A directory is viewed using the file browser or the file browser 
within an application when it is in thumbnail mode 
 The directory being viewed contains file types which are 
compatible with the thumbnail cache 
 A file exists in the directory which does not currently have a 
thumbnail subrecord 
 
Case 2: A subrecord only exists in the fail directory if the following 4 
criteria are met: 
 A directory is viewed using the file browser or the file browser 
within an application when it is in thumbnail mode 
 The directory being viewed contains file types which are 
compatible with the thumbnail cache 
 A file exists in the directory which only has a subrecord in the 
fail directory 
 The file is processed as if no record information is available 
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5.6.2 The modification of subrecords 
This subsection looks at the modification of information stored within the cache. 
In order to study the causes of modification to the thumbnail cache, clones of 
the virtual machines from Section 5.6.1will be used. Therefore the experiments 
start with data within the thumbnail cache; in order to assess how this data is 
modified the original source files will be modified during a variety of experiments 
described in this sub-section.  
 
Modifying the contents of a file 
A randomly selected group of files on the virtual machine were altered using 
appropriate pre-installed software. A list of the 500 user-generated files added 
to the virtual machine was stored in a text file. A small program was written to 
randomly select 10% of the files; the names of the selected files were stored in 
a second text file. Each of the selected files was opened using the default 
editing application for that file type; image files were modified by making the 
images entirely black, for text based file types the information within the file was 
copied and pasted underneath the original data. After the files were modified 
they were saved and the editor closed. Once all modifications had been 
completed the directories containing the user generated images were then 
viewed using the file manager. The modification caused the last modified time 
of the file to be updated. Both on Ubuntu and Kubuntu, this caused the affected 
subrecords to be altered, to show the current state of the file; all the files 
showed the modified black images or repeated text in the file browser. 
 
Modifying the files URI 
In order to ascertain the effect of modifying the file’s URI, the virtual machine 
was populated with 500 user generated files which were copied off a USB stick 
and into the user’s documents directory. A directory named ‘test’ was created 
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on the user’s desktop and 5 sub-directories were created within it.  Using the 
same piece of software described in the previous section, 10% of the files were 
randomly selected; the 50 selected were then further separated into 5 groups by 
splitting the file list every 10 entries.  
 
The entries in each group were then moved into one of the five sub-directories 
of the test folder. The terminal was used to move two groups of files, whilst the 
remaining three groups were moved using the file manager. The file manager 
was then used to view the test directory and its sub-directories; each sub-
directory was left open for 5 minutes. The virtual machine was then analysed. 
The results show that if a file is moved to a new URI, then a new subrecord is 
generated for its new location; unless, in Ubuntu a subrecord already exists for 
a different file at that URI with the same last modified time. On both operating 
systems, the subrecord for the files previous URI remains on the system, unless 
it is overwritten by a new file at that URI. This shows that multiple entries in the 
thumbnail cache may relate to a single file; the entries may assist with building 
an event timeline for the file. 
 
The deletion of subrecords 
From the tests conducted on Ubuntu and Kubuntu throughout this research, no 
evidence of the deletion of subrecords was recorded; the 53 virtual machines 
used during this research did not have any deleted sub-records. A further 
experiment was conducted by deleting the 500 user generated files on the 
virtual machine and manipulating the clock on the virtual machine to mimic time 
passing; clones of the virtual disk were taken at weekly intervals for 16 weeks to 
identify any changes to the information in the thumbnail cache. The test aimed 
to identify if the thumbnail cache removed content which had not being used 
recently. A test was also carried out where a USB stick was mounted on the 
virtual machines, to enable the creation of thumbnail cache records and then 
the device was dismounted. The machine was then left for thirty days to 
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ascertain if unused subrecords would be removed. In both experiments the 
thumbnail cache was not altered; this shows that information in the thumbnail 
cache may relate to source files which are no longer on the system. 
 
5.6.3 Fragmentation of the thumbnail cache 
The data produced during the experiments documented in Sections 5.5 and 
5.6 was analysed to ascertain the fragmentation rate of the thumbnail caches 
within Kubuntu and Ubuntu. It was noted that the thumbnail cache is generally 
in a fragmented state; as each individual file which makes up part of the 
thumbnail cache is stored in a different location on the disk. This is due to the 
fact it is made up of individual subrecord files, each of which being a standard 
file on the system can be placed anywhere. Therefore upon examination 
thumbnail cache subrecords exist throughout the system. This is interesting for 
an analyst as it provides a greater chance of recovering some information from 
the thumbnail cache, as even after deletion the files exist throughout the system 
and it is therefore unlikely they would all be overwritten unless the user was 
purposefully trying to do so. 
 
5.7 Identifying traces left outside the thumbnail cache 
This section describes the corroborating artefacts identified on the rest of the 
system during the experiments performed to ascertain the structure and 
behaviour of the thumbnail cache.  
 
A variety of the experiments described in previous sections involved the use of 
external media, however no information relating to the thumbnail cache could 
be found on the external media after use. A further experiment was performed 
where a USB stick containing 500 images was left plugged into the virtual 
machine for 7 days, with the file browser open. The resulting hard disk and USB 
stick were analysed, the thumbnail cache on the hard disk contained 
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information relating to the files on the USB stick; no information relating to the 
thumbnail cache could be found on the external media. The volume name for 
the external media is recorded in any subrecords relating to files stored on it; 
this volume name can also be found on the virtual hard drive both in allocated 
and unallocated space, showing that it has been mounted on the system. The 
information found in allocated space shows where the volume was mounted 
and can provide information about files present on the disk.  
 
As the subrecords are stored in standard files, their file names are present in 
directory listings for the thumbnail cache sub directories. There is also 
information on the original source files in the directory listing and within the 
journal file which can provide corroboration and extra information about user 
activity.  
 
5.8 Alteration of thumbnail cache artefacts 
This section describes the experiments performed to ascertain what would 
happen if parts of the thumbnail cache evidence were tampered with. The 
evidence has been divided into three sections: metadata, the visual thumbnail, 
and the original source file. Each section of the evidence was altered by viewing 
the virtual hard disk in a hexadecimal editor and editing the information as 
appropriate.  
 
5.8.1 Metadata 
Each tEXt chunk within the subrecords was altered during a series of 
experiments to determine the effect on the artefacts produced. Once the 
metadata had been altered, the original source files were then viewed in the file 
browser to see if the subrecord was altered. In both Ubuntu and Kubuntu 
altering the last modification time chunk without altering the original source file 
results in the affected subrecord being updated when the source file is viewed 
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in thumbnail view. This shows that one check used by the thumbnail cache 
generation algorithms is the last modification time; therefore an analyst can see 
the last modification date of the file when it was last viewed in a file browser. 
Altering the URI caused Kubuntu to update the subrecord even when the last 
modified time was the same; however Ubuntu only updated the subrecord if the 
last modification time was not equal to the one stored in the thumbnail cache. 
 
5.8.2 Visual thumbnail 
In Kubuntu, altering the IDAT chunks of a subrecord resulted in the subrecord 
being regenerated when the original source file was viewed; therefore showing 
that the system checks the image is an accurate representation of the current 
state of the original source file. Therefore the system overwrites the subrecord 
with an updated and accurate image; this shows that in Kubuntu if a file with a 
tampered subrecord was viewed a valid subrecord would replace it. 
 
In Ubuntu a curiosity was discovered when attempting to alter the visual 
thumbnail stored in the IDAT section of a subrecord. In order to successfully 
fool the system into displaying an incorrect thumbnail, all other metadata within 
the subrecord must be accurate. This includes the last modification time, as 
discussed previously, which must be exactly the same as the source file, or the 
subrecord is rewritten. It is also important to ensure that each chunk within the 
subrecord is accurate. For example, if an existing subrecord was being altered it 
would be necessary to alter the size of each chunk and the CRC data to ensure 
they matched the new information. If the subrecord uses a valid PNG structure, 
and the last modification date is equal to the source file then the new image 
placed in the IDAT section would be viewed instead of a representation of the 
actual file if the CRC was correct. 
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However, if this ‘tampered’ record is selected, a new visual thumbnail is shown 
which accurately represents the file. The tampered record is not, however 
overwritten in the thumbnail cache. Instead the accurate image is generated 
when required, by the system and does not appear to be stored anywhere. If 
the browser is refreshed or reopened, the tampered thumbnail is still displayed 
until the file is selected; the accurate image is only displayed and not saved in 
the thumbnail cache. 
 
5.8.3 Original source file 
If a new file is placed at a URI with an existing subrecord entry in the thumbnail 
cache, then both Ubuntu and Kubuntu will update the thumbnail cache entry. 
However, if the associated last modified time in the subrecord is altered to 
match the new source file, Ubuntu will not update its subrecord entry. Kubuntu 
appears to perform a greater number of checks on the information in the 
subrecords and appears to regenerate a record if the visual thumbnail does not 
accurately reflect the original source files state. Experiments corroborated this 
finding, as two identical files were viewed, one of which had a tampered 
subrecord; only the modification time for the subrecord which had been 
tampered with was updated, suggesting the subrecords are not simply 
regenerated on access.  
 
5.9 Forming a relationship between the thumbnail subrecords 
and the source files 
Previous sections have established the requirement to put thumbnail cache 
artefacts in the context of the user actions which generated them. This section 
looks at ways in which a relationship between a subrecord and an original 
source file could be formed.  
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5.9.1 Metadata 
There are three distinct types of metadata contained within a subrecord: the 
URI of the original source file, information on the original source file, and 
information about the visual thumbnail. The information about the visual 
thumbnail can assist in checking if the image is reliable, and can also be used in 
conjunction with the techniques discussed in Section 5.9.2 to identify visual 
thumbnails which are the same. The information within the subrecord relating to 
the original source file can assist with forming a relationship as it can be used to 
check the source file has the same properties. Finally the URI can assist with 
forming a relationship as it provides a location in the directory structure for the 
original source file. The filename of the subrecord is an MD5 hash of the URI, 
which can be used to corroborate a relationship between the subrecord and the 
original source file. Checking the source file’s URI along with the metadata 
stored in the subrecord about the original file can provide a stronger relationship 
between the file and the subrecord, if the two sources of metadata agree.  
 
5.9.2 Images 
Each file type which is eligible for visual thumbnail generation uses a specific 
algorithm; the generation algorithms and the list of associated file types is open 
source. Therefore it is possible upon knowing the file type of the original source 
file to use the appropriate algorithm, which would create a visual thumbnail. The 
IDAT chunks of the created thumbnail can be compared with IDAT chunks from 
existing subrecords to identify any matches. Finding a subrecord with a 
matching image does not show that there is a relationship between the original 
source file and the subrecord, as multiple copies of a file may exist. It is also 
possible that the subrecord was created earlier in the source files event timeline 
and does not accurately reflect its current status; for example, it may not be at 
the correct URI.  
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5.9.3 MD5 hashes 
In the previous sections it was established that the filename of a visual 
thumbnail is an MD5 hash of the URI for the original file. The URI is contained 
within the PNG file itself. For example an original file with a URI of:  
file:///media/KINGSTON/untitled.bmp would create an MD5 hash filename of 
5421fffe972f1173d0223624143dfb11.png. Whilst it is possible to find a 
subrecord given the URI of a source file, it is not possible to reverse this 
process as an MD5 hash is a one way function.   
 
5.9.4 Event timeline 
Given a file X, Currently located at the URI Y, the thumbnail cache can assist 
with reconstructing the event timeline of file X; providing sub-records exist within 
the thumbnail cache relating to the file. This section describes the criteria 
developed for determining which subrecords should be added to an event-
timeline for a given file. 
 
First, if available the original source file and the associated metadata must be 
extracted, this forms the basis for determining which records should be added 
to the event timeline for a file. A thumbnail of the file should then be generated 
using the appropriate algorithm for the source files type; this can be determined 
by looking through the source code and establishing which algorithm is 
associated with the particular MIME type. 
 
The following denotes the order in which subrecords should be added to the 
event timeline. Each subrecord is contained within a PNG file which has file 
creation and modification times; subrecords may also contain time information 
within their internal metadata. The order of adding subrecords ensures that the 
strongest evidence is added first; this is followed by any supplementary 
evidence which does not conflict with existing data. At each level listed below, 
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only information which does not conflict with existing information in the event 
timeline should be added: 
 
1. If a subrecord exists whose name corresponds to an MD5 hash of the 
source files current URI, it should be extracted and added to the event 
timeline. Section 5.9.3 describes the relationships which can be formed 
between the thumbnail cache and user files based on MD5 hashes. 
2. Any thumbnail records, with a hash value for the IDAT chunks that 
matches the hash value for the original source files thumbnail created 
should be extracted. Section 5.9.2 describes the limitations of matching 
visual data from the thumbnail cache with user created files. 
3. Any records which contain a URI which ends with the same file name 
may then be extracted; the same file name may suggest a previous path 
of the file or that the file has been copied. 
4. Any subrecords which have the same metadata information within them 
as the metadata contained within a generated subrecord of the original 
source file can then be added. Section 5.9.1discusses the limitations of 
forming relationships between thumbnail cache artefacts and user files 
based on metadata. 
5. Any subrecords of the same file type may then be extracted for hand 
analysis by an analyst. 
 
The ability to construct an event timeline based on a single subrecord can assist 
in establishing the user’s behaviour; establishing how the file was manipulated 
by the user can show their intention and assist with proving or disproving the 
mens rea aspect of the investigation [Chapter 4]. 
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5.10 Audio and Media thumbnails 
This section briefly discusses audio and media thumbnails, which are the two 
other types of thumbnail used in Ubuntu and Kubuntu systems. 
 
5.10.1 Audio thumbnails 
An audio thumbnail can be heard by a user hovering their cursor over an audio 
files icon; the audio file then begins to play from the beginning and continues 
until the cursor is moved away from the file’s icon. By default both Ubuntu and 
Kubuntu are able to play audio thumbnails. An audio thumbnail is generated at 
run-time and is therefore not stored on the system. A collection of 15 audio files 
were copied from a USB stick on to the virtual machine and on to the user’s 
desktop. Each of the 15 audio files was then hovered over to activate the audio 
thumbnail. On analysis of the virtual hard disk it was shown that audio 
thumbnails do not use the .thumbnails cache, and do not have any direct 
connection to the visual thumbnails. The audio information is played as required 
and plays the contents of the original file; no audio thumbnail information is 
stored. 
 
5.10.2 Media thumbnails 
Media thumbnails are also generated at run-time by the system and allow the 
user to view a media file from the beginning by hovering over the media files 
icon. Whilst the thumbnail is the same size as the file icon, the moving images 
and associated audio can assist a user in identifying files. Ubuntu and Kubuntu 
do not, by default, implement media thumbnails; however there are various 
implementation methods available on the Ubuntu community forum. A collection 
of 15 media files were copied from a USB stick on to the virtual machine and on 
to the user’s desktop. Each of the 15 media files was then hovered over to 
activate the media thumbnail. On analysis of the virtual hard drive it was shown 
that these thumbnails are also generated at run-time and do not store 
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information in the .thumbnails cache either. Visual thumbnails for each of the 
media thumbnails were found in the central thumbnail cache; it is possible to 
have a visual and a media thumbnail for the same source file. The visual 
thumbnail represents the first frame of the media file.  
 
5.11 Discussion 
In summary, table 5.1 provides an overview of the main user activity which 
leads to artefacts being generated within the thumbnail cache, based on a 
default installation.  As can be seen from the table, the reasons for subrecords 
existing in the two operating systems can be different. Kubuntu, in general 
provides a greater amount of evidence within the thumbnail cache, as it uses 
the large directory more frequently, which provide larger clearer images of files, 
which may assist an analyst. It is also evidentially significant that Kubuntu 
generally has both a normal and large subrecord for a file viewed in the file 
browser, which may provide further information about the state of the system. 
Ubuntu, uses the normal directory for the majority of its subrecord storage, and 
is easier to tamper with; suggesting that artefacts recovered from a thumbnail 
cache on this operating system would require a greater amount of corroboration 
from artefacts elsewhere on the system. 
 
In Chapter 4, a set of criteria were established to assist in assessing the 
strength of evidence from a thumbnail cache. These criteria will now be used on 
the artefacts found on Kubuntu and Ubuntu during the course of this research to 
establish the strength of evidence recovered. 
 
5.11.1 Provenance of artefacts 
This chapter has identified the structure and represented behaviour of the 
thumbnail cache artefacts in Ubuntu and Kubuntu. An analyst could use the 
experimental methods described throughout this chapter (for example Sections 
 
 
Page 98 
 
  
5.2, and 5.5) to replicate the experiments and verify the artefacts presented. 
The ability to replicate the results based on the descriptions provided in the 
chapter show the use of clear documentation; an analyst would be familiar 
with this style of documentation. A research paper on this work using the same 
style of documentation was available to analysts [Morris 2010] and was used in 
a lecture on thumbnail caches delivered at the Centre for Forensic Computing, 
Cranfield University in January 2012. 
 
In Section 5.5 the structures found in thumbnail cache artefacts are identified, 
this led to the experiments in Section 5.6 which enabled relationships to be 
formed between the artefacts and the behaviour which led to their current state. 
In order to corroborate the information retrieved from the thumbnail cache it was 
necessary to form relationships with other system artefacts which are in 
Section 5.7.The thumbnail cache artefacts identified during this research are 
justifiable as they are identified using a standard replicable process that 
enables the verification of the artefacts presented.  
 
The features identified in the thumbnail cache motivate the requirement to 
identify and provide corroboration. For example, if an analyst was investigating 
claims a suspect had being viewing illegal material and used a file browser, the 
thumbnail cache would contain a small graphic representation of a source file, 
and a location it had resided in [Section 5.5].It would also provide information 
about user behaviour which may or may not have led to the creation of the 
artefacts in the thumbnail cache. In order to identify the user behaviour 
associated with the artefacts and verify the information stored in the thumbnail 
cache it is necessary to form corroborative relationships with other artefacts on 
the system [Section 5.6]. Therefore for an analyst to put the information 
recovered from the thumbnail cache into context he would need to corroborate 
the information; this could be achieved by identifying other sources of 
information about the source file on the system. Whilst Ubuntu relies upon the 
last modification time for deciding whether to regenerate an image, Kubuntu 
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uses substantially more checks which make it harder to tamper with the file. 
Thumbnail cache entries contain CRC checks which can be used to corroborate 
the contents of each chunk. Finally additional log files such as those related to 
mounted devices or recently used files can corroborate the information 
identified in the thumbnail cache by providing additional verification. 
 
Table 5-1: A summary of the user activity which may lead to subrecords being 
present in the thumbnail cache 
 
 
It is necessary to maintain a relationship between the artefacts and the original 
data to show the thumbnail cache artefacts are understandable 
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consequences of the method used. For example the research conducted into 
the reasons subrecords are created in Section 5.6.1 was broken down into 
smaller research areas; focused experiments, such as the use of different 
methods for adding files which is described in Section 5.6.1.1, assist in 
maintaining a relationship between the original data and the artefact. The 
artefacts identified as a consequence of the user behaviour were documented 
throughout this chapter and could be applied to artefacts identified during 
forensic investigations. 
 
Any artefact presented in Court must be shown to have been extracted and 
interpreted using a scientific method. Each artefact identified from the Ubuntu 
and Kubuntu thumbnail caches can be checked to ensure it has a valid 
structure and syntax; sub-records use the standard PNG file format. Section 5.8 
shows methods in which the thumbnail cache could be tampered with; however 
the remainder of the system would also require editing to ensure that all 
relationships between artefacts on the system remained valid. The artefact can 
provide a set of data which may also assist with identifying or disproving a type 
of associated behaviour. The ability to corroborate the artefacts with other 
system data can provide further validation of the interpretation of the data which 
is presented to the Court. 
 
5.11.2 Interpretation of results 
Thumbnail cache artefacts can provide information on potential user activity; in 
order to put the artefact in the context it is necessary to establish the potential 
system activity which led to its current state. Therefore the analyst may need to 
defend that the artefact is a result of the system working properly. Some of the 
thumbnail cache artefacts identified show the creation algorithm which can 
assist with verifying the artefact and related system artefacts. This research has 
investigated the manipulation of the thumbnail cache artefacts [Section 5.8]; it 
has shown that parts of the thumbnail cache can be manipulated. However for 
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any manipulation to appear as standard system behaviour it would be 
necessary to alter artefacts which have a relationship with the thumbnail cache; 
further alterations may be required until all the relationships on the system 
appear to be generated as a result of the system working properly. Given the 
non-trivial requirement for manipulating the system to ensure all relationships 
matched the updated information, the task would be difficult and time 
consuming. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.4, a record within an Ubuntu or Kubuntu thumbnail cache 
may consist of several subrecords; the subrecords in a record are related to the 
same source file. As shown in Section 5.6, there are situations where multiple 
records may exist for the same source file; this shows that relationships can 
be formed between artefacts within the thumbnail cache. Artefacts on the rest of 
the system may also have a relationship with the information on the thumbnail 
cache, by providing both corroborating and supplementary information as 
shown in Section 5.7. As identified in Sections 5.5-6, it is possible to determine 
and eliminate likely user behaviour based on the metadata in the subrecords; 
however by building relationships with other data within the thumbnail cache 
and the rest of the system it is possible to minimise the potential types of user 
behaviour an analyst has to investigate the likelihood of occurring. 
 
In order to maximise the corroboration of thumbnail cache artefacts it is 
necessary to continue to build relationships with other sources of information 
until all the relationships between the artefacts involved are identified. 
Relationships between the thumbnail cache and other artefacts on the system 
are documented in Section 5.7; relationships between the information in the 
thumbnail cache and the source files are documented in Section 5.9. This 
permits the identification of multiple sources of corroboration and in turn permits 
the corroboration of those artefacts, enabling the analyst to identify any sources 
which invalidate the corroboration and investigate their potential meaning. 
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In Ubuntu and Kubuntu the thumbnail cache is stored in a centralised directory 
for each user; therefore in order to maximise the data recovered from the live 
thumbnail cache it is necessary to extract and examine the thumbnail cache 
directory. The carving of data relating to these thumbnail caches from 
unallocated space is discussed in Chapters 7-9. 
 
The structure and syntax identified in Section 5.5 permit the automation of 
extracting the data and the identification and reassembly of potential file 
fragments from unallocated space; a tool could be created based upon the 
identified structure and syntax for file carving. 
 
5.12 Conclusion 
This research has shown the structural implementations of the operating system 
thumbnail caches used by Ubuntu and Kubuntu. Whilst both thumbnail caches 
have multiple sources of corroborating artefacts their thumbnail cache and the 
subrecords contained within them, this research has highlighted the significant 
differences in context between artefacts recovered from the operating systems. 
Contextual analysis of an artefact can show the user activity which may have 
led to the artefact being on the system; it has been shown that the availability of 
corroborating artefacts can have a significant impact on the strength of the 
evidence. It has also been shown that the Ubuntu thumbnail cache performs 
less stringent checks on the subrecords to determine if they require updating 
and therefore it is easy to tamper with the subrecords and mislead a user or an 
analyst.  Audio and media thumbnails do not use the thumbnail cache, however 
it was determined that a media thumbnail may also have a visual thumbnail.  
 
Finally after an analysis of the research conducted it was determined that given 
a live cache, Kubuntu can produce stronger evidence from the thumbnail cache; 
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highlighting the need for understanding the context of any artefacts recovered 
from a system. This chapter has shown some opportunities for maximising the 
recovery of evidence but it has not addressed the potential recovery of artefacts 
from unallocated space; the identification of thumbnail cache data in 
unallocated space is discussed further in Chapters 7-9.  The remaining criteria 
can be met by artefacts from the Ubuntu and Kubuntu thumbnail caches; the 
scientific based method used to extract thumbnail cache artefacts and related 
system data provides a wide range of information about system behaviour. 
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6 The structure and behaviour of the Windows 7 
Operating System Thumbnail Cache 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The release of Windows Vista prompted speculation from Forensic analysts 
about the impact of the new Operating system on investigations [Hargreaves, 
2008]. One interesting change was the move away from the directory specific 
thumbs.db, to each user having a single centralised thumbnail cache. The 
release of Windows 7 in 2009 prompted further speculation from analysts; 
additional changes were introduced to the structure and behaviour of system 
components such as Windows Desktop Search [Chivers, 2011].The centralised 
thumbnail cache format introduced in Windows Vista had also been adapted in 
the new operating system. 
 
Microsoft operating systems are installed on a significant proportion of user 
machines and it is therefore unsurprising that currently a significant proportion 
of forensic analysis involves their operating systems. Due to the likelihood of 
encountering a Windows based operating system there is significant interest in 
finding and understanding relevant artefacts within the forensic community.  
 
This Chapter identifies the structure and behaviour of the Windows 7 operating 
system thumbnail caches; it begins with the methodology employed within this 
chapter [Section 6.2]. This is followed by the identification of relevant artefacts 
in a baseline installation of Windows 7 [Section 6.3]. Section 6.4 identifies the 
structure of the thumbnail cache components. In Section 6.5 the behaviour of 
the thumbnail cache is identified through experimentation, this is followed by a 
review of artefacts related to the thumbnail cache which are present on the 
operating system [Section 6.6]. Section 6.7 looks at the effect of tampering 
with data contained within the thumbnail cache; Section 6.8 looks at forming a 
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relationship between information contained within the thumbnail cache and 
other evidence present on the system. The use of audio and visual thumbnails 
in Windows 7 is discussed in Section 6.9; this is followed by a discussion of the 
strengths of the thumbnail cache artefacts identified during this research 
[Section 6.10]. Finally the conclusion of this Chapter is presented in Section 
6.11. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
In order to evaluate the structure and behaviour of the thumbnail caches used in 
Windows 7 it is necessary to establish the methodology which will be 
implemented during this research. This section describes the general 
methodology used throughout this chapter; specific experimental methodology 
is described as appropriate throughout the chapter. 
 
A critical review of existing resources relating to Windows operating system 
thumbnail caches was conducted in Chapter 2.4; this review enables any 
methodology created for this research to take into account existing knowledge 
on the subject. The related reading in Chapter 2 identified that originally visual 
thumbnails were stored in an alternate data stream for the user generated 
source file. In Windows XP, the directory specific thumbnail cache thumbs.db 
was introduced which stored visual thumbnails and associated metadata in the 
OLE2 format. Windows Vista introduced a user specific centralised thumbnail 
cache as its primary method of storing thumbnail information; the structures of 
the binary files in the centralised cache were altered again with the introduction 
of Windows 7. Limited information is available in the public domain about the 
structure or behaviour of the Windows 7 thumbnail cache. 
 
To establish the structure and behaviour of the Windows 7 thumbnail cache it is 
necessary to perform a variety of experiments; the experiments establish the 
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way the data on a storage medium changes based upon user activity. The 
experiments were performed on virtual machines; a base line virtual machine 
was created with a 30GB hard drive. Windows 7 Ultimate was installed, using 
an ISO downloaded from the MSDN website [Microsoft, 2012a]. During the 
installation, the default settings were selected in order to mimic a typical user 
system. Once the installation was complete the baseline machine was cloned 
and examined to determine the initial state of the thumbnail cache and related 
files, this is discussed in Section 6.3. A user account was created, logged on to 
and then the machine was shut down; this ensured the user accounts default 
settings, directory structure and files were created. A clone of the baseline was 
created for each set of experiments to assist in determining the structure and 
behaviour of the thumbnail cache. This enabled the results of any actions taken 
to be compared with the baseline image to establish what changes occurred. 
For some experiments, experimental virtual machines were compared with each 
other as well as the baseline image; for example during file modification 
experiments.  
 
The virtual disk images were primarily analysed using a hexadecimal editor, and 
were also mounted in read only mode to enable browsing of the live file system 
structure. Procmon was used during each experiment to assist with identifying 
other system artefacts potentially related to the thumbnail cache. To permit the 
automated extraction of artefacts from the thumbnail cache a Python program 
was created to extract any relevant information identified throughout the 
research. 
 
In summary, a baseline 30GB virtual machine was created and a default 
installation of Windows 7 Ultimate was installed. The baseline machine was 
cloned to enable the results of the experiments to be compared with the default 
system installation. The experiments were primary analysed using a 
hexadecimal editor and a Python program was created to automate the 
extraction of the artefacts identified during this research. The following sections 
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document the state of a default Windows 7 Ultimate installation and the 
experiments performed during this research. 
 
6.3 Default installation 
The baseline virtual machine provides a point of comparison for the 
experiments conducted during the research as it enables the effects of any 
actions performed to be identified. In order to identify artefacts relating to the 
thumbnail cache which were present on the baseline virtual machine a series of 
exploratory examinations were performed. This section details the methodology 
employed to identify the location of the thumbnail cache and other related 
sources of potential interest. 
 
6.3.1 Initial Searches 
Firstly a series of initial searches were conducted on the hard disk using a 
hexadecimal editor to identify locations which may require further evaluation. A 
search for the term “thumb” resulted in several hits within the directory 
\Users\Sarah\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer, when explored it 
contained 8 files: 
 
 ExplorerStartupLog.etl 
 ExplorerStartupLog_RunOnce.etl 
 thumbcache_32.db 
 thumbcache_96.db 
 thumbcache_256.db 
 thumbcache_1024.db 
 thumbcache_idx.db 
 thumbcache_sr.db 
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The six thumbcache files identified represent the centralised implementation of 
the thumbnail cache used in Windows 7. As the thumbnail cache is stored in a 
user’s home directory it can assist in establishing an event timeline for a specific 
user area; event timeline reconstruction is discussed in Section 6.8.4. The 
search for the term “thumb” also showed the existence of a thumbcache.dll file, 
which appears to assist with thumbnail record generation; the dll was located at 
C:\Windows\System32.  
 
6.3.2 Initial state of the thumbnail cache 
Upon examination of the thumbnail cache it was identified that the 
thumbcache_sr.db only contains a basic header file by default and therefore 
gives no initial indication of its role within the thumbnail cache. The files 
thumbcache_32.db, thumbcache_96.db and thumbcache_1024.db also just 
contain a header; these files are used to store the various sizes of visual 
thumbnail. The file thumbcache_idx.db has a single entry consisting of 32 bytes 
which is located close to the centre of the file. The structure of this entry is 
described in Section 6.4.2. Lastly thumbcache_256.db has been initialised to a 
size of 1MB, and contains two identical entries; the free space within the file has 
not been initialised and may therefore contain data of evidential significance. 
The two identical subrecords within the cache file do not have visual 
thumbnails, and instead store the GUID: :{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-
00AA002F954E} (see Section 6.4.4).  
 
6.4 Identifying the structure 
In order to extract meaningful information from the Windows 7 thumbnail caches 
it is necessary to understand their structure; the structure provides a context for 
the data. This section describes the structure of the various components of the 
Windows 7 operating system thumbnail cache. 
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Figure 6-1: Directory structure for experiment test files 
 
6.4.1 Methodology 
In order to identify the structure of the Windows 7 thumbnail cache a clone of 
the Virtual Machine Image discussed in the Section 6.3 was used. The 
directory containing the thumbnail cache was extracted from the baseline 
image, to allow further examination and provide a baseline. 
 
Experiment Set 1 involved the addition of 500 different user generated files to 
the system. The addition of files to the system aimed to populate the thumbnail 
cache with data; the data could be used to ascertain the structure and syntax of 
the thumbnail cache files. In order to ensure a variety of file types were included 
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10 potential user generated file types were selected; the file types selected 
were: JPG, BMP, GIF, DOC, DOCX, XLS, PPT, PPDF, MOV and, MP3. For 
each type 50 files were selected from the corpus of files collated before 
commencing this research.  
 
A python program was created to randomly select 50 files of each file type; 
these files were then split between 25 directories. The directory structure is 
shown in Figure 6.1; a naming convention of [Set of Directories| Level of 
directory | number of directory on that level] was applied. The structure 
permitted the evaluation of the behaviour in nested folders; directories displayed 
in thumbnail view may include thumbnails for sub-directories. The main 
directory ‘MainDirectory1’ and its contents were copied onto the virtual machine 
from a USB device using the command prompt. Ten clones of the machine 
were made in its current state.  
 
 Clone 1-1: Each directory was viewed in thumbnail view for 30 
seconds starting with the A directories. 
 Clone 1-2: Each directory was viewed in list view only 
 Clone 1-3: The A directories were viewed in thumbnail view for 30 
seconds each. 
 Clone 1-4: Directories on levels 0 and 1 for each set were viewed 
in thumbnail view for 30 seconds each. 
 Clone 1-5: All directories were viewed in thumbnail mode, but for 
less than 5 seconds per directory.  
 Clone 1-6: A single file in each directory was selected with a 
single click before proceeding to the next directory; at least two of 
each file type was selected overall.   
 Clone 1-7: The previous experiment was repeated with the 
preview pane turned on. 
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 Clone 1-8: Directories at level 0 were viewed in thumbnail mode. 
The preview pane was on and each directory was selected with a 
single click. 
 Clone 1-9: The directory E was viewed in thumbnail mode. 
 Clone 1-10: Every directory was viewed in thumbnail mode with 
the preview panel on; every file was individually selected for 5 
seconds with a single click. 
 
Experiment Set 2 used 5clones of one of the virtual machines created in 
experiment set 1 (Experiment Set 1: Clone 1). This meant that at the start of this 
experiment each of the 25 directories had been accessed in Windows Explorer 
thumbnail view. This set of experiments involved modifying files either by 
modifying their metadata or contents; the modification of this information allows 
changes in the data already stored in the thumbnail cache to be identified. 
 
 Clone 2-1: Each file in the A directory set was renamed to start with 
‘AAA’ using the command line; the directories were then viewed in 
Windows Explorer thumbnail view. 
 Clone 2-2: The A directory set was moved to an attached clean USB 
storage device using the command line and then viewed in thumbnail 
view in their new location. 
 Clone 2-3: As the previous experiment except the files were moved using 
Windows Explorer. 
 Clone 2-4: Keeping the directory structure intact, the files from directory 
set B were deleted; the directories were then reviewed in thumbnail view. 
 Clone 2-5: As per the previous experiment, except only one file from 
each sub-directory was deleted. 
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The structures were reverse engineered based upon previous experiments in 
Windows Vista and the experiments documented above. The two experimental 
sets permitted the structure of the thumbnail cache to be reverse engineered; 
this provided the information documented in the following sub-sections. An 
analysis of the data collected was performed using a hex editor, and by 
comparing the different thumbnail caches based upon the actions that were 
taken it was possible to deduce the associated structure. Partial thumbnail 
cache structures have been presented on some websites [Noxa, 2008; 
Parsonage, 2012]. In contrast with prior works the present research adopts a 
systematic methodology including experiment planning and quantitative 
analysis of efficiency and effectiveness of the existing approaches to thumbnail 
fragment detection and reassembly. Any structural and syntactical information 
identified during this research will be added to the thumbnail cache extraction 
program to enable artefacts to be automatically extracted from Windows 7 
thumbnail caches. 
 
This section begins with an overview of the thumbnail cache directory structure; 
this is followed by an overview of the structures contained within the six files 
used in the thumbnail cache. 
 
6.4.2 The thumbnail cache directory structure 
In section 6.3the operating system thumbnail cache implemented in Windows 7 
was found to reside in a user’s home directory. Windows 7 has a centralised 
thumbnail cache for each user rather than the directory specific cache system 
used in Windows XP. This directory was shown to contain six thumbnail cache 
files: an index and five further files. The index holds records, which provide 
pointers to the location of subrecords in the remaining files; the structure of the 
thumbnail cache is shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
 Page 
114 
 
  
 
Figure 6-2: The centralised thumbnail cache structure 
 
The rest of this section identifies the structures present within the six thumbnail 
cache files and identifies the records and subrecords which exist within them. 
 
6.4.3 thumbcache_idx 
The file thumbcache_idx.db provides an index to the information stored within 
the thumbnail cache. The index uses a hash table to store the records. At any 
point in time each source file is represented by a single record in the index; 
however the source file may have other records in the thumbnail cache which 
have a relationship with a previous state of the file. A record contains pointers to 
the locations of the associated subrecords. The file has a standardised structure 
for records with each one using thirty two bytes; the structure determined during 
the experiments documented earlier in this section is broken down in figure 6.3. 
The unique identification string consists of sixteen hexadecimal characters 
which are known as the ThumbCacheID, this string can also be found in the 
record relating to the original source file within Windows.edb. The flags are 
related to the file type; this was established through matching the records with 
the original source files. The remaining twenty bytes store pointers to the 
subrecords for the original source file; each pointer identifies the starting 
position in bytes from the beginning of the relevant file. If the pointer is set to 
0xFFFFFFFF there is no associated subrecord in the file. This was determined 
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by extracting the images from each of the thumbnail cache files and noting the 
first byte of the subrecord; these positions were then compared with values 
within the thumbnail cache index file. 
 
 
The thumbcache_idx.db record structure is different to the one used in Windows 
Vista, which contained records which were forty bytes in size. The structure of 
Windows Vista records was determined during preliminary research for this 
thesis using the same methodology. The last modification time of the source file 
has been removed, which accounts for the eight byte difference in record size.   
 
Within the index file, space for one hundred and one records is allocated at a 
time; the addition of records is covered further in Section 6.5 Below is an 
example annotated record from the Windows 7 Thumbcache_idx.db: 
Thumbcache_idx record structure: 
8 bytes: Unique Identification string 
4 bytes: Flags representing file type 
4 bytes: Pointer to location of subrecord in thumbcache_32.db 
4 bytes: Pointer to location of subrecord in thumbcache_96.db 
4 bytes: Pointer to location of subrecord in thumbcache_256.db 
4 bytes: Pointer to location of subrecord in thumbcache_1024.db 
4 bytes: Pointer to location of subrecord in thumbcache_sr.db 
 
Figure 6-3: Thumbcache_idx record structure 
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Start of Record 
87 F7 6A 62 4B 7B C1 36 02 80 00 08 FF FFFFFF00 B3 05 00 
 87 F7 6A 62 4B 7B C1 36 – Thumbnail Cache Record ID 
 02 80 00 08 – Flags denoting type of file 
 FF FFFFFF – Offset of subrecord in thumbcache_32.db 
 00 B3 05 00 – Offset of subrecord in thumbcache_96.db 
C7 E6 02 00 FF FFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
C7 E6 02 00 – Offset of subrecord in thumbcache_256.db 
FF FFFFFF – Offset of subrecord in thumbcache_1024.db.db 
FF FFFFFF – Offset of subrecord in thumbcache_sr.db 
End of record 
 
6.4.4 thumbcache_32, 96, 256 and 1024 
The centralised thumbnail cache system implemented in Windows 7 allows for a 
maximum of four differently sized images to be stored for each thumbnail 
source file. If the thumbnail cache is used as intended the images stored are up 
to a maximum of 32x32, 96x96, 256x256 and 1024x1024 pixels respectively. 
Each of the four sizes has its own file into which subrecords are stored; the 
structure of a subrecord can be divided into two separate sections: the header 
and the image.  The subrecord header section contains the metadata for the 
subrecord and has a clearly defined structure. This is followed by the image 
section which follows the standard structure for the image file type implemented 
(JPEG, BMP or PNG image formats).  The structure for the subrecord header is 
defined in figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6-4: Subrecord header 
 
The Windows 7 subrecord header is 32 bytes, which is 8 bytes smaller than 
theWindows Vista implementation; this is due to the removal of 8 bytes 
representing the file extension in Unicode. The Windows Vista structure was 
determined during the preliminary experiments performed before this research 
using the same methodology described in this Chapter for the identification of 
the Windows 7 thumbnail cache structure. The checksum values provide a 
method of authenticating the values in the subrecord. Below is an annotated 
example subrecord which was created during this research. 
 
  
Subrecord header: 
 4 bytes – Subrecord signature 
 4 bytes – Complete size of subrecord in bytes 
 8 bytes – Thumbnail cache ID 
4 bytes – Size of Identifier value in Unicode, during 
experimentation only a value of 32 bytes was recorded for visual 
thumbnail subrecords.  
 4 bytes – Size of padding after identifier value 
 4 bytes – Size of the data section of the subrecord 
 4 bytes – Unknown but during experiments always 00 00 00 00 
 8 bytes – Data checksum (CRC 64 value) 
 8 bytes – Header checksum (CRC 64 value) 
 Identifier value size (generally 32 bytes) – Identifier in Unicode 
Padding value size (generally 0) – Padding if required for the 
identifier value 
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Start of standard thumbnail cache subrecord 
Start of subrecord header 
000000B0   43 4D 4D 4D30 09 00 0047 F2 B6 FD 97 7E B8 24   CMMM0   Gò¶ý—~¸$ 
 43 4D 4D4D – subrecord signature 
 30 09 00 00 – 2352 – complete size of subrecord in bytes 
 47 F2 B6 FD 97 7E B8 24  -Thumbcache ID  
000000C0   20 00 00 0000 00 00 00E0 08 00 0000 00 00 00           à        
 20 00 00 00 – Size of Identifier string 
 00 00 00 00  - Size of padding 
 E0 08 00 00 – size of subrecord data in bytes 
 00 00 00 00 – Unknown but always 00 00 00 00          
000000D0   CF 22 EE 39 0B C5 17 37E6 14 5C 59 6B DA F0 B6   Ï"î9 Å 7æ \YkÚð¶ 
 CF 22 EE 39 0B C5 17 37 – Data checksum 
 E6 14 5C 59 6B DA F0 B6 – Header checksum 
000000E0   32 00 34 00 62 00 38 00  37 00 65 00 39 00 37 00   2 4 b 8 7 e 9 7  
000000F0   66 00 64 00 62 00 36 00  66 00 32 00 34 00 37 00   f d b 6 f 2 4 7  
  
End of subrecord header 
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00000100   FF D8FF E000 104A 46  49 46 00 01 010100 00ÿØÿà  JFIF       
 FF D8 – JPEG file signature 
 FF E0 - Application use marker 
 00 10 – Length of APPO field 
 4A 46 49 46 00 – Identifier – “JFIF” 
 01 01 – Version number 
 01 - Unit – dots per inch 
 00 00 – Horizontal resolution – 0   
00000110   00 0000 00 FF DB 00 43  00 05 03 04 04 04 03 05       ÿÛ C         
 00 00 – Vertical resolution – 0 
 00 - Horizontal pixel count - 0 
 00 - Vertical pixel count - 0 
 …(JPEG image data continues) 
000009D0   EB ED 43 E6 E8 75 D1 8E  05 41 7B 46 EE 7F FF D9ëíCæèuÑŽ A{FîÿÙ 
FF D9 – JPEG file footer 
End of subrecord 
 
The subrecord above shows a standard visual thumbnail subrecord from the 
thumbcache_256.db file; the image data contained within the subrecord is in 
standard JPEG format. Whilst the thumbnail cache predominately stores visual 
thumbnails, the thumbcache_256.db also holds non-standard subrecords. 
Below is an extracted subrecord which does not contain an image, instead it 
stores data in a Unicode format, in this particular case it is a GUID. 
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Start of subrecord 
14F8CE010                            43 4D 4D 4D80 00 00 00           CMMM€    
 43 4D 4D4D – Subrecord identifier 
 80 00 00 00 – Size of subrecord in bytes 
 
14F8CE020   E8 4E B8 F9 51 BC 24 0950 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   èN¸ùQ¼$ P        
 E8 4E B8 F9 51 BC 24 09 - Thumbcache ID 
 50 00 00 00 – Size of identifier 
 00 00 00 00 – Size of padding 
 
14F8CE030   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
 00 00 00 00 - Size of subrecord data 
 00 00 00 00 – Unknown but always 00 00 00 00 
  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 – Checksum for data section 
 
14F8CE040   1D FE 28 91 9F 41 8B 4D  3A 00 3A 00 7B 00 36 00    þ(‘ŸA‹M: : { 6  
 1D FE 28 91 9F 41 8B 4D – Checksum for the header section 
 
14F8CE050   34 00 35 00 46 00 46 00  30 00 34 00 30 00 2D 00   4 5 F F 0 4 0 -  
14F8CE060   35 00 30 00 38 00 31 00  2D 00 31 00 30 00 31 00   5 0 8 1 - 1 0 1  
14F8CE070   42 00 2D 00 39 00 46 00  30 00 38 00 2D 00 30 00   B - 9 F 0 8 - 0  
14F8CE080   30 00 41 00 41 00 30 00  30 00 32 00 46 00 39 00   0 A A 0 0 2 F 9  
14F8CE090   35 00 34 00 45 00 7D 00                            5 4 E } 
 
End of subrecord 
 
The subrecord above contains the GUID String“::{645FF040-5081-101B-
9F08-00AA002F954E}” in the identifier field within the subrecord header. This 
GUID is the value used for the recycle bin and relates to the associated icon 
located on the desktop.  
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The following two subrecords show the storage of allocated drive letters and 
available networked machines. Various devices were attached to the virtual 
machine to ascertain which drive letters were stored within the thumbnail cache. 
It was determined they are stored for all allocated drive letters which can be 
seen in the left hand pane of the standard Windows File Explorer, including 
portable storage devices; this is discussed further in Section 6.6. By adding, 
removing and modifying the names of network locations available to the virtual 
machine it was determined any network locations available when the Windows 
File explorer is being used are stored. This includes the name of the machine 
on which the thumbnail cache has been created. 
 
Start of subrecord 
00000110                            43 4D 4D4D 36 00 00 00           CMMM6    
00000120   87 05 EA 36 8A 72 17 75  06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ‡ ê6Šr u         
00000130   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                    
00000140   C9 20 C6 9D 50 B9 16 12  43 00 3A 00 5C 00         É Æ P¹  C : \ 
 This subrecord relates to the drive allocation C:\ 
End of subrecord 
 
Start of subrecord 
000001B0                                  43 4D 4D4D 48 00             CMMMH  
000001C0   00 00 F6 48 09 04 67 C9  7F DA 18 00 00 00 00 00     öHgÉ Ú       
000001D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                    
000001E0   00 00 44 1E BA 3B 95 FA  E2 9D 5C 00 5C 00 53 00     D º;•úâ\ \ S 
000001F0   41 00 52 00 41 00 48 00  2D 00 44 00 45 00 4C 00   A R A H - D E L 
00000200   4C 00       L 
 This subrecord relates to the network place \\SARAH-DELL   
End of subrecord 
 
6.4.5 thumbcache_sr 
Whilst this file is present in both the Windows Vista and 7 implementations of 
the operating system thumbnail cache, experimentation has yet to identify its 
purpose. The only recorded data for this file is in the standard header. 
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6.5 Identifying the behaviour 
The thumbnail cache can exhibit three kinds of behaviour towards the 
information stored in it: information can be added to the thumbnail cache, it can 
be modified or it can be deleted. This section identifies the behaviour the 
Windows 7 thumbnail cache exhibits when a user interacts with the operating 
system. For the experiments in this section both Microsoft Office and Adobe 
PDF viewer were installed on the baseline machine described in Section 6.3; 
the default settings were selected during their installation. The software was 
installed to allow the artefacts created in the thumbnail cache following the use 
of common user file formatsto be examined during the experiments.  
 
6.5.1 The creation of records and subrecords 
When a user interacts with a system, there are several ways in which they can 
create a new file;for example: they can use an application, they can move a file 
from a storage device, or they can download a file from the internet. They can 
also view the files using a variety of methods such as in an application or in a 
file browser. As discussed in Chapter 2, establishing the appropriate mensrea 
occurred is important in legal proceedings; therefore it is necessary to 
understand how the artefacts came to be in their current state as this may help 
to establish the suspect’s mensrea. This sub-section identifies the behaviour 
which results in records and subrecords being added to the thumbnail cache. 
 
6.5.1.1 Using different methods for adding files 
When a file is created in an application such as Paint or Microsoft Word a file 
can be saved to a storage location, allowing the created file to be accessed 
again at a later date. An experiment was conducted where 50 files were created 
on the virtual machines using the installed office applications and the pre-
existing software: notepad, and paint. The files were saved using the software 
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to a variety of locations on the storage device; the thumbnail cache was then 
viewed to ascertain what changes occurred. It was noted that when a file is 
created in this way a record relating to the file was not added to the thumbnail 
cache. The created source files were then viewed in thumbnail view using the 
file explorer, or a dialogue Window used for opening and saving documents. 
The analysis of the thumbnail cache showed that viewing the visual thumbnails 
in this way led to the creation of a thumbnail record for each potential thumbnail 
cache source file.  
 
Figure 6.5shows several files being viewed using the standard file browser 
(Windows Explorer). In the first experiment the directory was opened and the 
files were viewed without any further interaction; this resulted in each potential 
user created thumbnail cache source file having subrecords added into the 
thumbcache_256.db and thumbcache_96.db file. The system created images 
such as the one used for the directory ‘Not Viewed’ were only added to the 
thumbcache_96.db. In the second experiment when the size of the icons used 
was increased from medium to large icons, the resulting additions to the 
thumbnail cache did not change. The same directory was then viewed using the 
extra-large icons; this resulted in the directory visual thumbnail also being 
added to the thumbcache_256.db file.  
 
In the third experiment the file ‘Goat.jpg’ was selected using a single click, 
which led to the file and its metadata populating the preview and information 
panels. On analysis of the thumbnail cache it was recorded that subrecords 
were added to the thumbcache_1024.db file when a source file is selected and 
previewed in the preview pane of the file browser. A further experiment was 
performed with an image file of 1000 x1000, and a second image of 200 x 200 
pixels being selected in the same way; on selection of the files the images 
populated the preview and information panels. However only the 1000 x 1000 
pixel image had a corresponding subrecord added to the thumbcache_1024.db 
file; this suggests a subrecord is only added if the image being previewed is 
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greater than the maximum size image permitted in the next smallest thumbnail 
cache file. Throughout the experimentation in this chapter it has been noted that 
image files, PDF files and directories viewed in thumbnail mode consistently 
add records to the thumbnail cache; however visual thumbnails are not always 
stored for Microsoft Office files. This may be due to the addition of a checkbox 
to enable the saving of a visual thumbnail in the Save as Dialog box in Microsoft 
Office 2007 as shown in figure 6.6.  
 
 
Figure 6-5: The creation of subrecords in thumbcache_1024.db 
 
When files are viewed on moveable storage devices in thumbnail mode, entries 
are added to the thumbnail cache if the device is indexed by the system. A 
series of experiments were conducted where a directory containing 100 user 
generated files were moved from a USB storage device to the virtual machine.  
In the first experiment the storage device was attached to the virtual machine 
and the directory was viewed using Windows Explorer, the drive was indexed 
by default. The directory and its contents were then moved from the USB 
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storage device to the User’s “My Documents” Folder using Windows Explorer; 
the directory’s contents were then viewed in its new location.  
 
 
Figure 6-6: Introduction of a save thumbnail option 
 
The results of the experiment have showed that when a file is moved from an 
indexed storage device to a hard disk drive,2 records are added for each 
potential thumbnail cache source file. The first record represents the file on the 
storage media, the second represents the file on the virtual machine; therefore 
whilst two records are created only one has a relationship with the current state 
of the file. The addition of two records based on the same file due to the 
movement between indexed media may also help with event reconstruction. A 
subrecord containing the drive allocation letter was also added in the 
thumbcache_256 file. This shows that thumbnail cache entries for portable 
media may be present in the thumbnail cache and may provide corroboration 
that a device has an association with a particular machine or user. When the 
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experiment was repeated with a non-indexed external storage media records 
relating to the user files were not added to the thumbnail cache; instead a 
thumbs.db file was created. The subrecord containing the drive allocation letter 
was still added to the thumbcache_256 file. 
 
In order to ascertain the artefacts present in the thumbnail cache if a user views 
files in network storage the set of 100 user generated files were stored on a 
second virtual machine in a shared directory. The machine formed part of the 
network with the experimental virtual machine; the files in the shared directory 
were viewed using Windows Explorer from the experimental virtual machine 
and the results were analysed. The results showed that network storage viewed 
in thumbnail cache mode does not create entries in the thumbnail cache; 
however a thumbs.db file was created in the shared directory whilst it was being 
viewed using the experimental virtual machine.  
 
A further experiment was conducted by moving the files from the shared 
directory onto the experimental virtual machine and into the current user’s “My 
Documents” Directory. The files were moved using Windows Explorer and 
viewed in their new location. On analysis of the thumbnail cache a single set of 
records was present for each file viewed. The results of this experiment showed 
that visual thumbnails of the files were not present in the virtual machine until 
the files were moved to a local drive; this was due to the network drive not being 
indexed by the virtual machine’s operating system. 
 
In Section 6.4.1 an experiment was described where a collection of 25 
directories were viewed (Clone 1-1); when the thumbnail cache was analysed 
after this experiment it was noted that the subrecords were stored in the order 
the directories had been viewed. New subrecords are appended to the end of 
the file. This experiment was expanded on by repeating the experiment, but 
leaving 24 hours between viewing each directory. On analysis of the thumbnail 
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cache it was noted that the subrecords relating to the user generated content 
viewed did not alter their relative position.  
 
Any subrecords added to a thumbnail cache file are appended to the end of that 
file; however the index file is a hash table, where entries are assigned a place in 
the table based on the eight byte thumbnail cache ID number using the 
following calculation[Personal Communication from H.Chivers, 2010]. 
 
                = Position in hash table within thumbcache_idx.db 
Where  
X is the first 4 bytes in little endian of the thumbcache ID 
Y is the second 4 bytes in little endian of the thumbcache ID 
Z is the number of positions currently in the hash table 
 
The index allocates one hundred and one spaces in the thumbnail cache when 
it is initialised. A series of experiments were performed where 1000 user 
created files were added to the virtual machine in sets of 10; each group was 
then viewed using Windows Explorer. The thumbnail cache was then viewed to 
ascertain the size and growth of the thumbnail cache. The results showed that 
for index sizes fewer than five hundred and five records, each time a clash 
occurs in the hash table, another one hundred and one spaces are added to the 
table. For larger index sizes the number of new records added each time 
increases but is always a multiple of one hundred and one. The hash values for 
all the existing records are then recalculated to account for the new table size. 
 
Any record added to the thumbnail cache contains associated data in the 
Windows.edb file; the record within the windows.edb contains a thumbcache ID 
which allows a relationship between a source file and a thumbnail cache record 
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to be shown [Douglas, 2009].Figure 6.7 shows a file ‘Cake.JPG’, and shows the 
structure of the relationship between the files. 
 
It is important to note that records within the thumbnail cache may not be 
directly associated with a visual thumbnail; these records may instead hold 
information stored in Unicode in the identifier section of the subrecord header. 
During experiments to determine the behaviour of visual thumbnail subrecords, 
non-standard subrecords were observed in the thumbcache_256.db file, 
analysis showed these subrecords to contain: GUIDs relating to entries in the 
Windows registry, the letters associated with allocated drives, and the names of 
network places.  
 
 
Figure 6-7: The relationship between a file and a record in the thumbnail cache 
 
The thumbnail cache subrecords relating to drive letters and network places are 
generated when the file browser is used. This was identified by using a clean 
virtual machine to open Windows Explorer using the Computer shortcut on the 
desktop; this screen was left open for 5 minutes and then the virtual machine 
was shut down. The thumbnail cache was then analysed. As can be seen in 
Figure 6.8the right side of the file browser has icons for drives, folder locations 
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and network places. As these items use default icons, only the standard 
metadata in the subrecord header is stored in the thumbnail cache. New 
subrecords are added when locations are added to the right side panel, either 
by the system or a user and are visible in the file browser. 
 
Subrecords relating to locations which are no longer present do not appear to 
be removed. This was shown by continuing with the experiment over a 12 week 
period where 8 devices were originally on the same network as the virtual 
machine; every 4 weeks a device was removed from the network; Windows 
Explorer was then viewed to confirm the device was no longer available. At the 
end of the experiment the thumbnail cache was analysed and subrecords 
relating to all 8 original devices and the virtual machine were found. This may 
be a useful source of information for analysts as it can provide a list of drives 
which have been allocated and machines which have been networked to the 
users machine; it also provides the name of the users machine as this is shown 
in the network places list within the panel. Further investigation of drive 
allocation and network place subrecords is discussed in Section 6.6. 
 
 
Figure 6-8: A screenshot from a test to see if records were created for files which 
had not been viewed 
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6.5.1.2 Circumstances where information is added to the thumbnail cache 
A record is added to the thumbnail cache when no matching record currently 
exists for a given URI and the file at the URI is a potential thumbnail cache 
source file. For a record to match, the file must have the same last modification 
time as recorded in Windows.edb. 
 
A new record can be created under the following circumstance: 
 No matching record found within the current thumbcache_idx.db 
 A directory is viewed using the file browser, or the file browser 
within an application using thumbnail mode 
 The directory being viewed contains file types which are 
compatible with the thumbnail cache 
 A file exists within the directory which does not currently have a 
thumbnail cache record, or a subrecord of the appropriate size. 
 
6.5.2 The modification of records and subrecords 
A user can modify a file in three distinct ways: by modifying the contents of the 
file, altering the file’s URI, or deleting the file. This sub-section discusses the 
experiments performed to ascertain the behaviour of the thumbnail cache when 
the file is modified; Section 6.5.3 discusses the deletion of files. 
 
6.5.2.1 Modifying the contents of a file 
In order to ascertain the behaviour of the thumbnail cache when a user modified 
a file, the baseline virtual machine created in section 6.4 for experiment set 1 
was cloned. The virtual machine contained 500 files, 20 Microsoft Office files 
and 10 image files were modified using their default applications. The files were 
all located in the file browser, and then selected to open, each file was then 
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modified, saved and closed. The thumbnail cache was examined after the file 
was closed and no related changes to the thumbnail cache were observed.  
 
The modified files were then viewed using a variety of methods, including 
through the open command in their default application and through the file 
browser. The results showed that when a file was viewed in thumbnail view, the 
visual thumbnails associated with the source file were updated to reflect the 
current state of the file. During the experiments it was noted that the 
thumbcache_1024.db image, where present was not consistently updated when 
the subrecord was viewed.  
 
6.5.2.2 Modifying the files URI 
If a source file changes its corresponding URI, a new record is generated in the 
thumbnail cache and no alteration is made to the existing record. This effect 
was recorded during an experiment described in Section 6.4.1where a file was 
placed at a URI and viewed to ensure a record was added in the thumbnail 
cache. Once the record was stored in the thumbnail cache, the URI of the file 
was changed; this involved either altering the file’s name or the entire path. The 
file was then viewed at its new URI and the effect to the thumbnail cache was 
analysed.  
 
When the file name was changed or the file was moved to a new location on the 
storage media no effect was noticed in the thumbnail cache. When the file was 
moved to an external storage device a new record was created in the 
thumbcache_idx.db, with subrecords also being created. Aside from the 
different thumbcache ID value, the record and subrecords were identical. This 
suggests that it may be possible to create a false relationship between artefacts 
in the thumbnail cache and a source file. This could be achieved by an analyst 
forming a relationship between a user generated file and an entry in the 
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thumbnail cache based solely upon the visual thumbnail and the file looking 
similar.  The strength of a relationship based upon the image data is discussed 
in Section 6.8.2. 
 
Interestingly, if the file is returned to its original storage media and URI, the 
existing records are reused if the last modification time is equal to the one 
currently stored. Whilst experimenting with changing the name of a directory, 
which had a folder thumbnail, it was noted that this caused regeneration of the 
folder image. The new visual thumbnail used different images within the folder; 
however when the directory was changed back to the original name, the old 
visual thumbnail was displayed. This occurred even when the files relating to 
the folder image were removed from the directory. It was also noted that having 
multiple file browsers open with the directories being experimented on in view 
caused all information to be regenerated at each change, which meant old 
records were not used. 
 
In figure 6.8 a directory is being viewed using Windows Explorer, the directory 
contains a sub-directory named ‘Not Viewed’; which is represented by a folder 
and a selection of thumbnails. Experimentation has shown that the thumbnails 
used to represent the contents of a directory are selected when the thumbnail is 
first generated. If the images used in the thumbnail are removed from the 
directory, the directory thumbnail is not always updated, which may lead to an 
inaccurate representation of the directory’s current contents. Only files which 
are used for the directories visual thumbnail record have records created for 
them; therefore there may be records in the thumbnail cache for files which the 
user has not viewed. Since each user area has its own centralised thumbnail 
cache, the thumbnails used in the directory visual thumbnail must represent 
source files which have been present in the directory at some point.   
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It is also interesting to note that the two images being displayed for the directory 
are not identical, this is because they are both being taken from different 
subrecords for that entry in the thumbnail cache and the subrecords were 
generated at different times and were invoked by different processes which 
were unaware of other subrecords for the thumbnail cache entry. 
 
6.5.3 The deletion of records and subrecords 
There are several options in built into Windows 7 to allow the removal of the 
thumbnail cache; firstly the cache could be deleted by the user. However if the 
cache is simply deleted, the cache will start again, this may remove traces of a 
file which is no longer on the system. Since a file leaves multiple traces on a 
system, experimentation has shown that with the removal of the thumbnail 
cache, traces of a file can still be found in Windows.edb. The disk clean up 
wizard provides an option to remove the thumbnail cache, this simply deletes 
the current thumbnail cache; a new cache would be created next time it was 
called.   
 
The local group policy editor has an option to “turn off the caching of thumbnails 
in hidden thumbs.db files”, suggesting that Windows 7 can utilise both the 
directory specific and centralised forms of thumbnail cache. During the 
experiments conducted in this research, thumbs.db files were identified in 
directories which were accessed over a network or on partitions which were not 
set to be indexed by the operating system.  
 
Experiments showed that if a file is deleted from the system, it is not 
automatically removed from the thumbnail cache, instead the record remains; 
the cache also does not remove records which have not been accessed for 
some time. However it is possible to alter the default settings within Windows 7, 
to limit the size of the thumbnail cache, which experiments have shown causes 
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the cache to remove inactive records when it reaches its maximum size. The 
cache has been shown to create a sub-directory within the explorer directory 
named ThumbCacheToDelete; this directory is where outdated versions of 
thumbnail cache files are placed prior to deletion. Moving the thumbnail cache 
files allows the system to regenerate new files; this is particularly used when the 
index requires extra space.  During this research no method tested has led to 
the secure deletion of thumbnail cache files, therefore once deleted the files are 
available in unallocated space. 
 
6.5.4 Fragmentation of the thumbnail cache 
The allocation of a predetermined amount of space each time the thumbnail 
cache files appears to minimise fragmentation, by ensuring a collection of 
records are stored together. However the individual files tend to be fragmented 
in clusters the size of the file space allocation unit. Therefore as the files are 
unlikely to be contiguous, the grouping of several records or subrecords is likely 
to assist with identification. 
 
6.6 Identifying traces left outside the thumbnail cache 
This section identifies the artefacts present on a Windows 7 system outside the 
thumbnail cache.  The thumbnail cache works in conjunction with the rest of the 
operating system, and also interacts with user files. Therefore it is necessary to 
identify any correlation between artefacts within the thumbnail cache and those 
left on the remainder of the system.  
 
The experiments were designed to mimic typical user behaviour to identify 
information which changed on the remainder on the system that could be 
related to changes within the thumbnail cache. During the experiments potential 
thumbnail cache source files were added, modified and deleted both on the 
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main and external storage devices. The resulting changes to each virtual 
machine were analysed using a variety of tools, including Encase and WinHex. 
 
Table 6-1: A summary of the user activity which may lead to subrecords being 
present in the thumbnail cache 
 Windows 7 
Records in thumbcache_idx.db  A URI with a visual thumbnail is viewed in thumbnail 
view 
 A URI which represents a shortcut is viewed in 
thumbnail view 
Subrecords in thumbcache_32.db  Generally system icons or directories viewed in 
thumbnail view 
 Visual thumbnails of user generated content selected 
and viewed in the detail panel of Windows Explorer 
Subrecords in thumbcache_96.db  Directories viewed in thumbnail view 
 Visual thumbnails of user generated content viewed 
in thumbnail view 
Subrecords in 
thumbcache_256.db 
 
Standard 
subrecor
d 
 Visual thumbnails of user generated content viewed 
in thumbnail view from indexed drives 
 Directories viewed in thumbnail view 
 Visual thumbnails of images used in directory visual 
thumbnails 
Partial 
subrecor
d 
 GUIDs relating to system icons viewed in thumbnail 
view 
 ID values relating to icons for shortcuts viewed in 
thumbnail view 
 When viewed in Windows Explorer navigation or main 
panels: 
 Letters relating to allocated drives 
 Network place names 
Subrecords in 
thumbcache_1024.db 
 Visual thumbnails of user generated content viewed 
in extra-large thumbnail view from indexed drives 
 Visual thumbnails of user generated content selected 
and viewed in the preview panel of Windows Explorer 
Subrecords in thumbcache_sr.db No information added during experimentation 
thumbs.db Created on non-indexed drives when user files are viewed in 
thumbnail view 
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6.6.1 Windows.edb 
The database for Windows Desktop Search stores a wide range of information 
including comprehensive metadata about user generated files [Chivers, 2011]; 
therefore the database can potentially be used to provide extra and 
corroborating information on a user file which may be of interest to an analyst. 
Interestingly, the Windows Desktop Search database contains a field which 
holds the thumbnail cache ID [Douglas, 2009]; this field can be used to form a 
relationship between a file indexed in the database and a record in the 
thumbnail cache. Other metadata stored in Windows.edb may also assist in 
strengthening the relationship between a source file and the thumbnail cache 
for example Exif data. However, there may not be a record in the database 
relating to the file or thumbnail cache ID the analyst is looking for; Chivers 
proposes several approaches to recovering deleted records in the database, 
which may recover the record the analyst requires [2011].  
 
6.6.2 Registry 
There are records stored in the Windows 7 thumbnail cache that do not contain 
visual thumbnails [Section 6.4.4; Morris, 2011]; some of these records contain 
a GUID. The GUID can represent system icons found on the user’s desktop; the 
relationship can be identified by searching for the GUID within the registry. 
Figure 6.9 shows the results of searching for a GUID which relates to the 
Recycle Bin; by selecting the default icon directory shown in Figure 6.10it is 
possible to identify the location of the icons being used. In this example the 
icons are stored in imageres.dll in positions 54 and 55 depending on the state of 
the recycle bin; an example contents from an imageres.dll file is shown in 
Figure 6.11.  
 
In order to identify the icon used on the desktop it is necessary to identify the 
contents of file containing the icon as the result may be different to the standard 
icon, for example the user may be using a customised theme. Restore points 
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can identify when the icons appeared on the desktop; this is discussed further in 
Section 6.8. Generally system icons are added when a user first logs into their 
user area, however it is possible to manually add system icons later. This was 
established by examining the baseline machine described in Section 6.3, 
where an account had been created and logged on to in order to complete the 
creation of the account. On examination of the thumbnail cache GUID records 
were identified which were searched for in the registry hives. The GUIDs were 
found to correspond with “My Computer” and the “Recycle Bin”; the two system 
icons present by default on the user’s desktop.  
 
Further experiments were performed on the machine by adding 100 JPEG files 
a day over a 10 day period from a USB device to the user’s documents 
directory. After the first day the system icon for the “Control Panel” was added 
to the desktop; this resulted in the corresponding GUID being added to the 
thumbnail cache after the 100 visual thumbnails. Interestingly there was no 
associated record in the thumbnail cache index file for the subrecord containing 
the Control Panel GUID. After the experiment the virtual machine was analysed 
and the Control Panel GUID was found to have moved above the records for 
the images added in Day 1. The subrecords containing GUID’s generally move 
to the top of the thumbnail cache file and do not always contain a reference in 
the index file. System icons may also be removed by a user; however the 
reference to the icon appears to remain in the thumbnail cache which may 
assist in identifying the behaviour of the user. 
 
 
Figure 6-9:Searching for a GUID 
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Figure 6-10: Identifying the Default Icon 
 
6.6.3 Shortcuts 
Shortcuts on the system can also have visual thumbnails; these can be system, 
application or user created icons. Figure 6.12 shows an example of a shortcut 
Icon for the directory ‘Forensic Software’; the icon is not stored in the thumbnail 
cache, however a reference to the icon is. This was identified by using the 
virtual machine Clone 1-1 as described in Section 6.4; 20 shortcuts were 
created on the system, including the one for the ‘Forensic Software’ directory. 
The shortcuts when viewed in Windows Explorer were associated with an icon; 
when the thumbnail cache was examined new entries were found in the 
thumbcache_256 file. The new entries contained a hexadecimal character string 
and no visual thumbnail. The results show that the reference is a subrecord 
without an image, the name field stores a 30-32 hexadecimal character string in 
Unicode. For software shortcuts, there is generally a registry key which stores 
the default icon to be used, which like the desktop icons could be extracted by 
the analyst. 
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Figure 6-11: An example contents from an imageres.dll 
 
 
Figure 6-12: A Shortcut Icon in Windows Explorer 
 
6.6.4 External Media 
Visual thumbnails may be stored in the centralised cache for any potential 
source file which is stored on an indexed volume; during the experiments 
documented in this chapter the external media were automatically indexed 
when connected to the system. An experiment was performed using the 
baseline virtual machine where 10 external USB devices were each attached. 
Each USB device contained 25 of the files chosen during the experiments 
performed in Section 6.4. First the Computer icon was selected in the 
navigation pane of Windows Explorer to expand the list of currently available 
drives; on examination each of the 10 USB device drive allocations were found 
in the thumbnail cache. The contents of each drive were then viewed in 
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thumbnail view for 30 seconds. Upon examination records in the thumbnail 
cache were present for each of the files on the external media even though the 
files had not been present on the main storage media. 
 
Part of the algorithm for the generation of the thumbnail cache ID uses the 
volume ID; the generation of the thumbnail cache ID is discussed further in 
Section 6.8.3. Therefore by generating an ID for a file it may be possible to 
show the volume the file resided on. However, it would be time consuming to 
attempt to reverse engineer the ID given the number of variables involved in its 
creation.  
 
6.6.5 Encrypted Containers 
Encrypted containers such as those used in TrueCrypt [2013] can be mounted 
as a volume by a user to enable the content to be accessed. Once the content 
is mounted it is possible to index the container the same as a normal volume. In 
order to ascertain whether any information from the TrueCrypt drives was 
stored in the thumbnail cache 3 clones of the baseline virtual machine were 
created. 
 
 Experiment 1: A 10GB NTFS TrueCrypt volume was created on the 
user’s desktop. The file structure and associated files documented in 
Section 6.4 were copied into the volume. The contents of the drive were 
viewed in Windows Explorer thumbnail view, a file in each sub-directory 
was selected using a single click. 
 Experiment 2: A 2GB FAT TrueCrypt volume was created on the user’s 
desktop. The file structure and associated files documented in Section 
6.4 were copied into the volume.The contents of the drive were viewed in 
Windows Explorer thumbnail view, a file in each sub-directory was 
selected using a single click. 
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 Experiment 3: Experiments 1 and 2 were repeated, but with the option to 
index the mounted drives selected. 
 
In experiment 3, as expected both drives created records in the centralised 
thumbnail cache for each of the files viewed. In experiments 1 and 2, a 
thumbs.db file was created in each directory viewed on the drive. The drive 
letter assigned to the volume had an associated record in the centralised 
thumbnail cache; no other identifiable information about the volume was stored 
in the central thumbnail cache. In experiment 2 it was found that the selection of 
records within a FAT32 TrueCrypt volume by a user results in the creation of 
corresponding records within the thumbnail cache. 
 
6.7 Alteration of thumbnail cache artefacts 
This section investigates the strength of the thumbnail cache with respect to 
tampering; three different pieces of data relating to the thumbnail cache are 
manipulated during these experiments to attempt to mislead a user or analyst. 
 
6.7.1 Metadata 
It is difficult to alter the metadata of a thumbnail cache record in order to 
mislead the user; the thumbnail cache is closely linked to data within the 
Windows.edb file as well as the original source file. An experiment was 
performed where the data in a record was switched with another existing 
record. This meant although the records maintained their position in the index, 
they pointed to the wrong locations in the subrecord files. Such a modification 
also required the thumbnail cache ID in the subrecords to be altered, as well as 
the checksum for the subrecord header. Despite changing all known relevant 
metadata, the experiments failed to get an incorrect subrecord image to be 
displayed, with each attempt resulting in the correct subrecord being recreated 
and appended to the end of the appropriate file. This shows comprehensive 
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checks are performed on the associated metadata during the thumbnail image 
generation algorithms. 
 
6.7.2 Visual thumbnail 
When a user is viewing a file in thumbnail view, the corresponding visual 
thumbnail is requested from the cache; if it exists the visual thumbnail is 
displayed, otherwise one is created. This was observed during the experiments 
described in Section 6.4.1 where files were added to the system. Therefore the 
ability to modify the visual thumbnail may mislead the user by misrepresenting 
the file’s contents. Several experiments were performed to attempt to get the 
system to display an inaccurate visual thumbnail; these are described below.  
 
First just the image section of a thumbnail subrecord was modified; the image 
was replaced with another pre-existing visual thumbnail. It was determined that 
the checksum for the image would also require modification to match the 
updated information; once the subrecord had been modified the relating source 
file was viewed in the file browser. The result proved interesting as initially the 
modified visual thumbnail was displayed; however this was replaced by the 
actual visual thumbnail for the file within a few seconds.  
 
A second test showed that if the directory was only viewed quickly, for example 
a user upon entering the directory selects a sub-directory to view, that the 
subrecord entry remains in its altered state. This suggests that it may be 
possible to mislead a user if they were browsing through directories without 
giving the thumbnail cache an opportunity to authenticate the results. It also 
suggests that a tampered record which has not been viewed would remain in 
the tampered state, and if appropriate metadata such as the checksum was 
altered it would appear to be a valid entry. However whilst it is possible tamper 
with the visual thumbnail, it would be infeasible to edit all additional artefacts 
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which have a relationship with the thumbnail cache record; therefore if 
tampering had occurred an analyst would identify conflicting artefacts. 
 
6.7.3 Original source file 
In Section 6.5 it was shown that the modification of the contents of a user file 
within the virtual machine would result in the corresponding record in the 
thumbnail cache being updated the next time it was viewed in thumbnail view. A 
further experiment was performed where the last modified date of 6 files were 
altered; the times were moved backwards by 24 hours so that the modification 
time of each file appeared a day earlier. The files were then viewed in Windows 
Explorer thumbnail view; there was a noticeable delay in displaying the visual 
thumbnails whilst they were regenerated. If the last modification date in the 
original source file is altered to a time before that stored in Windows.edb, then 
the thumbnail subrecord is regenerated next time it is called.  
 
It is possible to modify the contents of a file within a hexadecimal editor, 
therefore ensuring the files metadata remains accurate. This was identified by 
editing a JPEG image using WinHex version 15 running from a portable storage 
device attached to the virtual machine; the image was replaced by one of the 
same size but with noticeable visual differences. The results showed that this 
form of modification does not lead to the records within the thumbnail cache 
being updated; as the checks performed on the data show the subrecord is 
accurate.  
 
6.8 Forming a relationship between the thumbnail subrecords 
and the source files 
The previous section discussed ways in which the information in the thumbnail 
cache could potentially be manipulated; the section highlighted the importance 
of relationships to provide corroborating information and make unidentifiable 
tampering of data harder. This section discusses the artefacts that can assist in 
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showing a relationship between information contained with the thumbnail cache 
and a thumbnail cache source file.  This is achieved by evaluating the metadata 
and images both within the cache and source file; finally the use of event 
timeline reconstruction in forming a relationship is considered. 
 
Establishing a relationship between a file created by a user and the thumbnail 
cache can assist in corroborating the information identified; it can also assist in 
forming an overview of the user’s interaction with a file. This section describes 
the ways in which a relationship can be formed between a thumbnail cache 
record and a user generated file.  
 
6.8.1 Visual Thumbnail 
A visual thumbnail provides a snapshot of at least part of a file at a point in the 
file’s history; if the visual thumbnail relates to the current state of the file then a 
visual comparison could be performed to identify if there is any similarity in its 
content to a user file. If the visual thumbnail and a user file appear to contain 
the same data then there may be a relationship between the two sets of 
information; an analyst cannot be certain the two sets of data are related. For 
example, there may be multiple copies of a file on the user’s system, in which 
case all the copies may visually match with the same subrecord however only 
one copy would have a relationship with it.  
 
The visual thumbnail may be compared to part of a user file using computer 
vision techniques; if the two images are the same size then a one-to-one 
mapping could be applied [Dufournaud, 2000]. However given it is likely that the 
two images are different sizes and may also be in different image formats the 
problem involves a one-to-many mapping; the increased requirement for the 
calculation of mappings may mean the technique is too resource intensive for 
large data sets and would therefore require the data set to be pre-processed. 
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Like the visual inspection by an analyst a matching algorithm can only narrow 
down the potentially related subrecords. 
 
The visual thumbnail may not represent the last state of the file, in Windows 7 
each record in the thumbnail cache may contain up to four different sized visual 
thumbnails [Morris, 2011]; it is possible that each of the visual thumbnails may 
represent different states of the file. Therefore the state represented by the 
visual thumbnail may not match the last state of a file. This would prevent a 
visual match of the data. It would therefore be necessary to examine each 
visual thumbnail for a record to maximise the chance of identifying a visual 
match between the data in the record and the file; it may also assist in 
identifying previous states of the file which may provide useful information for an 
analyst. 
 
6.8.2 Metadata 
The removal of time stamps from the thumbnail cache in Windows 7 makes it 
difficult for an analyst to establish the time a record was last updated within the 
thumbnail cache [Morris, 2011].  However it is possible to identify a time period 
during which a record was added to the thumbnail cache; previous versions of 
the thumbnail cache files are stored in Windows 7 by the Volume Shadow 
Service. Figure 6.13 shows the windows restore points for an Explorer directory. 
Since each previous version has a date attached it is possible to work out a 
time frame during which a record was added. Selecting each previous version 
of the directory stored by the Volume Shadow Service will show the thumbnail 
cache files in an earlier state; by comparing the information within the versions 
of the thumbnail cache it is possible to identify a basic order in which records 
were added.  
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The type of a file can be identified through the flags stored in the thumbnail 
cache; each type of file has a specific sub-set of flags; these flags are found in 
the main record for each file located in the thumbcache_idx.db file [Morris, 
2011]. The flags can be used to identify the type of file which relates to the 
record, as the file type may not be obvious from a visual inspection [Section 
6.4.2].   
 
6.8.3 Thumbnail cache ID 
Each record contains a unique thumbnail cache ID which is made up of sixteen 
hexadecimal characters. In order to ascertain the information which was used in 
the formula for creating the thumbcache ID a series of tests were conducted. 
The tests were conducted to investigate the possibility of a simple relationship 
that allowed a file path of MFT ID to be determined from the thumbnail cache 
ID. Each test was performed in a clone of the baseline virtual machine with a 
set of 20 user created files stored in the current user’s “My Documents” 
directory; the images were viewed using Windows Explorer in order to create a 
baseline thumbnail cache. The files selected were: 2 BMP, 2 DOC, 2 DOCX, 2 
GIF, 5 JPEG, 3 PDF, 2 PPT, and 2 XLS.  
 
 
Figure 6-13: Restore points for the directory Explorer 
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In each experiment a single variable was altered on all of the files; for example 
variables included: changing the file path, changing the volume the file was 
stored on, changing dates/times of both the system and the files. After each test 
the resulting thumbnail cache was extracted and compared with the original 
thumbnail cache; therefore any changes made to the thumbnail cache ID values 
could be identified. The results of this testing have shown this ID is comprised 
of data relating to the user file; it has been identified that the thumbnail cache ID 
is related to the volume, MFT data and the type of the file.  
 
This suggests that there is no straightforward way of recovering the file path 
from the thumbnail cache ID; however, in Section 6.6.1 the thumbnail cache ID 
is used to form a relationship through the Windows Desktop Search database. 
 
6.8.4 Event timeline 
It is possible to identify the order user created files were added to the thumbnail 
cache by identifying their position in the individual thumbnail cache files. 
Section 6.6.4 identified that it is possible for subrecords which do not contain 
visual thumbnails to move closer to the top of thumbnail cache files over time.  
Section 6.5.1 described an experiment which suggested that new subrecords 
containing visual thumbnails were appended to the bottom of the thumbnail 
cache files; they also maintained their relative positions in the thumbnail cache 
overtime. Therefore for user generated files the related subrecords in the file 
appear in the order they were created by the system.  This can assist with 
creating an event timeline as a subrecord can only be created for an original 
source file which has a relationship with the operating system at the time of 
creation. A relationship between the original source file and the operating 
system is defined as the file being viewable within the operating system. In 
order to add extra data to the event timeline it is possible to add metadata 
recovered from the subrecords, windows.edb, and the user created source file. 
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The event timeline created could then be placed in context with other system 
information to provide an overview of the systems activity. 
 
 
6.9 Audio and Media thumbnails 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are three kinds of thumbnail used in modern 
computing: audio, media and visual. This chapter has so far focused on the 
visual thumbnails; this section describes the application of audio and media 
thumbnails within Windows 7. 
 
6.9.1 Audio thumbnails 
Audio thumbnails, as defined in Chapter 2 are representations of audio files, 
which allow a user to preview the contents.  In Windows 7, an audio file can be 
identified by the visual thumbnail used for the file; this can be either the generic 
audio visual thumbnail or album art with an icon indicating the software 
associated with the file. Figure 6.14 shows the two different types of audio 
visual thumbnail and describes their individual characteristics. 
 
The audio thumbnails are activated by selecting an audio file in the file browser; 
the file then appears in the preview panel with an option to play the audio track. 
If the file is deselected, the file will be removed from the preview panel and will 
cease to play. Figure 6.15shows the file browser with an audio thumbnail 
selected; the audio file can only be played from the beginning within the preview 
panel. An experiment was performed where 10 audio files were copied into the 
current user’s My Documents directory in a virtual machine. The audio 
thumbnail for each of these 10 thumbnails was then accessed; the first audio 
thumbnail was accessed for 10 seconds, with each subsequent audio thumbnail 
adding 10 seconds to the amount of time they were played for. The results of 
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this experiment have shown that the audio thumbnails do not appear to be 
stored on the system; however the visual thumbnails associated with an audio 
file are stored within the central thumbnail cache. 
 
 
Figure 6-14: Audio Thumbnails 
 
 
Figure 6-15: The use of audio thumbnails 
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6.9.2 Media thumbnails 
In Windows 7, multimedia (media) thumbnails have a common structure, which 
can be seen in figure 6.16. The film strip border on the visual thumbnail 
identifies the file as having a media thumbnail. The media thumbnail preview of 
the file can be accessed when the file is selected in the file browser (figure 
6.17). As with audio thumbnails, upon selection of the file, the media thumbnail 
can be seen in the preview pane. If the file is deselected, the media thumbnail 
will cease to play; should the file be reselected, the media thumbnail can only 
be replayed from the beginning.  
 
An experiment was performed using a set of 10 media files copied into the 
current “My Documents” directory of a virtual machine. Each of the media 
thumbnails was accessed; the first media thumbnail was accessed for 10 
seconds, with each subsequent media thumbnail adding a further 10 seconds to 
the access time. The results have shown that the media thumbnails are created 
at runtime and are therefore not store on the system. However as with audio 
thumbnails, the visual thumbnail is stored in the cache. 
 
 
Figure 6-16: The structure of a media thumbnail 
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Figure 6-17: The use of media thumbnails 
 
6.10 Discussion 
In summary, table 6.1 provides an overview of the main user activity which 
leads to artefacts being generated within the thumbnail cache, based on a 
default installation. The table shows the actions which lead to the creation, 
modification, and removal of records and subrecords from within the thumbnail 
cache structure. The table shows both the behaviour for the standard records 
which are associated with visual thumbnails and the non-standard entries. As 
can be seen from the table a wide variety of user activity can lead to information 
being added or updated within the thumbnail cache; however the only actions 
identified during this research which led to the removal of information were the 
user choosing to delete the thumbnail cache either manually or through a 
system cleaning menu.  
 
This section discusses the potential evidential value of Windows 7 thumbnail 
cache artefacts.  The discussion is based around the evidential strengths 
identified in Chapter 4; this begins with looking at the criteria for establishing 
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the provenance of artefacts. This is followed by the criteria for assessing the 
interpretation of results. 
 
6.10.1 Provenance of Artefacts 
This chapter has identified the structure and represented behaviour of 
thumbnail cache artefacts identified in Windows 7. An analyst could use the 
experimental methods described throughout this chapter (for example Section 
6.2) to replicate the experiments and verify the artefacts presented. The ability 
to replicate the results based on the descriptions provided in this chapter show 
the use of clear documentation; an analyst would be familiar with this style of 
documentation.  
 
The thumbnail cache structure is identified in Section 6.4; this led to 
experiments to determine the types of behaviour which can lead to the addition, 
modification, or deletion of data from within the thumbnail cache [Section 6.5]. 
This information was corroborated by forming relationships with other artefacts 
in the system and with the user generated source as described in Sections1.6 
and 1.8.The thumbnail cache artefacts identified during this research are 
justifiable as they are identified using a standard replicable process that 
enables the verification of the artefacts presented. 
 
The features identified in the thumbnail cache motivate the requirement to 
identify and provide corroboration. For example, an analyst may be 
investigating claims that the suspect was unaware of terrorist material on their 
computer and that it was automatically downloaded. The thumbnail cache may 
contain several different sized visual thumbnails, metadata about the original 
file, and in conjunction with other system information it is possible to corroborate 
the path of the original file. If a record is present for any of the material in the 
thumbnail cache the analyst can determine potential user activity which may 
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have occurred; it could also determine which user activity could not have 
resulted in the current state of the thumbnail cache record [Section 6.5].  
 
In order for an analyst to further reduce the list of potential user behaviour which 
led to the thumbnail cache’s current state it is necessary to form corroborative 
relationships with other system information such as those described in Section 
6.6. Therefore an analyst needs to identify corroborating artefacts to put the 
information from the thumbnail cache into context; corroborating artefacts 
relating to the user generated source file can be identified on the system. 
 
A relationship must be maintained between the results and the original data in 
order to show thumbnail cache artefacts identified are understandable 
consequences of the methods used. For example in Section 6.6.1 a series of 
experiments are described which aim to form a relationship between a user file 
and the thumbnail cache; focused experiments such as the experiments relating 
to each main type of data stored within the thumbnail cache assist in 
maintaining a relationship between the original data and the artefact. The 
artefacts identified as a consequence of the user behaviour were documented 
throughout this chapter and could be applied to artefacts identified during 
forensic investigations. 
 
In order to present an artefact in Court it is necessary to show that the artefact 
was identified and put into context using a scientific method. The structure 
and syntax of any thumbnail cache artefacts identified by an analyst can be 
checked to ensure they are valid; the structures are documented in Section 6.4. 
Once verified the artefacts can then be placed in context by identifying 
relationships with other system artefacts. Putting the artefacts in context can 
assist an analyst in showing or disproving that a type of associated behaviour 
took place. 
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6.10.2 Interpretation of Results 
An analyst may be presented with a scenario where doubt is cast upon whether 
the system was working properly at the time of the alleged incident. The 
manipulation of thumbnail cache artefacts was evaluated in Section 6.7. The 
section showed methods of verifying and corroborating the artefacts in the 
thumbnail cache to ascertain the likelihood they were created whilst the system 
was working normally. It is a non-trivial task to alter all the relationships within 
the system which relate to the thumbnail cache; therefore it is likely an analyst 
would find some information to cast doubt on the manipulated data. The 
experiments performed in Sections 6.4 - 6.6 were based on a system 
functioning normally and document the expected results of certain behaviours. 
By establishing relationships between the thumbnail cache and the rest of the 
system it is possible to analyse the information in the thumbnail cache in the 
context of the general system activity; therefore the behaviour an artefact 
represents can be established [Section 6.5]. 
 
Thumbnail cache artefacts can be corroborated by forming relationships with 
other system artefacts [Section 6.6]. Artefacts such as a GUID within a non-
standard thumbnail cache entry can be difficult for an analyst to place into 
context without supplementary information. However if a relationship is formed 
between the thumbnail cache entry and the registry it is possible to determine 
the meaning of the GUID and create further relationships to provide additional 
information. Relationships between thumbnail cache artefacts and the original 
source file can also assist an analyst; the potential system behaviour identified 
from thumbnail cache and corroborating artefacts can be linked to a specific file. 
 
By forming relationships with other sources of information and continuing to 
build relationships until all the links between artefacts are identified it is possible 
to maximise the corroboration of thumbnail cache artefacts. The thumbnail 
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cache artefacts can be corroborated by forming relationships with other system 
artefacts and the original source file [Sections 6.6, 6.8]; this shows that multiple 
sources of corroboration for thumbnail cache evidence can be identified and in 
turn those sources can be corroborated. 
 
In Windows 7 there is a centralised thumbnail cache for each user which 
contains six binary files; therefore in order to maximise the data recovered 
from the live thumbnail cache it is necessary to extract the six binary files and 
examine them. Windows 7 also uses the thumbs.db format, which are directory 
specific thumbnail cache files. In a live file system these can be identified by 
searching for the filename thumbs.db; they can then be extracted and analysed. 
The carving of data relating to the Windows 7 centralised thumbnail cache from 
unallocated space is discussed in Chapters 7-9.  
 
The thumbnail cache structure and syntax identified in Section 6.4 permit the 
automation of extracting data from the file formats; they also permit the 
identification and reassembly of file fragments from unallocated space. 
 
6.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the structure and behaviour of the operating system 
thumbnail cache implemented within Windows 7. Within Windows Vista, the 
thumbnail cache implementation changed significantly from Windows XP by 
using a centralised thumbnail cache for each user, this implementation was 
continued in Windows 7 with slight differences in the structure of records and 
subrecords. The thumbnail cache contains visual thumbnail records alongside 
GUID information, active drive letters and network places. Records are added to 
the cache, with a new subrecord being added to the bottom of the thumbcache 
files. Some records are deleted periodically, however this is application specific. 
The subrecords contain checksums to assist in authenticating the data; 
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however it is still possible to tamper with parts of the thumbnail cache without it 
detecting an error. Finally audio and visual thumbnails are generated at run-
time and experiments have shown aside from their visual thumbnail they leave 
no trace on the system. 
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7 Identification of thumbnail cache fragments 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the structure and behaviour of the operating system 
thumbnail caches found in Ubuntu, Kubuntu and Windows 7 were identified; the 
results of this research provide a baseline which shows the artefacts recovered 
from complete thumbnail caches and related system artefacts. This chapter 
expands upon the previous research to explore the identification of thumbnail 
cache file fragments from unallocated space. It was established in Chapter 1 
that the increase in user awareness of both forensic practices and technology 
would make it easier for a user to attempt to hide their activity. If a user 
attempts to hide their activity it is likely the thumbnail cache would be deleted 
and therefore may exist either in whole or in part in unallocated space at the 
time of analysis. Also, as established in Chapter 6 when files in the Windows 7 
centralised thumbnail cache are updated, the old file is given a temporary name 
and deleted; therefore traces of these temporary files may also be found in the 
Master File Table (MFT) and unallocated space. 
 
The growing size of storage media and the possibility that only fragments 
remain of a piece of important evidence suggest that analysts may need to 
investigate the contents of unallocated space. It is too resource intensive for an 
analyst to investigate unallocated space in depth for every case. However the 
ability to identify fragments and reassemble them using an automated method 
may provide an analyst with further information about the state of the system 
with minimal resource cost. The likelihood of potentially relevant thumbnail 
cache artefacts being in unallocated space suggests research into identifying 
thumbnail cache file fragments would be relevant and may assist in automating 
a potentially lengthy process.  The process developed will also show that the 
approach is generalisable as it will have to be adaptable to different 
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implementations of the thumbnail cache; therefore the approach used in this 
research could enable the identification of other file types. 
 
This chapter investigates methods for identifying thumbnail cache file 
fragments. Section 7.2discusses traditional data carving techniques; recent 
data carving research is discussed in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4 a 
methodology for the research in this chapter is established; the information to 
be carved is described in Section 7.5. This is followed by the four most 
common types of identification method being adapted and implemented for 
thumbnail cache file fragment identification [Sections 7.6 – 7.9]. Section 7.10 
describes the results of the implemented file fragment identification methods; a 
comparative discussion of the four techniques follows in Section 7.11. A 
discussion of this research is provided in Section 7.12; finally this chapter is 
concluded in Section 7.13. 
 
7.2 Traditional Data Carving 
Both NTFS and FAT store information showing a relationship between 
individual clusters and their contents. The references in the file system provide 
a starting point to identify the clusters used to store a file. Fellows [2005] 
discusses the recoverability of deleted files when the directory structures such 
as the MFT are available; however the paper has little discussion on the 
recoverability of potential evidence from such files when the MFT information 
relating to a cluster is no longer available. There may be information on a 
device which does not have any file system references but is pertinent to the 
investigation; the file system references may not always be available, for 
example if the device has been formatted.  
 
Without the file system references, recovery becomes more complex; this 
creates a requirement for file carving. File carving is the technique of extracting 
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a file from a storage device based upon its structure. It is commonly used when 
the directory information is unavailable, to extract as much of the file as 
possible. In the case of deleted files this may not be the complete file as it may 
have been partially overwritten [Sammes, 2007]. The following sub-sections 
discuss traditional data carving approaches; in Section 7.2.1 the brute force 
approach to data carving is described. This is followed by a description of 
structural and syntactical data carving approaches in Section 7.2.2. 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Traditional file carving from clusters of unallocated space on the 
storage media 
 
7.2.1 Brute Force Approach 
File carving, or file recovery is the process of retrieving complete or partial files 
from the storage media when there is no file system information available. Early 
file carving methods were based on identifying the header and footer of a file 
and then carving out all the information between these two points; this provides 
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valid results only when the file is: contiguous, not fragmented, and has a footer 
[Calhoun, 2008]. As can be seen in figure 7.1 once a file signature is identified 
the file is carved until a footer is identified. If the file does not have a footer then 
it is possible to carve the file by extracting a predetermined number of bytes 
which is larger than the expected file size. The maximum size is determined by 
the analyst based upon the file type. Forensic tools such as Winhex provide an 
expected file size for file types which do not contain a footer; for example for 
thumbs.db or registry hive files. 
 
7.2.2 Structural and Syntactical Analysis 
The brute force approach, described above, relies on simple sequences to 
identify information; by using additional information about the file type it is 
possible to improve the accuracy of the identification. In Figure 7.1 the 
approach relies upon a footer signature. This type of file carving may not 
identify the whole file. For example PDF files have an ambiguous footer 
signature which occurs in multiple positions within the file. In order to carve out 
a complete PDF file an offset larger than the potential size of the PDF file is 
selected; from here the offsets back towards the PDF header are checked for 
the footer signature. Identifying the file signature and carving the data that 
follows it will only retrieve a complete file if the file is contiguous; therefore 
fragmented files will only be partially recovered which may result in potentially 
relevant artefacts not being recovered [Pal, 2009]. 
 
Another method for identifying artefacts is to search for keywords, for example 
using a hex editor. It is also possible to search for a structure using regular 
expressions [Fleishmamn, 2008]. Whilst the file signatures would be found in 
the first cluster a file occupies, later clusters would not contain this information; 
if the cluster containing the header was overwritten it may be difficult to identify 
the remaining clusters.  
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If potential evidence is identified in unallocated space using a keyword search it 
is possible to identify the potential file type by applying structures of known file 
types to the information and validating the syntax. This approach uses the Brute 
force approach to identify potential candidate information in unallocated space. 
In order to extract information from the fragment a template containing the 
structure can be applied to the information; the template extracts and interprets 
the information [Fleishmamn, 2008].The identified keyword is used to ascertain 
the type and position of the structure. The information can then be extracted 
from the file using the context and checked to ensure it follows the expected 
valid syntax. 
 
7.3 Data Carving Research 
To encourage the development of file carving techniques within the forensic 
community, the organisation Digital forensic research workshop [DFRWS] ran 
challenges [Dickerman, 2006], which created a surge of interest and new 
techniques for file recovery, several of which are discussed later in this chapter. 
After the focus of the challenge moved the research continued; however tools 
still struggled to deal with fragmented or incomplete files.  
 
Cohen [2007] suggests that identifying positive and negative constraints on 
files, to establish whether a fragment belongs to the correct file type, can 
improve efficiency and give a greater level of accuracy. Most algorithms 
implicitly use this approach to rule out fragments that are not of the correct type. 
His descriptions of carving PDFs, Zip files, Mpegs and email formats highlight 
the requirement to understand the structure of the file being carved; this 
ensures the resulting file can be validated 
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7.3.1 Statistical Methods 
If document fragments can be identified as belonging to the same file it is 
possible to reassemble them using statistical modelling based upon the 
expected context of the file [Shanmugasundaram, 2003]. The fragments are 
added to a graph with the probability of adjacency to other fragments being 
calculated and used as weights; the reassembled document is therefore 
equivalent to picking the sequence of fragments with the highest probability of 
being a structurally and syntactically valid file. Currently this is possible only for 
files where all the fragments are available, making it useful in cases where the 
directory structure is missing, but would not provide assistance reassembling 
incomplete files. This algorithm can currently only find a solution when it is given 
an input that consists solely of fragments from the file to be reassembled 
[Memon, 2006]; it is unclear how fragments could be sorted into individual files 
during an investigation to provide the necessary input.  This research was 
conducted by looking at a variety of file types including logs and binary files. 
This implied the authors wanted to determine the effects of carving multiple file 
types that may be relevant to an investigation rather than just focusing on a 
specific structure such as OLE2 or jpeg.  
 
Fragmentation of a file occurs when it is not possible to store the file in 
contiguous sectors, such as when storing a large file. A fragment may be part of 
a fragmented file or as little as a single cluster recovered from unallocated 
space. Research has suggested that file fragmentation is not present on all 
drives that an analyst would come across [Garfinkel, 2007]; this is in line with 
the fact that different users have different needs from their computers and are 
therefore likely to store varying amounts of information.  
 
Garfinkel [2007] collected a series of hard drives from places such as eBay and 
whilst examining them found that from the 51 NTFS file systems he examined 
approximately 12.2% of files were in at least 2 fragments, with 6.6% being in 5 
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or more fragments, showing that fragmentation is likely to be encountered on 
NTFS systems, this is in contrast to FAT systems where almost 97% of files 
were found to be contiguous. Approximately 44% of the total drives in the 
corpus contained no fragmented files, however the total number of files found 
from these drives accounted for less than 1% of the files recovered from the 
entire corpus, suggesting the more files found on the drive the greater the 
chance of fragmentation occurring.  
 
Garfinkel [2007] makes an interesting statement when he discusses the 
probability of encountering fragmentation is related to the individual type of the 
file; user generated files such as word documents were found to have higher 
fragmentation rates, possibly due to the tendency to work on such files over a 
prolonged period. These results show that whilst tools such as Disk 
Defragmenter exist it is still likely an analyst will find fragmented user files on 
the disk. This suggests that the file types an analyst is likely to be interested in 
are those most at risk of fragmentation; this suggests that fragmented file 
carving may be necessary to recover relevant artefacts. Since this study was 
conducted, the use of computers has altered; users are now storing vast 
quantities of media such as music and videos on their machines. The media 
can take up a significant amount of space; whilst the size of storage media is 
also increasing, the large volume of data being stored still suggests a greater 
chance of encountering fragmented files. Since the thumbnail cache stores 
information relating to user files, it is likely to become fragmented if enough user 
files are added that generate thumbnail cache content. This is particularly likely 
if the additions are done over a prolonged period as the additional clusters 
required to store the new subrecords may not be available contiguously on the 
storage media. 
 
Fragments can be classified based on pattern recognition statistics; a prototypic 
histogram is used in a supervised learning environment to attempt to model file 
types, and research has shown this to be reasonably successful with a low error 
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rate for HTML and JPEG files [Veenman, 2007]. Veenman also establishes the 
need to combine such techniques with pre-existing carving techniques in order 
to maximise the information being carved, which may take a greater length of 
time to run on a given storage device. To date, such techniques have been 
relatively separate in their research and implementation, and whether 
developing a tool encompassing several methods would decrease the error rate 
on more complex file types is still unknown. 
 
Calhoun [2008] looked at predicting the file types of fragments using linear 
discriminant and longest common substrings. It was found that using longer 
byte sequences for statistical analysis would improve the prediction rate of the 
linear discriminant method; this may be due to the fact that information is 
normally stored in several bytes. Veenman [2007] also looked at statistical 
methods for identifying fragments but used data surrounding the fragments 
being tested to provide a context. Providing information which places a 
fragment in context of its location and surrounding information is useful during 
an analysis as it may assist with identifying the likely type of smaller fragments 
and providing an overall timeline of the activity on the machine.  
 
7.3.2 Neural Networks 
Whilst tools currently used by analysts, such as Encase and FTK, rely on 
header and footer information for the majority of their carving, a criminal may 
alter such information to prevent automated software finding the files. If these 
tools were the only method of investigation on a case such evidence may not be 
discovered. Neural Networks are adaptive and research has shown they may 
identify tampered documents which are otherwise overlooked. Harris [2007] 
investigated the possibility for recovering binary file types, and whilst his results 
showed that such networks could identify several important file types, a number 
of factors may improve upon his research. Firstly, Harris used back propagation 
to adjust the weights on the network, and whilst this is a common algorithm for 
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adjusting weights, techniques such as those utilised by Fogel [2001], using 
evolutionary algorithms based on a Darwinian approach, could also have been 
employed and may have increased the adaptability of the network [Russell, 
2003]. Harris also used a training set that was ten times larger than the testing 
set. Decreasing the size of the training set and altering the proportions of each 
file type may have increased the recognition for the file types, preventing the 
network from becoming over trained, losing the ability to generalise to new files. 
 
7.3.3 Recovering deleted information from other operating systems 
Whilst analysts are most likely to come across Windows operating systems, 
they may also see Mac and Linux based systems too [Burghardt, 2008]. 
Deleted files in OS X have been the subject of research, by establishing if any 
given sector which is known to contain a deleted file has been overwritten; it is 
possible to calculate the chance of recovering useful evidence from the file. This 
is a useful technique, as the method identifies where blocks containing deleted 
information should be and in comparing them to the volume bitmap it can see if 
they have been overwritten. The technique is also limited in that it relies upon a 
complete and accurate entry in the journal; a log of file changes on the disk, and 
would therefore not provide assistance in cases where this is corrupt. 
 
7.4 Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate methods to identify thumbnail cache file 
fragments. The methods described earlier in this research were based upon the 
identification of file fragments which consisted of multiple clusters.  This 
research focuses on identifying single fragments of thumbnail cache files, 
without using any information outside the fragment to assist with its 
identification; it has already been established that a single fragment may be all 
that remains of a file. Therefore an important consideration for this research is 
the identification of methods which could be adapted to identify single fragments 
of information without any supplementary information about the system. 
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Having described current methods for the identification of deleted file fragments 
it is possible to take a single method with reasonable performance statistics, 
adapt it for fragment identification and apply it to the thumbnail cache file type. 
However this method would establish only the ability of the method being 
implemented to identify thumbnail cache file fragments, whereas a comparative 
study of the most commonly implemented methods would assist in 
implementing a single method with higher rates of identification for thumbnail 
cache files. A comparative study also prevents bias on the results of this 
research which the use of a single method may give and provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the performance of the methods on a single file type. 
Therefore the results on the file type can be accurately compared, highlighting 
the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. 
 
Trialling a variety of methods against the thumbnail cache may improve the 
accuracy of recovery and allow the corroboration of results. Based on the 
review of literature conducted earlier in this chapter the four types of methods 
chosen for evaluation in this research are: Brute force, Structural and 
Syntactical, Statistical, and Neural Network. Of each type a single method will 
be implemented; the specific implementations are discussed in later sections; 
each method will then be evaluated against the same test data set.  
 
In order to identify thumbnail cache fragments using the four methods identified 
it is first necessary to determine the data set which will be used to train and test 
the ability of each method; this is discussed in Section 7.5. This is followed by a 
description of how each of the identified methods was adapted to enable single 
fragment identification; the sections also describe how each method was 
applied to the thumbnail cache file formats [Sections 7.6 – 7.9]. The results of 
each method are then described in Section 7.10; after the results the methods 
are compared and evaluated in Section 7.11. Finally a discussion of the 
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research in this Chapter is provided in Section 7.12, and the chapter conclusion 
is provided in Section 7.13. 
 
7.5 Information to be carved 
In previous chapters Ubuntu, Kubuntu and Windows 7 thumbnail caches have 
been researched; as a result of this research a corpus of data based on these 
three operating systems has been collected. The data corpus also contains a 
wide selection of user generated files which were collected for use during the 
previous experiments. This section describes the generation of the corpus and 
how it has been constructed for this research. 
 
7.5.1 Corpus Generation 
In order to find a method for identifying thumbnail caches the methods 
implemented on this chapter need to be tested on a set of data which is 
representative of real problems and independent from the methods created. 
This led to the creation of three data sets which were used during this research 
to test each identification method.  
 
Data Set 1 
In order to create the first data set all the live files were extracted from virtual 
machines created in Chapters 5 – 6; the live files were classified into sub-
directories of the corpus by file extension. For Windows 7 this generated 
4147076 individual files with a total size of approximately 500 GB; for Ubuntu 
2197329 individual files with a total size of approximately 140GB. A further 250 
GB of user generated content was added to the corpus; these 1095696 files 
were collected specifically for this research and contained a wide variety of user 
generated data. The files were either created using software tested during the 
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previous experiments or downloaded from file type specific searches made 
using Google.  
 
Data Set 2 
The second data set represented a real world case with a larger range of file 
types and usage. The live files were taken from both machines and organised in 
directories by extension. The data set which contained 1.3TB of files taken from 
the main computer used for the 18 month period before this research was also 
collected; as the computer had significant use over this period it had completed 
a large variety of tasks and contained a significant amount of user data. In 
addition in order to study the growth of the thumbnail cache in Windows 7 
during this research, the thumbnail cache directory was made read only; this led 
to a thumbnail cache with a total size of 23 GB and 827 temporary thumbnail 
cache files being created. An 80 GB Ubuntu machine used during the same 
time period was also included in this data set; the machine had a similar range 
of usage and contained significant amounts of user generated data. 
 
Data Set 3 
The final data set consisted of the free space from all the storage devices used 
in Data Sets 1 and 2. This unknown data provides a second set of test data 
where little is known about the contents before the identification methods are 
used. The free space contains unknown file types which may generate false 
positive results from the identification methods. It also provides an opportunity 
to identify any thumbnail cache file fragments in unallocated space on the 
systems analysed during this research. In Windows 7 the free space from data 
set 1 was 490 GB, and set two provided 687 GB of data. The data collected 
from the free space would have been too resource intensive to analyse by 
hand, and is therefore 1177 GB of unknown data.  
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7.5.2 File Fragment Classification 
In order to identify thumbnail cache file fragments each type of fragment 
requires a classification; each class represents a file fragment with different 
characteristics. Initially classifications for each operating system were 
considered individually; after refining the classifications for Windows 7 fragment 
identification 4 classes of fragment were created: 
 
W1:The fragment is part of the thumbcache_idx.db file 
W2: The fragment is part of an image thumbcache file and contains 
metadata 
W3: The fragment is part of a thumbcache file and only contains image data 
W4: The fragment is not part of the Windows 7 thumbnail cache 
 
Visual thumbnails are generally stored in one of three image formats: JPEG, 
PNG and BMP; BMP is generally only used to store visual thumbnails in the 
smaller cache files and therefore it is most likely that image-only data fragments 
will only be present for JPEG and PNG image formats. Since PNG files are 
present in the Linux thumbnail caches this research will focus on JPEG images 
for W3. 
 
In Chapter 5 it was established that visual thumbnails in Linux are stored in 
individual PNG files and contain thumbnail specific metadata. For this research, 
this led to the creation of three classifications for Ubuntu and Kubuntu fragment 
identification: 
 
L1: The fragment is part of a PNG visual thumbnail and contains 
metadata 
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L2: The fragment is part of a visual thumbnail and only contains image 
data 
L3: The fragment is not part of the PNG thumbnail cache record 
 
There is a possibility that a storage device may contain multiple operating 
systems, therefore it is appropriate to search for both Linux and Windows 
thumbnail cache fragments on a device. Whilst each operating system is stored 
in separate partitions, it is possible that this information may not be available on 
a damaged or partially overwritten device; therefore the area an analyst may 
have to file carve during an investigation may contain artefacts from multiple 
operating systems. It was also noted that the PNG file format is used to store 
visual thumbnail is associated with user generated files in all the operating 
systems being investigated. These considerations led to the classifications 
being merged to produce 6 classes of files for this research. 
 
H1:Thumbcache_idx.db file 
H2: Image thumbcache file and contains metadata 
H3: Image thumbcache file and only contains JPEG image data 
H4: Linux PNG visual thumbnail and contains metadata 
H5: PNG visual thumbnail fragment and only contains image data 
H6: Not part of a Windows or Linux thumbnail cache 
 
7.5.3 Preparing the File Fragments 
The aim of this research is to identify thumbnail cache file fragments; however 
this is rather broad and requires the terms fragment and thumbnail cache file to 
be further defined. For the purposes of this research a fragment will be 
considered to be a cluster of data; for this research a cluster has been defined 
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as 4096 bytes. The cluster size selected is the default cluster size currently 
adopted by Windows 7 installations using NTFS and Ubuntu installations using 
EXT4.  As has been previously determined in Chapter 2there is no standard 
implementation of an operating system thumbnail cache and therefore trying to 
identify any thumbnail cache file fragments would be a broad aim. For this 
research it has been decided that each type of thumbnail cache structure 
identified in Chapters 5 and 6 will be dealt with as a separate classification for 
identification; the structures for these implementations of the thumbnail cache 
are described in Appendix A. 
 
In order to prepare the file fragments for this research, each of the files in the 
corpus was split into 4096 byte chunks; each chunk was put into a separate file 
with a header to enable it to be identified. The 64 byte header contained: 
 
Signature [“FRAGMENT”]  
Individual frag id [4 bytes] 
Path of original file [44 bytes] 
Place in file [4 bytes] 
Classification [4 bytes] 
 
Each file was named with the unique fragment identifier and an extension of 
“frag”. Given the large number of fragments created by this process it was 
decided to store only 1000 fragments per sub-directory; separating the files into 
batches made it easier to navigate the files manually. 
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Table 7-1: Breakdown of file fragment types per classification 
 Data Set 1 Data Set 2 
H1 3218 3277 
H2 768039 672922 
H3 6774078 5971550 
H4 63385 11677 
H5 62429 10668 
H6 225625589 357223017 
Total Files 233296738 363893111 
 
 
7.5.4 Distribution of File Types 
The distribution of file fragment types in the 2 known data sets is shown in 
Table 7.1. This is followed by a breakdown of file fragment types which have 
similar characteristics to the thumbnail cache classifications [Table 7.2]; these 
file types are most likely to be falsely classified as belonging to the thumbnail 
cache. 
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Table 7-2: Breakdown of potentially similar file fragment types in H6 
 Data Set 1 Data Set 2 
Thumbs.db 972 1349884 
Bmp 3999477 3895491 
JPG 7167119 8244521 
PNG 8855007 4436326 
Office Files (OLE2) 6931152 5945872 
PDF 5212690 3925449 
TXT 5364586 2005622 
Other H6 Files 188094586 327419852 
Total H6 Files 225625589 357223017 
 
7.5.5 Training and Testing Sets 
The three data sets contain a wide variety of file types which may be found on 
user systems during an investigation. As it is not feasible to produce a data set 
which contains every type of file fragment which may occur on a user’s system, 
a data set needs to be selected which can provide a wide variety of file types 
which are likely to be on a system under investigation. The corpus created for 
this research contained a wide variety of system and user generated file 
fragments. In order to evaluate the identification methods created during this 
research the data corpus is split into training and test sets. 
 
The training set is used to assist each method with modelling based upon 
fragments with known classifications. The training set was made up of 
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approximately half the data in Data Set 1; using a random number generator 
half the fragments from each file type were selected. For the thumbnail cache, 
half the records for each classification of thumbnail cache data were selected. 
Where the number of fragments in a category was odd, the number of selected 
fragments was rounded up.  
 
For methods 1 and 2, the training phase focused on determining which rules for 
classifying fragments were accepting false positives. After each time the 
methods were run, the logs were analysed to ascertain which rules were falsely 
classifying fragments. For example, was a specific structure used to classify a 
fragment also being detected in other file types? Once the rules generating 
false positives were identified the individual method could be adapted to 
strengthen the rule. This provided an opportunity to refine the classification 
rules based on the thumbnail cache information identified in Chapters 5 and 6. 
For the statistical and Neural Network methods, the training is described in their 
individual sections.  
 
After the models had been trained using the training set data, the models were 
tested against the testing set. The testing set comprised the remainder of the 
files from Data set 1, and all the files in Data sets 2 and 3. The files in Data sets 
1 and 2 had known classifications. In data set 3 the number of fragments in 
each classification was unknown; therefore the only information provided by 
each models for this data set was the number of correctly identified thumbnail 
cache fragments and the number of false positive identifications. 
 
  
 
 Page 
175 
 
  
7.6 Brute Force Approach 
This approach uses a list of known hexadecimal strings which can be used to 
classify potential files; if a potential fragment contains one of the known strings 
it is put in the relevant classification. In Windows 7, thumbnail cache files begin 
with the file signature IMMM or CMMM; the record signature CMMM also 
appears at the start of each record contained in the Image files. The keyword 
IMMM would identify the first cluster of the index file; given the structure of the 
records in the index any further clusters belonging to the index file could not be 
identified in this manner. Searching for the keyword CMMM may identify a 
significant number of thumbnail cache file fragments; the keyword CMMM 
should be present in most of the fragments which satisfy H2.If the metadata for 
a subrecord is split over a cluster boundary then a fragment may contain 
metadata without a header; the fragment may still contain an image file 
signature so checks could be performed for JPEG, PNG, and BMP file headers. 
The image data only fragments do not contain any keywords and therefore 
cannot be identified using this method.  
 
Visual thumbnails in the Ubuntu and Kubuntu thumbnail cache files are stored 
in individual PNG files and therefore contain standard PNG identifiers such as 
chunk names [Chapter 5]; the files also contain thumbnail specific metadata 
chunks with identifiers that could be searched for. With the establishment of 
keywords and file signatures [Table 7.3] which could be used to search for 
thumbnail cache file fragments a simple program was created which takes a 
fragment of data at a time and examines it for the identified keywords. Any 
fragment which contained a keyword was then extracted and stored in a 
directory for the relevant classification; the classifications relating to each 
keyword are shown in table 7.3. 
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Table 7-3: A list of thumbnail cache keywords 
Key Words Identified in Thumbnail Cache Files 
Ubuntu / Kubuntu 
Keyword Hexadecimal Classification 
tEXtThumb 0x744558745468756D62 H4 
ThumbnailFactory 0x5468756D626E61696C466163746F7279 H4 
PNG 0x504E47                                         H2,H4 
IDAT 0x49444154 H4 
IEND 0x49454E44 H4 
Windows 7 
Keyword Hexadecimal Classification 
IMMM 0x494D4D4D H1 
CMMM 0x434D4D4D H2 
JFIF 0X4A464946 H2 
BM6 0x424D36 H2 
PNG 0x504E47        H2, H4 
thumbcache  0x7468756D626361636865 H1, H2 
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7.7 Structural and Syntactical Approach 
The Structural and Syntactical method relies on the information gathered about 
the different implementations of the thumbnail caches researched in Chapters 
5 and 6; in which the structure of the files are identified along with the valid 
syntax for each part of the structure.  In order to automate the Structural and 
Syntactical method, a program was written which begins by checking if the 
fragment starts with a known file signature. If the file signature is 0x434D4D4D 
or 0x494D4D4D then it may be part of a thumbnail cache file; if the fragment 
starts with a known file signature that does not belong to a thumbnail cache file 
then the fragment is automatically classified as H6. This is followed by the 
checks described in the sub-sections below starting with those for the H1 
classification; processing for each classification stops as soon as a check is 
failed. If all checks for a classification are completed successfully the fragment 
is classified as that type; if the fragment fails to be classified as H1 – H5 it is 
automatically classified as H6 with no further checks. The following sub-
sections describe the characteristics of each classification of fragment which 
were used for validation in this method. 
 
7.7.1 H1: 
The index files used by the Windows 7 caches (thumbcache_idx.db) store 32 
byte records with the first complete record starting at byte 24 of the cluster; a 
cluster can hold up to 127 complete records and may hold a file header and 
incomplete records. Figure 7.2 shows the 4 possible structures of an index file 
fragment; the first complete record starts 24 bytes into the fragment. Each 
record should either be empty or complete; therefore the first check to identify if 
a fragment belongs to an index file is to apply the basic structure to the 
fragment. It was also shown that the 4 bytes of a record which show the position 
of the subrecord in the thumbcache_sr.db file should either contain all 0xFF or 
0x00.  
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Figure 7-2: Classifications for thumbcache_IDX fragments 
 
The next check to identify an index fragment involves the thumbcache ID values 
stored in each record; In Chapter 6 it was established the index stores records 
in a hash table, the formula for working out the position of a record in a hash 
table is: 
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((X * 2^32) + Y) Mod Z = Position in hash table within thumbcache_idx.db 
Where 
X is the first 4 bytes in little endian of the thumbcache ID 
Y is the second 4 bytes in little endian of the thumbcache ID 
Z is the number of positions currently in the hash table 
[Chapter 6] 
 
This formula can also be used to establish the possible table sizes for an index 
file fragment by substituting possible values of Z, which must be multiples of 
101, into the equation to identify which, if any, values of Z solve the equation. 
Any value for Z which is valid for all the thumbnail cache ID’s in the fragment 
can be considered a potential table size. Once a possible table size is 
established it can be verified by substituting it into the equation for other records 
in the same fragment. The identification of a valid possible hash table size also 
shows that the thumbcache ID values are syntactically valid and provides a 
substantial indication that the fragment belongs to a thumbcache_idx.db file. 
 
After checking the thumbcache ID value, the remainder of the record structure 
is checked to ensure that the fragment follows the remainder of the structure 
and syntax identified in Chapter 6. The structure is followed in order starting 
with checking the flags are valid; if the record is complete the flags cannot 
consist solely of either 0xFF or 0x00. The remaining positions are then checked; 
these cannot be equal to 0 unless the record is empty. If a record fails any of 
the checks then the fragment is tested to see if it belongs to H2.  
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7.7.2 H2 
For the identification of H2 fragments a similar structural and syntactic validation 
is performed to the one used for H1 identification. In the first instance fragments 
which contain the subrecord signature ‘CMMM’ are identified; the first instance 
of this signature within the fragment is used for classification. In this case the 
subrecord structure which begins with CMMM could start at any offset within the 
fragment; once the CMMM identifier is found each part of the subrecord 
structure can be validated for syntax against the structure in Appendix A. It is 
possible that a fragment may start part way through a subrecord header; this 
would mean that the subrecord signature may not be present. Given the 
fragment size of 4096 if the subrecord header was split over two fragments and 
the subrecord contained a visual thumbnail then the second fragment should 
contain an image file signature. If an image file signature is found the structural 
checks can be performed backwards heading towards the start of the file in 
order to identify if the fragment is likely to be part of a thumbnail cache image 
file.  
 
In the third case the subrecord header is still split over 2 fragments, but the 
subrecord does not contain a visual thumbnail. In this case it is either 
immediately proceeded by another subrecord or the end subrecord; the header 
in these subrecords should ensure the fragment is subjected to the 
classification checks for this category. At the end of each thumbnail cache 
image file there is an end subrecord which does not have the same valid range 
of syntax as other subrecords. The last subrecord begins with the subrecord 
signature and 4 byte integer which stores the size of the subrecord. This is 
followed by 32 bytes of 0x00, and an 8 byte thumbnail cache ID value. If the last 
subrecord is stored in a fragment which contains other fragment headers then 
the last fragment will not be used for the classification checks. However if the 
last subrecord contains the only subrecord header in the fragment then the 
identified structure would be subject to classification checks.   
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The cases are checked in order from 1-4; for each case if any of the checks are 
failed then the case is rejected and the next case validation checks are 
performed. If the fragment fails the checks for all 4 cases the fragment is 
rejected for H2; the fragment is then tested for the H3 classification.  
 
7.7.3 H3 
The H3 classification relates to a JPEG thumbnail cache image fragment which 
does not contain metadata. Such fragments may not contain any information 
which an analyst could classify by a quick visual inspection. The JPEG file 
format is a binary file type that stores information in chunks; each chunk has an 
identifying marker to denote its type. The start of a visual thumbnail may occur 
in a fragment which also contains subrecord metadata; in this case the fragment 
would be categorised as H2. If the subrecord header is not in the same 
fragment as the start of the visual thumbnail, then the JPEG file signature 
0xFFD8 would be identified; the data preceding the JPEG file signature could 
be checked to ascertain if it meets the structure and syntax of an image 
thumbnail cache file.  
 
The first 623 bytes of each JPEG visual thumbnail from the thumbcache_256 
files examined during this research was found to be the same; the first 623 byes 
of JPEG visual thumbnails from the thumbcache_1024 files examined during 
this research were also found to be the same as each other. Whilst each size of 
JPEG visual thumbnail shared a common 623 bytes at the start there was a 3 
byte difference between the two thumbcache files. Therefore 2 sequences of 16 
bytes were selected from the common information; the sequences were 
searched for in the first 623 bytes of each fragment. If a sequence was 
identified, then the surrounding area of the fragment was checked to ensure it 
contained the expected sequence. The sequences and the relative offsets from 
the start of the visual thumbnail are shown below: 
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Relative offset: 48    
0B 09 0C 11 0F 12 12 11  0F 11 11 13 16 1C 17 13 
Relative offset: 592    
E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EA  F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
 
Later parts of the visual thumbnail occurring in image only fragments could not 
be identified using this structural and syntactic method as only the start of 
image markers were identifiable; however out of context it would be difficult to 
validate a fragment which appeared to contain a start of sequence marker. 
Such fragments are more suited to pattern matching techniques such as those 
used with the Bayesian and Neural Networks later in this chapter. If any of the 
checks identified in this section fail, the classification checks for H4 begin. 
 
7.7.4 H4 
The H4 classification relates to Linux PNG thumbnail cache files containing 
metadata; the first fragment of each file is likely to contain a substantial amount 
of identifiable artefacts which indicate the file is part of a thumbnail cache. For 
example Chapter 5 describes the thumbnail cache specific chunks which 
generally contain the word ‘thumbcache’ and could be used to separate 
standard PNG files from PNG thumbnail cache files.  The chunk format is 
described in Chapter 5; there is a CRC value at the end of every chunk which 
can be used to validate the content and the structure.  
 
Other fragments belonging to a PNG thumbnail cache file may contain the IDAT 
PNG chunk marker; on analysis of the files found in Chapter 5 it was noted that 
the IDAT marker occurred in every second fragment of a file. If the marker is 
found the data around it can be checked for structural and syntactic validation to 
enable it to be classified as H4. However these fragments can only be validated 
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to show they belong to a PNG file; this may not be a thumbnail cache file as 
they both have the same structure and syntax for the IDAT chunks. 
 
7.7.5 H5 
The H5 classification relates to a PNG thumbnail cache image fragment which 
does not contain metadata. Such fragments do not contain any information 
which an analyst could determine by a quick visual inspection. The average 
PNG thumbnail cache file would be held in between 20 – 40 fragments. The 
first, last and every odd fragment contained within the file contain PNG markers 
that would be identified and checked for H4. The fragments which belong to this 
classification would just contain binary information, and like H3 are more suited 
to pattern matching techniques for their classification. If a fragment is checked 
for H5 classification it is automatically rejected and passed to H6. 
 
7.7.6 H6 
The combination of the classifications in Section 7.5 to take into account the 
possibility of a storage device containing artefacts from multiple operating 
systems led to the creation of 6 classifications. For all fragments tested, each 
4096 file fragment is tested for each classification of fragment in the order H1-
H6; should a fragment fail to meet any of the first five classifications it is 
automatically allocated to H6 and determined not to be a thumbnail cache file 
fragment. This is because it has failed to meet the expected structure and 
syntax for any of the thumbnail cache file fragment types. 
 
7.8 Statistical Approach 
The statistical technique chosen was a Bayesian Network, this enables the 
method implemented in the previous section to be expanded and developed 
with the aim of increasing the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments. 
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The Bayesian Network takes into account the probability that an artefact or set 
of artefacts appearing in a fragment relates to its classification. In order to 
construct the Bayesian Network originally each artefact relating to each 
hypothesis was shown in the network; however this led to the development of a 
complex network which required refinement.  
 
7.8.1 Construction 
In order to construct a Bayesian Network it was first necessary to establish 
characteristics which have a relationship with each of the classifications; the 
complete Bayesian Networks for the identification of thumbnail cache file 
fragments are shown in figures 7.3 – 7.5.  As can be seen from the figures a 
selection of structural, syntactical and frequency based statistics were used to 
identify fragments; the related probability tables and a short description of each 
node can be found in Appendix B. It is interesting to note that in the original 
Bayesian Network all nodes were directly linked to the hypothesis nodes; 
however upon examination of the statistics it was noted that some artefacts 
have a greater impact on the validity of a hypothesis when combined together 
leading to the layers in the network. For each node with dependencies the 
probability table is created using the formula below.  
 
    |     
          |   
    
 
  
In this research the Bayesian Network nodes will have Boolean outcomes; a 
node can resolve to either True or False. The equation provides the probability 
of a node resolving to True given the data that directly effects it within the 
network.  X represents the node itself, while Z relates to any nodes directly 
influencing X. For this research, the syntax p(X | Z) means the probability of X 
being True given Z is True). In the Bayesian network nodes can have multiple 
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parents; in this case Z would represent the state of the parent nodes. For 
example if a node had two parents, Z could represent one of four states ([True, 
True], [True, False], [False, True], [False, False]).  
 
After the construction of the probability tables for each node the network could 
be used for to classify each fragment. In order to calculate the probability tables 
in Appendix B the training data was used. For each value with no parents the 
probability of the value occurring was established by calculating the number of 
fragments the value occurred in compared to the number without the value. For 
values with parents the probability of each set of parent states occurring while 
the node value was True was compared with the probability of the parent states 
occurring with the node being False. Therefore the probability of a set of states 
occurring in a thumbnail cache file fragment was compared with the probability 
of the states occurring in a fragment which does not belong to the thumbnail 
cache. 
 
7.8.2 Using Bayesian Networks for Classification 
The Bayesian Network shown in figures 7.3 – 7.5 and associated probability 
tables in Appendix B can be used to classify fragments. A program was 
constructed which identified whether each of the conditions of the independent 
nodes were True or False. This information was then used to calculate the 
probability of each of the classifications being true. A classification was deemed 
to be True if the probability of it being True, given the data, was above 0.75. If 
multiple classifications resolved to True, the one with the highest probability was 
accepted as the fragment classification. 
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Figure 7-3: Bayesian network for H1 and H2 classification 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Bayesian Network for H3, H4 and H5 classification 
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Figure 7-5: Bayesian Network for H6 classification 
 
7.9 Neural Network Approach 
The Neural Network method was implemented using a feed forward Neural 
Network with a single hidden layer. The network consisted of 17 input nodes 
which use the same input as the nodes identified in the Bayesian Network. The 
hidden layer consisted of 11 nodes, with 6 output nodes representing the 
various classifications. A sigmoid transfer function and back propagation were 
used for learning. The training set comprised of half of Data Set 1 as described 
in Section 7.5. The learning rate was initially set at 0.5 and training was set to 
stop when the error rate was 0.01 or 25000 iterations were reached. The 
remaining fragments in the corpus were used for testing the network. The 
implemented network was designed and written completely for this research; 
this enabled the method to be adapted to the specification of this research. 
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7.10 Results 
This section contains the results from the last iteration of each method on the 
training set, followed by testing on the unused part of Data set 1, then against 
Data set 2 and Data set 3; as described in Section 7.5 some of the methods 
were altered during iterations to take into consideration the results of the 
previous attempt and improve the methods accuracy.  
 
7.10.1 Method 1: Brute Force approach 
 
Table 7-4: Method 1 Results for the Training Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
 
Classification of each fragment by Method 1(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
  
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 8 0 0 0 0 1601 1609 
% 0.4972 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 99.5028 100 
H2 
No. 0 378980 0 0 0 5040 384020 
% 0.0000 98.6876 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.3124 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 3387039 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31693 0 0 31693 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 31215 31215 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H6 
No. 32615718 3781375 0 5246610 0 71169092 112812795 
% 28.9114 3.3519 0.0000 4.6507 0.0000 63.0860 100 
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Table 7-5: Method 1 Results for the 1st Testing Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
s 
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 25 0 0 0 0 1584 1609 
% 1.5538 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 98.4462 100 
H2 
No. 0 376150 0 0 0 7869 384019 
% 0.0000 97.9509 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.0491 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 3387039 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31692 0 0 31692 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 31214 31214 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H6 
No. 33254086 2550791 0 5696645 0 71311272 112812794 
% 29.4772 2.2611 0.0000 5.0496 0.0000 63.2120 100 
 
 
Table 7-6: Method 1 Results for the 2nd Testing Set (Data Set 2) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
s(
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 24 0 0 0 0 3253 3277 
% 0.7324 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 99.2676 100 
H2 
No. 0 665706 0 0 0 7216 672922 
% 0.0000 98.9277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0723 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 5971550 5971550 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 11677 0 0 11677 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 10668 10668 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H6 
No. 54874388 3924175 0 3566289 0 294858165 357223017 
% 15.3614 1.0985 0.0000 0.9983 0.0000 82.5418 100 
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Table 7-7: Method 1 Results for the unknown data set (Data Set 3) 
Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
No. 2 572 0 49 0 308544299 308544922 
% 6.482E-07 0.000185386 0 
1.588E-
05 
0 99.99979808 100 
 
 
7.10.2 Method 2: Structural and Syntactical approach 
 
Table 7-8: Method 2 Results for the Training Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 1609 0 0 0 0 0 1609 
% 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H2 
No. 0 384020 0 0 0 0 384020 
% 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 51 0 0 3386988 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 99.9985 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31693 0 0 31693 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 31215 31215 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H6 
No. 0 0 3583560 630989 0 108598246 112812795 
% 0.0000 0.0000 3.1766 0.5593 0.0000 96.2641 100 
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Table 7-9: Method 2 Results for the 1st Testing Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
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e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
e
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en
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 1609 0 0 0 0 0 1609 
% 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H2 
No. 0 384019 0 0 0 0 384019 
% 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 76 0 0 3386963 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 99.9978 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31692 0 0 31692 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 31214 31214 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H6 
No. 0 0 3981698 631732 0 108199364 112812794 
% 0.0000 0.0000 3.5295 0.5600 0.0000 95.9105 100 
 
 
Table 7-10:Method 2 Results for the 2nd Testing Set (Data Set 2) 
  Classification of Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
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n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 3277 0 0 0 0 0 3277 
% 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H2 
No. 0 672922 0 0 0 0 672922 
% 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 73 0 0 5971477 5971550 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 99.9988 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 11677 0 0 11677 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 0 10668 10668 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100 
H6 
No. 0 0 8244521 321139 0 348657357 357223017 
% 0.0000 0.0000 2.3079 0.0899 0.0000 97.6022 100 
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Table 7-11: Method 2 Results for the unknown data set (Data Set 3) 
Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
No. 71 874 2736 945 0 308540296 308544922 
% 
2.30112E-
05 
0.000283265 0.000886743 0.000306276 0 99.9985007  100 
 
 
7.10.3 Method 3: Statistical approach 
 
Table 7-12: Method 3 Results for the Training Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
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n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 1567 0 0 0 0 42 1609 
% 97.3897 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.6103 100 
H2 
No. 0 384020 0 0 0 0 384020 
% 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 1540682 0 0 1846357 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 45.4876 0.0000 0.0000 54.5124 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31693 0 0 31693 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 21866 9349 31215 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 70.0497 29.9503 100 
H6 
No. 105821 2931512 6589250 404 4747223 98438585 112812795 
% 0.0938 2.5986 5.8409 0.0004 4.2081 87.2584 100 
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Table 7-13: Method 3 Results for the 1st Testing Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of fragment by method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
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p
e
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e
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e
n
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g
e
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    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 1581 0 0 0 0 28 1609 
% 98.2598 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.7402 100 
H2 
No. 0 384019 0 0 0 0 384019 
% 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 2115649 0 0 1271390 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 62.4631 0.0000 0.0000 37.5369 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31692 0 0 31692 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 0 0 21433 9781 31214 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 68.6647 31.3353 100 
H6 
No. 128791 2849734 6019246 91641 4622362 99101020 112812794 
% 0.1142 2.5261 5.3356 0.0006 4.0974 87.9262 100 
 
 
Table 7-14: Method 3 Results for the 2nd Testing Set (Data Set 2) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 3261 0 0 0 0 16 3277 
% 99.5117 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4883 100 
H2 
No. 0 672922 0 0 0 0 672922 
% 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 3346051 0 3820 2621679 5971550 
% 0.0000 0.0000 56.0332 0.0000 0.0640 43.9028 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 11677 0 0 11677 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 4322 0 5489 857 10668 
% 0.0000 0.0000 40.5137 0.0000 51.4529 8.0334 100 
H6 
No. 1 3 9879115 7509961 40845608 298988329 357223017 
% 0.0000 0.0000 2.7655 2.1023 11.4342 83.6979 100 
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Table 7-15: Method 3 Results for the unknown data set (Data Set 3) 
Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
No. 65 864 9193 3490 51532 308479778 308544922 
% 
2.10666E-
05 
0.000280024 0.002979469 0.001131116 0.01670162 99.9788867  100 
 
 
7.10.4 Method 4: Neural Network approach 
 
Table 7-16: Method 4 Results for the Training Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 529 0 6 0 5 1069 1609 
% 32.8776 0.0000 0.3729 0.0000 0.3108 66.4388 100 
H2 
No. 0 236144 0 0 0 147876 384020 
% 0.0000 61.4926 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 38.5074 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 2396283 0 84557 906199 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 70.7486 0.0000 2.4965 26.7549 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31693 0 0 31693 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 259 0 26322 4634 31215 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.8297 0.0000 84.3248 14.8454 100 
H6 
No. 637 186 9056634 1485 7596948 96156905 112812795 
% 0.0006 0.0002 8.0280 0.0013 6.7341 85.2358 100 
 
  
 
 Page 
195 
 
  
Table 7-17: Method 4 Results for the 1st Testing Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 472 0 1 0 6 1130 1609 
% 29.3350 0.0000 0.0622 0.0000 0.3729 70.2300 100 
H2 
No. 0 306495 0 0 0 77524 384019 
% 0.0000 79.8125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 20.1875 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 2502056 0 94470 790513 3387039 
% 0.0000 0.0000 73.8715 0.0000 2.7892 23.3394 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31691 0 1 31692 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 99.9968 0.0000 0.0032 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 3809 0 22929 4476 31214 
% 0.0000 0.0000 12.2029 0.0000 73.4574 14.3397 100 
H6 
No. 822 128 9348868 1268 7201152 96260556 112812794 
% 0.0007 0.0001 8.2871 0.0011 6.3833 85.3277 100 
 
 
Table 7-18: Method 4 Results for the 2nd Testing Set (Data Set 2) 
  Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
(P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 1226 0 3 0 9 2039 3277 
% 37.4123 0.0000 0.0915 0.0000 0.2746 62.2215 100 
H2 
No. 0 395123 0 0 0 277799 672922 
% 0.0000 58.7175 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 41.2825 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 3991699 0 105340 1874511 5971550 
% 0.0000 0.0000 66.8453 0.0000 1.7640 31.3907 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 11673 0 4 11677 
% 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 99.9657 0.0000 0.0343 100 
H5 
No. 7 0 630 0 8755 1276 10668 
% 0.0656 0.0000 5.9055 0.0000 82.0679 11.9610 100 
H6 
No. 1373 2007 14580167 1875 18408479 324229116 357223017 
% 0.0004 0.0006 4.0815 0.0005 5.1532 90.7638 100 
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Table 7-19: Method 4 Results for the unknown data set (Data Set 3) 
Classification of each Fragment by Method(Percentage) 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
No. 28 253 9028 932 60974 308473707 308544922 
% 
9.07485E-
06 
8.19978E-
05 
0.002925992 0.000302063 0.01976179 99.97691908   
 
7.11 Comparison of Classification Methods 
The methods described and implemented throughout this chapter have different 
strengths and weaknesses. Each of the four methods adapted and implemented 
during this research has shown to assist with the identification of thumbnail 
cache file fragments. Table 7.20 shows the success and false positive rate for 
each method tested on data set 2. The table shows that the structural and 
syntactical method achieved 100 % success with no false positives for 
categories H1 and H2; this method also achieved the highest success rate for 
H4. The highest success rate for H3 was achieved by the statistical approach; 
the neural network achieved the highest success rate for H5. 
 
The Brute Force approach provides a quick way of implementing a system to 
identify information; it relies on unique sequences which can be used to classify 
information. The sequences are identifiable to an analyst by a brief examination 
of the file type. The Brute Force method can only identify fragments containing 
known sequences; this relies on the analyst selecting a sequence which occurs 
in every instance of the classification they are attempting to identify. Depending 
on the frequency of the keyword, it is possible to attract a substantial amount of 
false-positives; whilst the amount of information is still reduced from the original 
data set the analyst may need to use other methods to further refine the 
potential information. 
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Table 7-20: Percentage Success and False Positive rate for each method for Data 
Set 2 
  Brute Force 
Structural and 
Syntactical 
Statistical Neural Network 
H1 
Success 0.73 100.00 99.51 37.41 
False 
Positive 
15.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H2 
Success 98.92 100.00 100.00 58.71 
False 
Positive 
1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H3 
Success 0.00 0.00 56.03 66.84 
False 
Positive 
0.00 2.30 2.76 4.07 
H4 
Success 100 100 100 99.96 
False 
Positive 
0.98 0.09 2.06 0.00 
H5 
Success 0.00 0.00 51.45 82.06 
False 
Positive 
0.00 0.00 11.23 5.09 
 
The Structural and Syntactical approach requires a more in depth 
understanding of the file structure and valid syntax. The approach provides 
information which can be used in conjunction with the Brute force approach to 
further validate potential fragments and reduce the number of false positives. 
The use of this method requires a stable structure and any changes in both 
structure and potential syntax to be identified and added to the model; if the 
changes are not added then the method will not be able to identify those 
fragments. The structure and syntax is generally developed using known 
information; it is possible that the known data set which is used to create the 
model does not contain every variation of that fragment type and this may also 
lead to information being missed.  
 
Both the Brute Force and Structural and Syntactical approaches performed 
badly when attempting to classify image only fragments; such fragments are 
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more suited to pattern recognition techniques. Methods such as the Bayesian 
and Neural Networks take in a variety of input and aim to put a fragment into the 
category it most likely belongs to. The techniques could not improve upon the 
Brute force and Structural and Syntactical approaches for identifying structured 
information with metadata; the pattern recognition techniques improved the 
identification of image-only data. Whilst given infinite resources it is possible for 
an analyst to examine and classify each fragment individually for H1, H2, and 
H4, it would be difficult for an analyst to identify fragments belonging to H3 and 
H5. Such fragments which would be difficult for a human to identify have unique 
patterns which a machine can use to learn which classification is the most likely 
for a given input.  
 
The Bayesian approach takes the likelihood of a node occurring in both the 
classification and in other circumstances into consideration to build a statistical 
model based upon the training data. The use of statistical modelling allows a 
fragment which does not perfectly fit the structural and syntactical model to be 
classified; this allows for variations outside the observed data. The Bayesian 
network is designed using expert knowledge about the domain to construct a 
model to form relationships between characteristics. The Neural network uses 
the same input information as the Bayesian network but allows the machine to 
interpret the relationship between features and classification. This suggests that 
theneural network has the capability to assign weight to relationships differently 
to an analyst which may assist with classification. 
 
7.12 Discussion 
The hypothesis of this research focused on the evidential value of thumbnail 
cache file fragments identified in unallocated space. The potential size of 
unallocated space on a storage device makes the individual analysis of each 
cluster infeasible; therefore a method for the automated identification of 
information was required. At the time of conducting this research there was little 
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information available about single fragment identification; particularly in cases 
where the fragment classification was based solely on the information within the 
fragment. This suggested that an existing method for the identification of larger 
chunks of data had to be selected and adapted for single fragment 
identification.   
 
If a single method was selected and adapted then the research would be 
evaluating the ability of the adapted method to identify thumbnail cache file 
fragment. Therefore a comparative study was selected to attempt to maximise 
the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments. The study provided an 
opportunity to evaluate a variety of adapted methods on different thumbnail 
cache structures; this highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of using each 
approach.  
 
The results of this research on data sets 1, 2provided 100% identification of 
fragments in H1 and H2 with no false positives using the structural and 
syntactical approach; H3 produced the least accurate results with a high rate of 
false positives and negatives. The evaluation of file fragment identification 
methods produced inaccurate results when identifying fragments which solely 
contained JPEG data; this is partly due to the fact it is difficult to distinguish 
between a JPEG fragment which belongs to the thumbnail cache and a JPEG 
fragment which belongs to any other file. For this research it was decided that it 
would be best to ensure all the JPEG fragments from the thumbnail cache were 
identified; whilst attempting to minimise the false positives; this proved difficult 
and most JPEG fragments were classified as thumbnail cache image 
fragments. Therefore further research is required into methods of identifying 
JPEG fragments in order to improve the accuracy of their carving. 
 
The tables of results in Section 7.10 show the actual fragment classification 
against the classification given to the fragment by each method for Data sets 1 
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and 2. This is possible because the fragments in this data set were taken from 
known live files; the files were split into fragments and each given a header with 
metadata to ensure a relationship with the original file was maintained. Data set 
3 was a collection of the unallocated space from the machines used to provide 
the original two data sets.  
 
Given the size of Data set 3 it was not feasible to individually analyse each 
cluster to ascertain its actual classification; therefore the only information 
provided after parsing this data set is the classified files. This data set 
represents a real world example of unallocated space with which to test the 
methods and identify information from an unknown collection of data. The data 
set also provided an opportunity to analyse the unallocated space for thumbnail 
cache artefacts; the results of this research show that the methods classified 
some information found in unallocated space as belonging to the thumbnail 
cache. On examination of the fragments identified from Data Set 3, information 
was recovered from deleted user accounts, and thumbnail cache files which 
were known to have been deleted from the systems.  
 
This research has highlighted the increased identification for classifications of 
fragments which have been studied and can be formally described; therefore to 
identify fragments accurately it is necessary to understand the specific 
characteristics of the file type. The ability to accurately identify multiple types of 
thumbnail cache file fragments suggests that the approach documented can be 
generalised to other types of file.   
 
None of the methods tested during this research were able to identify all the 
thumbnail cache file fragments without false positives; classifications H1 and H2 
were identified with no false positives using the structural and syntactical 
approach. The lack of a completely successful method suggests there is room 
for improvement in the identification of single thumbnail cache file fragments. A 
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hybrid approach may improve the accuracy of identification, and would provide 
an opportunity to enhance the identification of H3 fragments; Table 7.20 shows 
H3 had the lowest overall success rate during this research with the highest 
success rate for this classification being 66.84%. The results tables in Section 
7.10show that for most of the methods and data sets, the H3 fragments 
consistently have low rates of identification.  
 
7.13 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter described research into the identification of thumbnail cache file 
fragments; this was achieved by implementing a variety of the most common file 
carving methods and evaluating their performance on a corpus. If a single file 
carving method had been implemented the results of the identification would 
have only provided an evaluation of the method itself; therefore using several 
methods provides the opportunity to enhance identification. The evaluation of 
the file carving methods also provides a unique opportunity to compare the 
strengths and weaknesses of each file carving approach.  
 
The results of the comparative study showed that the H1 and H2 classifications 
could be successfully identified with no false positives in the corpus. Whilst it is 
noted that fragment types may exist which were not present in the corpus the 
high identification rate suggests a significant reduction in the number of 
fragments an analyst would have to analyse. A hybrid approach may improve 
classification for H3-H5 and to improve the overall performance of the method. 
Since image-only thumbnail cache fragments have similar characteristics to 
standard image fragments it would be difficult to completely remove false 
positive matches. The aim of this research is to identify fragments which can be 
used for the reassembly research in Chapter 9; therefore a solution would be to 
maximise the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments whilst minimising 
false positives. 
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This chapter has successfully identified some thumbnail cache fragments; as 
the methods implemented do not identify all the thumbnail cache file fragments 
it is possible a piece of relevant evidence may not be found. The results on data 
set 3 show the potential for the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments 
from unallocated space and have also highlighted some circumstances where 
evidence may be recovered which is not available in the live file set. The 
classification of image-only fragments was the least successful; the next 
chapter focuses on the problem of image-only fragment identification and the 
creation of a hybrid approach. It aims to improve upon the classification of 
thumbnail cache file fragments in this research. 
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8 The creation of a Hybrid Identification Approach 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 a set of criteria for establishing evidential value were established; 
one of the criteria was maximising the recovered data. Therefore in order to 
establish the evidential value of thumbnail cache information in unallocated 
space it is necessary to maximise the data recovered.  
 
The four file fragment identification methods implemented in the previous 
chapter had success rates which had room for improvement; therefore it is 
proposed to develop an approach based upon a hybrid of the previously 
implemented methods to improve the identification statistics. In the previous 
chapter the lowest identification statistics were achieved for image-only 
fragments identification. It was determined that further research was required to 
create an implementation which takes into account the features of image-only 
fragments may improve the identification.  The methods implemented in the 
previous section highlighted the impact understanding the file format can have 
on the amount of data recovered.  
 
This chapter describes the research performed into improving the identification 
of thumbnail cache file fragments; it begins by establishing a problem definition 
[Section 8.2], this is followed by a brief overview of the methodology for this 
research [Section 8.3]. Section 8.4 describes related research into JPEG file 
recovery; the method implemented for identifying image-only fragments is 
documented in Section 8.5. In Section 8.6 the new approach for thumbnail 
cache file fragment identification is described. The results of this research are 
shown in Section 8.7; this is followed by a discussion on the research [Section 
8.8] and the conclusion of this chapter [Section 8.9]. 
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8.2 Problem Definition 
In the introduction it was established that the research described in the previous 
chapter did not produce a method which could identify all the thumbnail cache 
file fragments without producing any false positives.  Therefore there is the 
potential for further research into improving the identification of thumbnail cache 
file fragments; the completion of this further research assists with meeting the 
criteria for maximising the data recovered. In order to compare the results of 
this research with the results recorded in Chapter 7 the same classifications will 
be used, these are listed below for completeness. 
 
H1:Thumbcache_idx.db file 
H2: Image thumbcache file and contains metadata 
H3: Image thumbcache file and only contains JPEG image data 
H4: Linux PNG visual thumbnail and contains metadata 
H5: PNG visual thumbnail fragment and only contains image data 
H6: Not part of a Windows or Linux thumbnail cache 
 
Within the thumbnail caches examined in Chapters 5 and 6 of this research 
each visual thumbnail is stored in a standard image format; this means 
thumbnail cache image only fragments and standard image only fragments 
have the same structure and characteristics. Whilst the system visual 
thumbnails may provide useful artefacts such as a sample of the files within a 
directory, focusing on identifying JPEG fragments provides interesting 
opportunities for the generalisation of this research. Image fragments in JPEG 
format could also belong to user created images such as those created by 
cameras or downloaded from the internet; therefore the ability to identify these 
fragments would be of significant interest to the forensic computing community.  
The results for the identification of H3 fragments were consistently the lowest, 
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and had a high number of false positives; therefore further research into the 
format of H3 fragments is required to assist with maximising the data recovered. 
 
Each method used in the previous research had different strengths; methods 1 
and 2 produced the most accurate results on structured information with a 
known syntax. Method 3 produced accurate results with a file which had a 
known but variable structure; both methods 3 and 4 improved the accuracy of 
pattern matching for the image only fragments. If the strengths of each method 
were utilised it may be possible to construct a single approach to identifying 
thumbnail cache file fragments. In order to compare any new implementation to 
the previous methods the information to be carved should remain as described 
in Section 7.5. In order to successfully maximise the data recovered and 
maximise the relationships formed it is necessary to both identify thumbnail 
cache file fragments and to reassemble the files where possible. The 
reassembly of a thumbnail cache file would assist with forming relationships 
between artefacts and provide contextual information about any artefacts 
recovered. Therefore it is necessary to consider the potential input requirements 
of reassembly methods to ensure the output produced from this research is 
suitable for the next stage of this research project. 
 
For this research it is necessary to consider the feasibility and performance of 
the reassembly approach. If fragments have not been successfully identified 
then it will not be possible to completely reassemble the information; this 
suggests that it is better to identify all relevant fragments and have some false 
positives than to fail to identify a relevant fragment. However a large number of 
false positives can reduce the feasibility of the reassembly method. For 
example a large number of false positives may result in a substantial number of 
comparisons which may significantly impact the processing time required to 
complete the reassembly process. It may also affect the number of false 
positive reassembled files produced. This would mean an analyst had more 
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information to examine at the end of the process; the large amount of 
information may mean that a piece of important information is overlooked.  
 
 
Figure 8-1: Jigsaw piece classification 
 
The reassembly problem can be thought of as a tub full of jigsaw pieces; the 
pieces are from 1000 jigsaws. The aim is to build a single jigsaw, in order to do 
so the best use of resources would be to refine the number of pieces likely to 
belong to the jigsaw as shown in Figure 8.1. Refining the number of possible 
pieces ensures fewer comparisons are carried out during the reassembly 
process. In order to complete the jigsaw successfully it is better to have too 
many pieces than too few; whilst attempting to ensure the feasibility and 
processing required to complete the task is acceptable. Therefore the 
identification method needs to maximise the thumbnail cache file fragments 
which are found, whilst attempting to minimise the false positives. 
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8.3 Methodology 
The problem definition highlighted two areas for investigation in this research. 
Firstly methods to improve the identification of H3 fragments will be considered; 
as these are JPEG image data only fragments standard image fragment 
recovery techniques can be considered. After research relating to JPEG 
fragment identification has been considered a new method for H3 identification 
will be implemented. This will be followed by the construction of a hybrid 
approach for thumbnail cache file fragment identification; the implementation 
will take the strengths of the four methods evaluated in the previous chapter 
and aims to improve the statistics for identification.  
 
In order to conduct this research the three data sets constructed in Chapter 7 
will be used to evaluate the resulting implementation of a thumbnail cache file 
fragment identification method. Previous work has highlighted the importance of 
understanding the structural characteristics of files in order to identify potential 
fragments and this will be considered throughout the construction of an 
identification method for each classification. The research conducted to 
implement a new method for H3 identification will be used in the hybrid 
approach constructed in Section 8.6. The results of the hybrid approach will 
then be described in Section 8.7 and evaluated against the identification 
methods constructed in Chapter 7 [Section 8.8]. 
 
8.4 JPEG Identification Research 
One of the most common image formats is JPEG; JPEG is a compression 
method which is commonly used for images such as those on web pages and 
those taken with digital cameras. Like PNG images, JPEG files are split into 
sections, however the sections do not contain information about the length of 
their content. Each section begins with a marker to denote its start and type; 
since the file type is less structured than a PNG file the markers can occur at 
any point and therefore at any point in a file fragment. The structure of JPEG 
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files is described on the Joint Photographic Experts Group website [JPEG, 
2013].Using the brute force approach of searching for known signatures and 
strings present in a file it is possible to identify a JPEG header by searching for 
the signature string OxFFD8.  
 
A thumbnail stored in JPEG format is likely to be stored over several clusters; 
clusters which contain the middle of a JPEG file may not have any easily 
identifiable features and therefore a tailored identification approach is required. 
As a visual thumbnail may begin at any point in a cluster it is necessary to 
perform an exhaustive byte by byte search for the header signature in order to 
identify the start of the image.  
 
It is possible to successfully decode a potential JPEG fragment that does not 
belong in the current file sequence; identifying the wrong fragment increases in 
likelihood when there is a substantial amount of similar images involved. One 
possible solution to this problem is to analyse the changes in the intensity of the 
pixels around the join of the clusters; a large change in pixel intensity suggests 
the clusters should not be reassembled in that pattern [Pal, 2008]. The process 
of identifying and reassembling JPEG file fragments can be considered process 
intensive because of the requirement to decode each potential new cluster 
sequence.  
 
JPEG identification techniques typically combine identification and reassembly 
of the file into a single phase where each cluster of the file is searched for in 
order. When a potentially matching cluster is identified JPEG decoding is 
performed on the current file fragments; if no error occurs during decoding the 
fragment is added to the file sequence and the next cluster in the sequence is 
searched for [Garfinkel, 2007]. 
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A bit pattern matching technique proposed by Sencar [2009] aimed to identify 
JPEG fragments without relying on a chain of clusters from the file. This 
technique could be used for classification of potential JPEG fragments which 
would significantly reduce the potential trial matches required during the 
reassembly process.  Guo [2011] described a technique for recovering JPEG 
files based upon their visual thumbnail; the technique uses visual thumbnails 
stored in thumbnail caches. This technique could be reversed to assist with 
identifying thumbnail cache fragments. For example, the original file could be 
processed using the thumbnail creation methods to provide a visual thumbnail, 
this visual thumbnail could assist with locating and reassembling pieces of the 
original thumbnail record. 
 
8.5 Visual Thumbnail JPEG File Fragment Identification 
As described in Section 8.4 previous research has been conducted into JPEG 
file fragment identification; this research can be applied to thumbnail cache 
JPEG only file fragments as they have the same characteristics. In this research 
the aim is to identify single 4096 byte JPEG image only fragments without the 
use of supplementary system information. As most of the techniques in JPEG 
identification combine the identification and reassembly phases they cannot be 
directly applied to this research; this research does not assume further clusters 
relating to the JPEG fragment exist and therefore reassembly of the original file 
may not be an option.   
 
From the previous research it was established that understanding the structure 
and expected characteristics of a JPEG can assist with identification; therefore 
this research will focus upon identifying characteristics of JPEG file fragments.  
From Data set 1, described in Chapter 7, 1000 JPEG only thumbnail cache file 
fragments were selected.  A Python program was used to randomly select the 
fragments from the H3 category. A further 1000 JPEG only file fragments which 
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were not from thumbnail cache files were randomly selected for comparison 
from data set 1.  
 
A small software program was implemented to analyse the frequencies of byte 
patterns for up to 4 bytes to ascertain if any characteristics could be identified 
for JPEG fragments. It was found that for single byte frequencies 0x00 is often 
quite high, with 0xFF generally being one of the less frequent bytes; four 
example images and their associated single byte frequencies are shown in 
figure 8.2. For two byte frequencies there are interesting characteristics for 
those starting with 0xFF; for example the set of bytes 0xFF FF does not appear 
in any of the JPEG image-only thumbnail cache fragments. However the 
sequence 0xFF FF did occur on multiple occasions in the non-thumbnail JPEG 
fragments. This interesting characteristic is due to the use of 0xFF as the first 
byte of a start of sequence marker; therefore only sequence markers used in 
the JPEG specification are valid in the JPEG clusters.  
 
A python program was written to extract each 2 byte sequence starting with 
0xFF found in the Windows 7 JPEG visual thumbnails. The program found eight 
unique 2 byte sequences, which are documented in table 8.1;the function of 
each byte sequence is also described [Cuturicu,1999; Weeks, 1998]. Out of the 
identified byte pairs, six have static positions relative to the start of the visual 
thumbnail; therefore only 0xFF 00 and 0xFFD9 can occur after than the first 611 
bytes of a JPEG visual thumbnail. As the first 623 bytes of a visual thumbnail 
are mostly consistent if a marker is identified it is possible to check the bytes 
around it and validate it occurs at the right relative offset in the visual thumbnail. 
If the byte sequence 0xFFD9 occurs this should be directly followed by a 
subrecord header; therefore this byte sequence is unlikely to occur in a H3 
fragment.  
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Figure 8-2: Single byte frequencies for 4 visual thumbnails 
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In order to identify potential H3 fragments the first check used is to identify if the 
byte 0xFF occurs; if the byte occurs then it is checked to ensure it is followed by 
one of the 8 valid bytes. If a 0xFF is found which is not followed by one of the 
valid byte structures then the fragment is rejected. If a valid byte pair is 
identified then the area around the byte sequence can also be checked; if the 
byte sequence is one of the first six in table 8.1 then the information around the 
byte can be used to verify it occurs at a valid position. In order to assess if the 
markers were the only ones used in thumbnail cache JPEG images every H3 
fragment in data set 2 was analysed. The results supported the hypothesis that 
only the subset of markers found in table 8.1 are found in JPEG thumbnail 
cache images. 
 
The byte frequencies identified were also compared with non-JPEG file 
fragments to identify characteristics which could be used to assist with the 
classification of JPEG fragments. The byte frequencies for JPEG fragments 
observed during this research fell throughout the byte range; therefore each 
potential fragment can be checked to ensure the byte frequencies are spread 
over the byte range and not heavily favouring a sub-set. Fragments with 
inappropriate structures tend to favour specific byte range sub-sets such as 
fragments containing ASCII or Unicode text strings; these fragments can be 
rejected as thumbnail cache image fragments for JPEG thumbnails do not 
contain metadata.  
 
On analysis of the single byte frequencies 91.197% of the JPEG visual 
thumbnails analysed had a maximum single byte frequency of 2.16%; a further 
8.802 % had a maximum single byte frequency of 4.2%. Interestingly images 
which had unusual frequencies were ones which consisted of between 1 and 4 
colours. These images did not have a distributed byte frequency; instead 
several of the bytes had high frequencies, ranging up to 20% of the total whilst 
up to 14% of the bytes had a frequency of 0%. For this research as the majority 
of images had single byte frequencies under 4.2% this figure will be used as a 
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check for each potential fragment. If a byte frequency is over the cut of, or a 
byte has a frequency of 0% the fragment will be rejected. 
 
Table 8-1: JPEG sequence markers found in Visual thumbnails 
Byte 
Sequence 
Meaning Relative Position(s) in 
visual thumbnail 
FFD8 Start of JPEG image 0 
FFE0 JFIF marker 2 
FFDB Define Quantization table 
marker 
20, 89 
FFC0 Start of frame marker 158 
FFC4 Define Huffman table 
marker 
177, 210, 393, 426 
FFDA Start of Scan marker 609 
FF00 0xFF with filling byte 0x00; 
read as just 0xFF 
Anywhere in the scan 
sequence 
FFD9 End of JPEG Image End of visual 
thumbnail 
 
In order to construct a method for identifying H3 fragments the checks detailed 
in this section were used to pre-process the data. Any fragments which met the 
checks were used as potential candidates for the neural network. The neural 
network architecture is the same as the one used in Section 7.9; a copy of the 
neural network implementation was created with a single output node and re-
trained using the pre-processed data. The sigmoid transfer function and back 
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propagation were again used for learning. The training set consisted of a 
randomly selected third of the fragments which were considered valid 
candidates after pre-processing; equal percentages of each file type in the pre-
processed data set were used.  As in Chapter 7 the learning rate was set at 0.5 
and training was set to stop when the error rate was 0.01 or 25000 iterations 
were reached. The remaining fragments in the pre-processed data set were 
used for testing the network.   
 
Table 8-2: Results of visual thumbnail JPEG method 
  
Classification of fragment by method 
(Percentage) 
  
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
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P
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e
n
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ge
) 
  
H3 
Fragment 
H6 JPEG 
Fragment 
Total 
H3 
Fragment 
No. 755 245 1000 
% 75.5 24.5 100 
H6 JPEG 
Fragment 
No. 391 609 1000 
% 39.1 60.9 100 
  Total 1146 854   
 
 
Table 8-3: Percentage success and false positive rates for the H3 method 
  
JPEG 
identification 
method 
H3 
Success 75.5 
False Positive 39.1 
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The results of the H3 identification method are in table 8.2, and the success rate 
is shown in table 8.3. The results show a success rate of 75.5% for the method; 
the rate reflects the amount of JPEG fragments which do not belong to the 
thumbnail cache which contain markers not found in table 8.1. The markers 
identified were the only ones found in the thumbnail cache file fragments 
analysed.  
 
8.6 A hybrid approach for thumbnail cache identification 
The combined approach aims to take the strengths of each of the individual 
methods and combine them to create a hybrid approach with improved 
classification statistics. Whilst the bases of the combined approach are the 
methods previously implemented in Chapter 7 other information is also added 
to the individual approaches as appropriate to improve their performance. The 
complete hybrid method takes in a cluster which comprises of 4096 bytes; the 
method can also take disk images which once added are broken down into 
4096 byte fragments to send to the identification method. Each cluster is 
individually assessed for classification using the hybrid method.  The method is 
broken down into 6 testing stages. In general each testing stage is followed 
sequentially, however depending on validation checks performed at each stage 
a fragment may be classified or miss classification stages. If at any stage a 
fragment is identified as not belonging to a thumbnail cache it is rejected and 
categorised as H6. The process is summarised in figure 8.3; each stage of the 
identification method is described below.  
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Figure 8-3: A summary of the hybrid approach 
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8.6.1 Stage 1: Preliminary Checks 
Each fragment starts in the ‘preliminary checks’ section which aims to quickly 
remove fragments which are not part of the thumbnail cache. Firstly the 
fragment is assessed to see if it contains a known file signature; if the signature 
is from an irrelevant file type it is automatically rejected. If a file signature 
header of “IMMM”, “CMMM” or “PNG” was identified the fragment was passed 
directly to Stage 2, 3, and 5 validation checks respectively; the values 
represent header signatures which are found at the start of thumbnail cache 
files.  Known file types were established using the known file signatures listed in 
the WinHex 16.0 file “File Type Signatures Search.txt”. Further potential file 
system fragment headers were also included such as the start of an NTFS 
volume “0xEB52904E544653” and the MFT record header “0x46494C4530”; 
this was based on the information provided about file systems by Sammes 
[2008] and was used to exclude known H6 fragments.   
 
The second check identifies whether the fragment contains solely a single hex 
value for example 0x00 or 0xFF; as thumbnail cache fragments are not likely to 
be made up solely of a single value such fragments are automatically rejected. 
Thirdly checks are performed to ascertain whether the fragment consists mostly 
of ASCII or Unicode values. In order to perform these checks the hex values of 
the fragment are considered. If 90% or more of the bytes in the fragment fall 
between 0x41 and 0x7A the fragment contains mainly ASCII characters and is 
rejected. If 80% or more of the double bytes in the fragment fall between 
0x0030 and 0x007A the fragment contains mainly Unicode characters and is 
rejected.  
 
The final preliminary check is to ascertain if the fragment has a compound 
structure; file types can be contained within compound structures and therefore 
a header signature may appear anywhere within a fragment. Only image file 
types (JPEG, BMP, and PNG) are valid headers to be found within thumbnail 
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cache file fragments. The headers identified in the first check using the WinHex 
file are used again for this extensive check of the entire fragment. If a header is 
found which is not part of a thumbnail cache file the fragment is rejected. As the 
Linux visual thumbnails are stored in individual PNG files the PNG header 
signature will only be found at the start of a fragment and would therefore have 
been identified in the first check of this stage. If the fragment contains a JPEG, 
PNG or BMP header the fragment is passed to Stage 3 as these are the file 
types used to store visual thumbnails in the Windows 7 thumbnail cache.  
 
After the final preliminary check if the fragment has not been rejected or passed 
directly to another stage it is passed to Stage 2.  
 
8.6.2 Stage 2: H1 Validation Checks 
If the fragment completes the Stage 1 checks and is not rejected or identified as 
containing a thumbnail cache file H2 or H4 file header then it is assessed for H1 
classification; given the ability of the structural and syntactical approach to 
identify H1 fragments with no false positives it was decided to use the checks 
defined in Section 7.7.1. If these checks are all positive the fragment is 
classified as H1; if any check fails the fragment is passed to H2.  
 
8.6.3 Stage 3: H2 Validation Checks 
A fragment can be passed to stage 3 by either stage 1 or 2. If the fragment is 
passed directly from Stage 1 then it begins with the file signature “CMMM”; in 
this case if the fragment belongs to a thumbnail cache the file signature is either 
followed by the remainder of the thumbnail cache file header or the subrecord 
header structure. In Section 7.7.2 the implementation for identification of H2 
fragments using the structural and syntactical approach was described. The 
method identified all the thumbnail cache file fragments in the three data sets 
used in the previous chapters without identifying any false positives. Therefore 
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the checks used in Section 7.7.2 are used in this method for H2 validation. If a 
fragment meets the criteria it is classified as H2, otherwise the fragment is 
passed to stage 4. 
 
8.6.4 Stage 4: H3 Validation Checks 
In Chapter 7 for each of the four methods implemented the classification with 
the lowest identification rate was H3; this classification related to visual 
thumbnail JPEG image only fragments. Earlier in this chapter the research 
taken to attempt to improve the identification of H3 fragments was described. 
The checks described in Section 8.5 are used for stage 4. If the fragment fails 
stage 4 it is passed to stage 5.   
 
8.6.5 Stage 5: H4 Validation Checks 
Originally a Bayesian network was used for the identification of H4 fragments; 
this method was chosen over the structural and syntactic approach due to the 
variety of metadata a Linux thumbnail may contain. In Chapter 7 the Bayesian 
network approach identified all the thumbnail cache file fragments but a 
significant number of false positives were also recovered. However the large 
amount of false positives would create significant performance problems for any 
reassembly approach; using this method would affect the feasibility of using this 
approach in cases as it would increase the resource requirements. The neural 
network did not successfully identify all the fragments for this category but had a 
99.96% success rate for data set 2; the method also had a low false positive 
rate of less than 0.01%. Therefore on consideration of the feasibility of the 
reassembly of the information the neural network method was selected for this 
classification. 
 
In Chapter 5 it was established that the thumbnail cache used in Ubuntu and 
Kubuntu stores each visual thumbnail in a separate PNG file. These subrecords 
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follow the standard PNG specification but contain varying amounts of metadata. 
Once the neural network has classified a fragment as H4 further checks are 
performed with the aim of reducing the false positives. Within the H4 
classification there are two distinct types of PNG thumbnail cache fragment 
which contain metadata. The first type is the first fragment of the individual PNG 
subrecord files; these fragments contain the PNG header and any metadata 
chunks that are present in the file.  The second type of fragment occurs 
throughout the subrecord files and contains the IDAT chunk identifier; Chapter 
5 described how this identified appears in every other fragment of the file.   
 
Both types of fragment may occur in standard PNG files as well as thumbnail 
cache files; therefore the removal of false positives is not possible. Instead this 
stage aims to minimise the number of false positives. If a fragment contains the 
start of a PNG file and contains thumbnail cache specific metadata it is 
classified as H4a. The IDHR chunk which is compulsory at the start of PNG files 
contains the width and height of the image; if these dimensions are greater than 
the large thumbnail cache image size the fragment is rejected.  If the fragment 
contains the start of a PNG and metadata but does not contain any thumbnail 
cache specific metadata it is rejected. If the fragment contains the start of a 
PNG file which meets the image size requirements and contains no metadata it 
is classified as H4b. Fragments classified as H4a contain thumbnail cache 
specific data and are therefore considered thumbnail cache file fragments; any 
fragment classified as H4b is a potential candidate thumbnail cache fragment. 
Fragments which contain the keyword “IDAT” may also be categorised as H4; if 
the fragment also contains the PNG header it would have already been 
classified as H4. In order to separate the fragments for the reassembly method 
fragments just containing IDAT are classified as H4c. 
 
If the neural network does not categorise the fragment as H4 the fragment is 
rejected and passed to Stage 6. 
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8.6.6 Stage 6: H5 Validation Checks 
The highest identification statistics for H5 classification in Chapter 7 were 
achieved by the neural network. Therefore for stage 6 of this method the neural 
network implementation used in Section 7.9 was used; the fragment is provided 
as input for the neural network. If the fragment is classified as H5 by the neural 
network it is accepted, otherwise the fragment is rejected from stage 6. 
 
If the fragment fails the validation checks for Stage 6 the fragment is classified 
as H6; the fragment has failed to satisfy the validation checks for any of the 
thumbnail cache classifications and is therefore unlikely to be a thumbnail 
cache file fragment. 
 
8.6.7 Logs 
Each classification method logs the reasoning for rejecting or accepting a 
fragment; this is stored in a CSV file. The CSV file contains: the name and 
location of the fragment, its classification, the reason for classification, and any 
supplementary information. The additional information stores details such as if 
the fragment started with a thumbnail cache file header, or has been sub-
categorised; the extra information is useful for file fragment reassembly. The 
logging was designed to assist an analyst with corroborating the results and to 
provide information on each fragment to assist with reassembly.  
 
8.6.8 Accepted Fragments 
Fragments which are awarded a classification of H1 – H5 are identified as 
thumbnail cache file fragments.  Each classification has a separate sub-
directory; any fragment which is classified as belonging to the thumbnail cache 
is copied into the relevant sub-directory. It is the copy of the fragment which can 
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then be viewed by an analyst and used by the reassembly methods 
implemented in the next Chapter. When a fragment is copied it is given a file 
header which contains metadata about the fragment. The header contains: 
 
Signature [“TCFRAG”] 
Individual fragment identifier [8 bytes] 
Path of original file [44 bytes] 
Relative position in file [8 bytes] 
Classification [4 bytes] 
 
The file signature identifies the fragment as a thumbnail cache file fragment. 
The individual fragment identifier is a unique number based upon the order the 
fragments are processed; the first fragment of a batch to be processed is given 
the number 1. The path of the original file and relative offset in the file allows an 
analyst to maintain a relationship between each fragment and the original 
source file. The classification holds in ASCII the classification of the fragment in 
the first 2 bytes; the third byte is used to store the sub-category, and the fourth 
byte is set to 0xFF if the fragment begins with a thumbnail cache file header. 
 
8.7 Results 
This section contains the results of testing the hybrid thumbnail cache file 
fragment identification method against the data sets used in Chapter 7. 
 
  
 
 Page 
223 
 
  
Table 8-4: Method 5 Results for the Training Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of fragment by method (Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
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t 
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e
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P
e
rc
en
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H
1 
No. 1609 0 0 0 0 0 1609 
% 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H
2 
No. 0 384020 0 0 0 0 384020 
% 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H
3 
No. 0 0 2990084 0 47781 349174 3387039 
% 0.00 0. 00 88.28 0.00 1.41 10.30 100 
H
4 
No. 0 0 0 31693 0 0 31693 
% 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H
5 
No. 0 0 140 0 26322 4753 31215 
% 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 84.32 15.22 100 
H
6 
No. 0 0 8454928 1038 6563467 97793362 112812795 
% 0.00 0.00 7.49 0.00 5.81 86.68 100 
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Table 8-5: Method 5 Results for the 1st Testing Set (Half of Data Set 1) 
  Classification of fragment by method (Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
 (
P
e
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en
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H1 
No. 1609 0 0 0 0 0 1609 
% 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H2 
No. 0 384019 0 0 0 0 384019 
% 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H3 
No. 0 0 2975951 0 44325 366763 3387039 
% 0.00 0.00 87.86 0.00 1.30 10.82 100 
H4 
No. 0 0 0 31691 0 0 31692 
% 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.99 0.00 0.00 100 
H5 
No. 0 0 147 0 22929 8138 31214 
% 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 73.45 26.07 100 
H6 
No. 0 0 8482214 1131 6333494 97995955 112812794 
% 0.00 0.00 7.51 0.00 5.61 86.86 100 
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Table 8-6: Method 5 Results for the 2nd Testing Set (Data Set 2) 
  Classification of fragment by method (Percentage) 
A
ct
u
al
 F
ra
gm
e
n
t 
Ty
p
e
 (
P
e
rc
en
ta
ge
) 
    H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
H
1 
No. 3277 0 0 0 0 0 3277 
% 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H
2 
No. 0 672922 0 0 0 0 672922 
% 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
H
3 
No. 0 0 5163582 0 102984 704984 5971550 
% 0.00 0.00 86.46 0.00 1.72 11.80 100 
H
4 
No. 0 0 0 11673 0 0 11677 
% 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.96 0.00 0.00 100 
H
5 
No. 0 0 644 0 8755 1269 10668 
% 0.00 0.00 6.03 0.00 82.06 11.89 100 
H
6 
No. 0 0 10933051 1363 17589760 328698843 357223017 
% 0.00 0.00 3.06 0.00 4.92 92.01 100 
 
Table 8-7: Method 5 Results for the unknown data set (Data Set 3) 
Classification of fragment by method (Percentage) 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 Total 
No. 71 874 2542 932 60974 308479529 308544922 
% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 99.97   
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8.8 Discussion 
The end aim of Chapters 7-9 is to identify and reassemble thumbnail cache file 
fragments located in unallocated space in order to assess their evidential value. 
Given this aim it is more important at this stage in the research to have too 
many fragments available for the reassembly process in order to maximise the 
chance of a successful reassembly. This research successfully improved the 
number of JPEG image thumbnail cache file fragments identified; despite the 
large number of false positives it still represents a reduction compared to the 
results of Chapter 7. Despite the reduction the large number of fragments may 
still significantly impact the performance of any reassembly method created. 
 
Further identification of JPEG specific fragment characteristics enabled the 
hybrid identification method created in Chapter 7 to be modified with the aim of 
improving JPEG classification. When compared to the results of the previous 
chapter it is clear that a noticeable improvement in the identification of JPEG file 
fragments has occurred. This highlights the need to consider each different 
classification of file type independently; it also highlights the need to consider 
the requirements before determining appropriate classifications. For example in 
this research JPEG thumbnail cache file fragments are classified separately to 
JPEG file fragments from other sources, this resulted in a high level of false 
positive classifications. If the identification classification had been JPEG image-
only fragments from any source the false positive rate would have been 
substantially lower. The same classification problem applies to PNG image-only 
fragments where a substantial amount of the false positive fragments identified 
were from other PNG files. 
 
A decision was made in this research to use the observed subset of JPEG 
markers found in visual thumbnails instead of the full set of valid markers. 
Whilst this decision has improved the identification of H3 fragments for this 
research and reduced the number of JPEG false positives it may not have the 
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same affect on other data sets. The alternative option would have been to 
accept all markers which are defined as valid by the JPEG specification. It is 
possible that whilst in the data sets collected by this research all JPEG visual 
thumbnails conform to the marker list and positions documented in table 8.1, 
other visual thumbnails may not; therefore this decision may exclude potential 
evidence. However given the size of the data set it is also possible that the 
visual thumbnails use a sub-set of markers as observed during this research. 
Further research into visual thumbnail markers would be required to ascertain 
whether the identification method should use the values observed during this 
research or accept any marker which is valid in the specification.  
 
The hybrid approach significantly improved identification and produced logs 
which show the reasoning for accepting or rejecting each fragment. Neither the 
methods in the comparative study nor the hybrid approach achieved high 
classification rates for image-only fragments. Since image-only thumbnail cache 
fragments have similar characteristics to standard image fragments it would be 
difficult to completely remove false positive matches. Since the aim of this 
research is to identify fragments which can be used for the reassembly research 
in Chapter 9 then a requirement is to maximise the identification of thumbnail 
cache file fragments whilst minimising false positives. Table 8.8 shows the 
success and false positive rate of the hybrid approach. 
 
This research highlights the improved identification of file fragment information 
by understanding the structure of each fragment classification and by combining 
methods. Unique characteristics identified for each classification may not be 
unique when implemented and tested against a large data set; with the variety 
of possible file fragment structures available it is likely that another file fragment 
type would also have the same characteristic. By combining multiple 
characteristics and methods for identification it is possible to reduce the number 
of false positive identifications whilst maximising the identification of fragments 
in the classification. The combination of approaches and breaking the 
 
 Page 
228 
 
  
identification method into stages led to a structured identification approach 
which an analyst could repeat by hand to verify the classification of an 
evidentially significant fragment. 
 
Table 8-8: Percentage Success and False Positive rates for the hybrid approach 
and the commercial recovery tool Blade for Data Set 2 
 
Hybrid 
Approach 
Blade, Forensic 
Recovery 
Software 
H1 
Success 100.00 3.22 
False 
Positive 
0.00 
0.61 
H2 
Success 100.00 68.74 
False 
Positive 
0.00 
16.5 
H3 
Success 86.46 0.15 
False 
Positive 
3.05 
14.99 
H4 
Success 100 78.08 
False 
Positive 
0.00 
28.3 
H5 
Success 82.06 0.01 
False 
Positive 
4.86 
0.04 
H6 
Success 100.00 99.83 
False 
Positive 
0.00 
0.00 
 
The hybrid method produces a log of the fragments it classifies, the log provides 
information on the original location of the fragment, the classification it was 
awarded and the reason for the classification. By providing an analyst with this 
log it is possible for the analyst to show a relationship between the original data 
and the artefact produced; it is also possible to ascertain the characteristics of 
the fragment which led to its classification. This log also can assist with 
providing information for the potential reassembly of file fragments; research 
into the reassembly of the fragments identified during this research is described 
in the Chapter 9. 
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The hybrid method was also tested against Blade, a leading forensic data 
recovery program (Table 8.8). The hybrid method achieved higher success 
rates and lower false positive rates in each category. This is due to the hybrid 
method performing a greater number of validation checks on the data. 
 
8.9 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter improves the identification statistics for thumbnail cache file 
fragments by producing a single hybrid approach with the maximum data 
recovery for each classification. In order to improve the identification of JPEG 
only thumbnail cache fragments an examination of the characteristics in JPEG 
files determined a set of unique criteria which could be used for identification. 
The research used observed information about a subset of JPEG markers to 
reduce the false positives for the H3 category; whilst the corpus conformed to 
the observed markers it is possible that Windows 7 visual thumbnails exist on 
other machines which use other markers. If other markers were used the 
fragments would not be identified. A hybrid approach was created which utilised 
the strengths of the methods implemented in Chapter 7; the approach also 
enabled other information learnt about the thumbnail cache file format during 
the previous research to be added. 
 
This research resulted in a method which due to its structured approach could 
be easily verified by an analyst; the method was broken down into stages to 
assist with maintaining a clear relationship between the original artefact and the 
classification. The hybrid approach was tested on the same test set as the 
previous methods; the results showed the method had the highest identification 
rate for each classification. Image only fragments produced a significant amount 
of false positives; this may affect the approach taken to reassemble thumbnail 
cache files. The next chapter uses the results of both this and the previous 
chapter to construct reassembly methods for the identified file fragments.  
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9 Thumbnail cache fragment reassembly 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In chapters 7 and 8, the focus of the research was the identification of 
thumbnail cache file fragments; the fragments were classified without using 
supplementary information about the system. The research conducted in the 
previous chapters resulted in the identification of a significant amount of each 
thumbnail cache file fragment type under investigation. The classifications used 
in the research represented the different types of file fragment that were found 
in the thumbnail caches used for this research. The results of the identification 
process were stored in detailed logs to assist with verifying the results and 
maintaining a relationship with the original data; each classification of file 
fragment was stored in a separate sub-directory to assist with locating each 
type of fragment.  This chapter uses the results of the previous research to 
investigate methods for reassembling thumbnail cache file fragments; the aim of 
this research is to produce a method which can reassemble thumbnail cache 
file fragments to reconstruct the original files. 
 
The reassembly of thumbnail cache file fragments provides an analyst with the 
opportunity to identify a greater number of relationships with artefacts identified 
in thumbnail cache file fragments. A single thumbnail cache file fragment on its 
own may provide metadata, or part of a visual thumbnail; however when 
multiple fragments are reassembled it may be possible to extract complete 
subrecords. As described in the previous chapters some of the thumbnail cache 
file fragments are indistinguishable in classification from image fragments; this 
is because they are essentially the same structure and syntax. Therefore in 
order to maximise the identification of potential thumbnail cache file fragments 
there may be significant false positives for some classifications. One of the 
criteria for evaluating evidential value  of thumbnail cache file fragments 
requires the data recovered to be maximised [Chapter 4]; therefore a valid 
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reassembly is more likely when there are too many fragments rather than too 
few. It should also be noted that the larger the number of fragments in a data 
set the more resources that will be required to complete the reassembly. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: firstly previous research into file fragment 
reassembly is considered in Section 9.2. The methodology for this research is 
presented in Section 9.3; the method for reassembling the thumbcache_idx 
files is described in Section 9.4. The method for reassembling thumbcache_32, 
thumbcache_96, and thumbcache_1024 files is described in Section 9.5. In 
Section 9.6 the thumbcache_256 reassembly method is described; this is 
followed by the reassembly method for Linux thumbnail cache files in Section 
9.7. The results of the implemented reassembly methods are provided in 
Section 9.8; Section 9.9 provides a description of the information from 
thumbnail cache files reassembled from Data Set 3 of Chapter 7. A discussion 
of this research is provided in Section 9.10; the chapter conclusion is in 
Section 9.11. 
 
9.2 Image Reassembly 
In Chapters 7 and 8 a significant proportion of the previous research reviewed 
used methods for file identification that combined the identification and 
reassembly process; the methods combining the steps tended to focus on 
single file types with unique characteristics and without a compound structure. 
The combined identification and reassembly approach tended to focus on the 
reassembled files having a valid structure or valid result after processing the 
data. In this research the identification and reassembly research have been 
conducted separately; this permitted the identification of single file fragments 
where the rest of the fragments of the file were no longer available. 
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Once the fragments have been identified and classified, reassembly methods 
can be used to attempt to reconstruct the files; the reconstruction enables a 
larger amount of information to be extracted. One task which requires fragment 
reassembly is completing a jigsaw [Pomeranz, 2011]; the methodologies 
employed for the completion of a jigsaw can be applied to other fragment 
reassembly problems. For example, fragment reassembly has been a large 
area of research in subjects such as archaeology where it is often necessary to 
reconstruct artefacts [Willis, 2008]. 
 
Fragment reassembly methods in related work have focused on solving path 
problems such as using the Hamiltonian, and K-Vertex disjoint path algorithms 
[Pal, 2006]; the K-Vertex disjoint path problem uses each cluster in unallocated 
space as a vertex. Pre-processing by first classifying the fragments and then 
only using related classifications in the graph would reduce the processing time. 
The use of context based statistical models for reassembly was explored by 
Shanmugasundaram [2003]; the method relies on in depth knowledge of the 
structure and syntax of the file type in order to build appropriate models to 
assist with the reassembly process. 
 
For this research it has been shown that reassembly approaches use 
information about the expected structure of the object; the structural information 
provides guidance for selecting the next component at each point of the 
reassembly and validation of the reassembled object. This section has also 
established the adaptability of jigsaw reassembly methodology to other 
reassembly problems.  
 
9.3 Methodology 
As described in Chapter 8, the reassembly of a file is similar to the reassembly 
of a jigsaw; this research will apply jigsaw reassembly methodology to the 
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creation of a file fragment reassembly method. The general reassembly 
approach is documented in Section 9.3.5.  Throughout this thesis the 
importance of understanding the structure and valid syntax of a file type have 
been highlighted. The information about the file type can be used to validate the 
reassembly of the individual files and assist with customising the reassembly 
process for each file type.  
 
In order to complete this research a general approach to file fragment 
reassembly will be used; this approach will be customised by each individual file 
type to enable the selection and validation of file fragments at each point in the 
reassembly of a file. This section describes the general method for file fragment 
reassembly and discusses the considerations for customisation.  A description 
of the methods for training and testing, and the data sets used for evaluating the 
reassembly methods are also provided.  
 
9.3.1 Potential clashes and missing fragments 
For each file type reassembly there are two important individual considerations: 
dealing with potential clashes for a reassembly point, and dealing with missing 
fragments.  If no suitable fragment can be found for a point in the reassembly 
this research will place an empty fragment in its place; in order to ensure an 
analyst may easily identify the substitute fragment it will contain the ASCII 
phrase “SUBSITUTE” repeated through the fragment. As shown in figure 9.1, 
after the reassembly process has gone through each point of the file it tries to 
resolve any points where a clash has occurred. A clash occurs where multiple 
fragments appear to fulfil the requirements for reassembly at a point in the file; 
once the remainder of the file has been reassembled it may be possible to 
identify which of the clashing fragments belongs to the file. The method for 
determining which clashing fragment to select is individual to each file type; the 
method requires an understanding of the characteristics of each file type to 
ascertain which fragment is the most likely to belong to the file. 
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9.3.2 Logging 
In order to maintain a relationship with the original data it is necessary to 
produce comprehensive logs of any actions taken by the reassembly method. 
For this research 2 logs will be created: an overview log of the reassembly 
approach, and an individual logs for each reassembled file.  The overview log 
will provide information on the number of reassembled files, and the fragments 
each file contains. The individual logs provide comprehensive information on 
each reassembled file; it states the original location of each fragment and the 
reasoning for selecting each fragment. The log also identifies any potential 
clashes for a point in the reassembled file and any missing fragments. 
 
9.3.3 Data sets 
In the reviewed previous research reassembly methods used a pre-selected 
data set; this research will use three data sets for the reassembly of thumbnail 
cache file fragments. The fragments for use with the reassembly method are 
taken from the file corpus described in Chapter 7. Each of the reassembly data 
sets is described below: 
 
Reassembly Set A: 
This set consists of all the complete thumbnail cache files from Data Sets 
1 and 2 described in Chapter 7. This set only contains thumbnail cache 
file fragments and each file is complete.  
 
Reassembly Set B: 
This set consists of all the file fragments identified as H1 – H5 by the 
hybrid approach created in Chapter 8 from Data Set 2. The thumbnail 
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caches in the file may not be complete, as not all the known thumbnail 
cache file fragments were identified. 
 
Reassembly Set C: 
This set consists of all the file fragments identified as H1 – H5 by the 
hybrid approach created in Chapter 8 from Data set 3. The data set 
used for this research was a collection of unallocated space; given the 
volume of unallocated space it was not feasible to ascertain the type of 
each fragment and any possible relationships prior to conducting the 
research.  
 
9.3.4 Training and testing 
In order to develop the reassembly approach a selection of fragments are 
required to identify characteristics which can be used for the reassembly of files. 
Therefore half of each data set was available for examination of their individual 
characteristics to assist with the development of reassembly methods; the 
characteristics of individual fragments and fragments put together were 
examined. Both valid and invalid reassembled fragment sequences were 
examined to determine information which could be used to identify valid 
reassembly sequences. After the reassembly methods were complete, they 
were tested on remaining data, for which the characteristics had not been 
analysed.  
 
9.3.5 A general reassembly approach 
The classification of file fragments listed in Chapter 7 separated the fragments 
into different classifications which would assist with their identification; these are 
listed below for completeness. 
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H1:Thumbcache_idx.db file 
H2: Image thumbcache file and contains metadata 
H3: Image thumbcache file and only contains JPEG image data 
H4: Linux PNG visual thumbnail and contains metadata 
H5: PNG visual thumbnail fragment and only contains image data 
H6: Not part of a Windows or Linux thumbnail cache 
 
The classifications break down the components of the thumbnail cache files to 
assist with their identification and classify them to assist with reassembly. In 
order to construct appropriate reassembly methods it is also necessary to 
consider the characteristics of each part of a file; after the characteristics have 
been identified it will be possible to search for the fragments in their 
identification classifications based upon this information. In general, for 
reassembly there are four categories of file fragment; these are described 
below: 
 
Category 1: This file fragment contains the entire file; it begins with the 
file type header signature 
Category 2: This file fragment contains the file type header signature 
and is the first fragment in a larger file 
Category 3: This file fragment is in the middle of a larger file 
Category 4: This file fragment is the last fragment of a file; therefore the 
data relevant to the file type may not fill the entire fragment 
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When reconstructing a jigsaw, generally the corners and outside edges are 
identified and reassembled first, as these have an easily identifiable 
characteristic; generally these pieces are easy to identify as they contain at 
least one straight edge (Categories 1 and 2). For a file type it is possible to 
identify the header based upon the identified structure and syntax. If the 
fragment falls into Category 1, then reassembly is complete; otherwise it is then 
possible to reassemble the internals of the jigsaw using the edges as a method 
of identifying and validating the remaining reassembly.  The internal file 
fragments (Category 3) can then be identified in sequence and validated 
against the selected header; after all the internal fragments have been identified 
the final fragment can be added to the file (Category 4).  
 
Having considered the reassembly methods used for jigsaws a model for the 
reassembly of file fragments was created. The general flow chart for the 
reassembly model is described in figure 9.1; this figure shows the process for 
reassembling multiple files, given a set of file fragments identified using the 
methodology documented in the previous chapter. The methodology can be 
used to construct a program to automate the process. Whilst the generalised 
method shows the approach for reassembly, individual file characteristics assist 
with selecting and validating fragments in each of the categories. Therefore 
each file type requires an individual approach to the selection and validation of 
fragments; these individual methods are discussed in later sections [Sections 
9.4-7].  
 
9.4 Thumbcache_idx 
In Chapter 6 the Windows 7 thumbnail cache structure was described; the 
index for the Windows 7 thumbnail cache is stored in a file named 
thumbcache_idx; the index file fragments were identification type H1. Using the 
hybrid fragment identification approach described in Chapter 8, the H1 
classification was identified 100% with no false positives in any data set. 
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Therefore this research assumes that false positives in the H1 sub-directory are 
likely to be minimal; the research assumes that all fragments present in this 
sub-directory belong to the thumbcache_idx file type.  
 
 
Figure 9-1: Flow Chart for File Fragment Reassembly 
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9.4.1 Thumbcache_idx file fragment categories 
The repeating and fixed size record structure of the thumbcache_idx.db file can 
assist with reassembling the various fragments of the file.  The index file stores 
records in a hash table whose size is always a multiple of 101; each file 
fragment of 4096 bytes can hold up to 127 complete records as shown in figure 
9.2. The figure shows there are four different categories of this file fragment 
type. Below each category is described: 
 
IDX Category_1: Fragment with 101 records and file header 
In this case the single fragment contains the entire 101 record index and 
therefore does not require further reassembly. The first check to identify these 
fragments is to check the file header identifier “IMMM”; this is followed by 
checking the header structure is a valid thumbcache_idx structure as identified 
in Appendix A. Within the header the number of records should be set to 101, if 
the number is larger, then the fragment belongs to Category_2. As a 4096 byte 
fragment can contain up to 127 complete records a further check is made to 
ensure that the fragment is empty after the 101 expected records; therefore the 
last 840 bytes of the fragment is checked to ensure they are0x00.If a fragment 
meets the criteria for this category it is logged as a reassembled file. As the 
entire 101 record file has been recovered the file is complete and the method 
moves on to the next fragment for identification.  
 
IDX Category_2: Fragment with 127 complete records and file header 
This fragment is the beginning of a larger index file which is stored over multiple 
fragments. The checks performed for this category are the same as in 
category_1; the difference between the two categories is the total number of 
records stored in the complete file. The file header contains the size of the index 
hash table and it is therefore possible to work out the total number of file 
fragments storing the index file; each fragment can hold up to 127 complete 
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records and 2 partial records. The number of allocated records in the hash table 
is also given in the file header this can assist in reassembly; in a situation where 
two fragments could fit into the same position of an index file, calculating the 
total number of records in the file could rule out a potential matching record. 
 
 
Figure 9-2: Thumbcache_IDX Classifications 
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IDX Category_3: Fragment with 127 complete records and no file header 
In this case the fragment begins with 24 bytes of a record and finishes with the 
first 8 bytes of a record; in between these two partial records are 127 complete 
records which can be used to identify the potential size of the hash table that 
the fragment relates to. The complete records can also be used to identify the 
position of the fragment within the hash table by working out the relative 
position of the fragment for each valid hash table size. In order to establish a 
valid hash table size multiple records can be used to corroborate the validity of 
using the possible size in the formula for calculating relative positions; the 
formula for validating the thumbcache ID described in Chapter 6 can be used to 
find a list of table sizes which would be valid for the fragment. This can be 
achieved by finding a common table size which produces valid sequential 
record numbers for the fragment.  
 
IDX Category_4: Fragment with less than 127 complete records and no file 
header 
In this case the records which are in use will not reach the end of the fragment 
and whilst it is likely there will be at least one in use record present the fragment 
may be completely empty. Therefore any records present will be used in the 
same way as in Category_3 to determine the potential hash table size. Once 
this fragment has been added to the file reassembly chain, it is possible to 
calculate the number of in use records and check this matches what was 
expected. 
 
9.4.2 Thumbcache_idx file fragment reassembly 
In order to reassemble the index file fragments each fragment in the H1 sub-
directory is evaluated; the fragments are separated into those which start with 
the index file signature and those which do not. In order to minimise the 
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requirement for generating table sizes the possible table sizes for fragments 
which do not contain a header are calculated at the beginning of the reassembly 
process and stored in a CSV file. This file stores the valid table sizes for each 
fragment, and relative position in the file. For this research 100 possible table 
sizes are evaluated against each fragment.   
 
The CSV file can be accessed during file reassembly to identify fragments 
which are valid for the current table size; the fragments can then be added 
according to their relative offset in the file. If multiple fragments are valid for a 
point in the file then they are stored as a clash, until the remainder of the file 
has been reassembled. After all the points of the file have been considered for 
reassembly the clash points are evaluated; using the number of records 
expected in the file it may be possible to accept or reject potential fragments. 
The system also looks at the number the fragment was assigned and gives 
priority to fragment numbers closest to the preceding fragment in the current 
file.  
 
In order to reassemble the index files the characteristics of the four fragment 
types are used to reconstruct each index file; the method begins by identifying 
all fragments which contain header information and attempting to reassemble 
each file starting with the largest file size. Once the reassembly of all files with 
headers has been completed any remaining fragments are reassembled. 
Reassembly takes into account the possible sizes and relative positions. If 
multiple fragments are valid for a point in the file the physical location of each 
fragment on the disk is also considered; priority for reassembly is given to 
fragments located close to each other on the disk when a clash occurs. An 
example of an index reassembly is given in figure 9.3.  
In order to evaluate the performance of this algorithm the asymptotic 
computational complexity of this method is evaluated using O(n) notation; this 
establishes the worst case performance of the algorithm for a given input size, 
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n. To calculate the asymptotic computational complexity of this reassembly 
method an analysis of the implementation was performed; each step in the 
implementation was evaluated to assess whether it had a constant running 
time, or if the running time was dependant on the number of fragments being 
evaluated. For this method, f(n) the number of computational steps was 
calculated to be: 
 
f(n) = 122n1 + 58c*n0 
where: 
 n represents the number of fragments being evaluated by the method 
 c represents a constant processing time 
 
When f(n) is converted into a standardised polynomial with the constants 
removed the function becomes: 
f(n) = 61n1 + 29 
As the number of fragments being analysed by the method tends towards 
infinity, the constant value of 29 becomes insignificant compared to the value 
n1; to find the computational complexity it is necessary to identify the upper 
bound of the algorithm. Therefore in this case as n increases the value of n1 has 
the greatest effect on the running time of the algorithm; to calculate the 
computational complexity the constant value of 61 is removed leaving n. 
Therefore the upper limit running time of the reassembly algorithm for 
thumbcache_idx fragments given a set of n fragments is O(n).  
 
The method makes use of the properties of the hash table to minimise clashes 
and evaluations. The running time has a linear growth, which means that the 
growth is in proportion to the number of fragments the method has to evaluate. 
The identification method used for the thumbcache_idx fragments achieved a 
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100% success rate, with 0% false positives; therefore the input is optimised and 
the running time will be relative to the number of index fragments found. 
 
 
Figure 9-3: Thumbcache_IDX reassembly 
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9.5 Thumbcache_32, 96, 1024 
In Chapter 6 the Windows 7 thumbnail cache structure was described; the 
subrecords for the Windows 7 thumbnail cache are stored in files named 
thumbcache_32, thumbcache_96, thumbcache_256, thumbcache_1024. The 
32, 96, and 1024 files store only standard subrecords; in Chapter 7 the 
fragments which comprise these files were identified as classifications H2 and 
H3. Using the hybrid fragment identification approach described in Chapters 8, 
the H2 was identified 100% with no false positives in any data set. The H3 set 
had a substantial amount of false positives. Therefore this research assumes 
that false positives in the H2 sub-directory are likely to be minimal.  
 
9.5.1 Thumbcache_32, 96, 1024 file fragment categories 
The files which hold standard subrecords contain data in variable sized chunks; 
each file starts with a file header and then a series of variable sized subrecord 
chunks. Each subrecord chunk is made of two components: a header, and a 
visual thumbnail stored in a standard image format.  Due to the variable sized 
nature of the chunks the structures can begin at any point in a fragment.  As 
described in Section 9.3 there are four types of file fragment which need to be 
considered for reassembly, these are described below: 
 
Store Category_1: Fragment contains whole file 
If a thumbcache file which only stores standard subrecords consisted of a single 
fragment it is likely to contain the file header with no subrecords; in this case the 
file would be resident in the MFT record. In the unlikely event that a single 
fragment whole file thumbcache holds a visual thumbnail, the header contains 
the size of the file and therefore the file could be identified as complete. If the 
fragment contains the file signature, valid structure and a file size less than or 
equal to a fragment size it is considered a single fragment thumbcache file; it is 
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then stored and marked as a complete file in the logs. Fragments in this 
category would be stored in the H2 directory. 
 
Store Category_2: Fragment is the start of the file 
In this case the file would not be resident in the MFT and would be the start of a 
larger file; therefore it should begin with the file signature “CMMM” and the valid 
header structure identified in Chapter 6. The file header contains the total size 
of the file; when divided by the fragment size the number of fragments in the file 
can be calculated. After the file header the remainder of the file stores 
subrecord chunks; each chunk has a header which contains the total size of the 
chunk. Fragments in this category would be stored in the H2 directory. 
 
Store Category_3: Fragment is in the middle of the file 
As described in the previous category, these files store information in chunks; 
each chunk has a header and a visual thumbnail. Information in the middle of 
the file can therefore either contain some information from a subrecord header, 
or consist entirely of visual thumbnail data. 
 
If the fragment contains metadata it will have been classified as H2, these 
fragments at least part of a structurally valid subrecord header, or a visual 
thumbnail file signature. These fragments represent the start and the end of 
chunks; they can provide information on the size of the chunks which can be 
used to ascertain the number of fragments in the subrecord.  
 
If the fragment contains image-only data it will have been classified as H3; they 
are the second part of a subrecord chunk. The visual thumbnail may span over 
several fragments, therefore in a file there may be multiple image-only 
fragments next to each other. 
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Store Category_4: Fragment is at the end of the file 
The thumbnail cache files pre-allocate space, which they then fill with 
subrecords; once the file is full a new larger file is created, which can then be 
populated with the existing data giving the thumbnail cache room to continue 
growing. The last subrecord marker in the file contains an empty record; the 
empty record continues to the end of the file. The empty subrecord may contain 
non-thumbnail cache data in its data section; therefore there may be fragments 
which are part of the thumbnail cache file but do not contain thumbnail cache 
file data.  
 
As it is not possible to know the contents, or structure of the last subrecord’s 
data section, this research focuses on the reassembly of the files until the last 
subrecord is identified; the research does not aim to reassemble the data 
section of the last subrecord. The last subrecord header is identifiable: it begins 
with the header “CMMM”, four bytes indicating the size of the subrecord, 32 
bytes of 0x00, followed by the thumbnail cache ID value. The 32 empty bytes 
show this is the last subrecord and therefore all complete subrecords are above 
this point in the file. By identifying the fragment, where the last “CMMM” occurs 
at the expected relative offset given the size of the preceding chunk, the 
reassembly has reached the end of the file.  
 
9.5.2 Thumbcache_32, 96, 1024 file fragment reassembly 
Both category 1 and 2 represent the first fragment in a file; both categories 
represent a fragment which starts with the file signature “CMMM”. As the file 
signature is also used as a subrecord signature it is possible that if a subrecord 
started on a fragment boundary it may be confused for the start of a file. To 
ensure a valid category 1 or 2 fragment is identified the remainder of the file 
header is validated against the expected structure described in Chapter 6. 
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Once a start of file fragment has been identified the size of the file is extracted 
from the header; if the size is less than 4096 bytes the file is considered 
reassembled and logged. If the file is larger than 4096 then the number of 
fragments containing the file is calculated; this provides the number of 
fragments in the chain.  
 
The thumbnail cache files which contain visual thumbnail records have a set 
structure [Appendix A]; however given the variable size of elements of the 
structures the information could occur at any point in the fragment. This means 
that two connecting file fragments could join at any point. Since each file 
consists of a collection of subrecords the information that bridges two fragments 
will either belong to subrecord metadata or the image data. 
 
 
Figure 9-4: Reassembling fragments with a metadata join 
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If the join is in the middle of a metadata section such as in figure 9.4, the 
structural template can be applied to identify a fragment with a valid structure 
and syntax to follow the fragment.  The header section of image records contain 
fixed metadata structure; this allows the type of structure to be identified from 
the first fragment and the template to be applied until the end of the fragment. 
Each remaining fragment can then be assessed to see if it is valid based on the 
remainder of the structural template being applied. In the example shown in 
figure 9.4 the template finishes part way through a variable and this is matched 
to a fragment which fits the remainder of the structure.  
 
 
Figure 9-5: Reassembling an image fragment 
 
If the fragments join in the middle of image data like the example shown in 
figure 9.5 then image fragment reassembly methods would need to be 
employed to identify suitable candidates. Firstly if the fragment which contained 
the size of the image data was available it would be possible to identify the total 
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number of fragments which contain only image data. The last fragment of the 
image can be identified by working out the position of the last image data byte 
relative to the start of the fragment; this is shown in figure 9.6. Secondly 
assuming the visual thumbnail was written and any subsequent changes to the 
visual thumbnail resulted in a completely new visual thumbnail being generated 
which replaces the subrecord it can be assumed the chances of fragmentation 
are small; therefore the first step in image fragment reassembly is to identify if 
any of the fragments available would have been located next to the 
reassembled data on the disk. If a candidate fragment is next to the last 
fragment in the reassembled sequence it is likely to be the next fragment; 
therefore by first attempting to reassemble potential chains on the disk it is 
possible to minimise reassembly resources. 
 
 
Figure 9-6: Calculations for image reassembly 
 
If trying the fragments located close to the existing sequence did not provide a 
valid file sequence it would be necessary to try other techniques. An option for 
reassembling the image fragments for a known size of image data is to try every 
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possible combination of fragments and attempt to interpret the data as an image 
in the appropriate format. An example of this is shown in figure 9.7; however 
since image fragments may not belong to the thumbnail cache there is likely to 
be a significant number of fragments making this approach resource intensive. 
The numbers of possible permutations which require evaluation for potential 
visual thumbnail data sizes can be calculated using the formula:  
 
 
 
Where 
n is the total number of fragments being considered during reassembly 
x is the expected number of fragments in the reassembled file 
c is the number of possible permutations of the file fragments 
 
For this research after classification of the file fragments there is still a 
substantial difference between the amount of fragments classified as a file type 
and the average size of an individual thumbnail cache file. The high number of 
false positive fragments which belong to other image files results in a significant 
number of permutations. JPEG reassembly approaches could be adopted such 
as checks to identify changes in pixel colour between two connecting 
fragments; if two fragments are connected the change in pixel information at the 
join of the fragments is likely to be small. It is feasible that multiple visual 
thumbnails may exist which are the same and may relate to multiple files; in 
unallocated space there may be limited information to form further relationships.  
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Figure 9-7: Reassembling an image by trying every permutation 
 
The production of all syntactically valid image fragment sequences provides an 
analyst with the opportunity to decide how to proceed. Therefore unless a valid 
image fragment sequence directly follows a subrecord header fragment the 
method will produce and store the visual thumbnails for any valid JPEG 
sequence which can be formed from the remaining fragments. In order to 
validate the images each set of fragments was passed to a python program 
which ran an Image module and attempted to verify and open the images. If the 
entire image appeared to be a valid sequence the image was exported and put 
in the same directory as the rest of the reassembled file. If multiple fragment 
sequences were valid for a subrecord the image only sections of the subrecord 
were left blank and the valid image sequences were stored in a sub-directory 
named with the reassembled files name and relative offset of the subrecord. 
The log for reassembling images shows the original name of each image only 
fragment and its position in the completed sequence. 
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On examination of the training set 72% of the subrecords were contiguous; 
therefore it appears likely that once a subrecord header is identified the 
remainder of the record would contiguously follow it. In the remaining 28% of 
subrecords were fragmented a maximum of twice; the fragments were spread 
across the storage media. Without further knowledge of the storage structure it 
would not be possible to form a relationship between the fragments. In these 
circumstances producing every valid combination provided a maximum of 42 
results for each visual thumbnail. Out of the images produced a maximum of 11 
resulted in full visual thumbnails which could be viewed using a standard image 
viewer. Therefore an analyst could manually go through the resulting images 
along with the logs and decide what evidence if any to produce.  
 
To calculate the asymptotic computational complexity of this research an 
analysis of the implementation was performed using the same approach as 
Section 9.4.2. For this method f(n) the number of computational steps was 
calculated to be: 
 
f(n) =  6n! + 34n2+ 116n1 + 75c*n0 
where: 
 n represents the number of fragments being evaluated by the method 
 c represents a constant processing time 
 
When f(n) is converted into a standardised polynomial with the constants 
removed the function becomes: 
f(n) = 6n! + 34n2+ 116n1 + 75 
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As the number of fragments being analysed by the method tends towards 
infinity, the constant value of 75 becomes insignificant compared to the value 
116n1; however both 116n1 and 34n2 become insignificant when compared with 
6n!. Therefore in this case as n increases the value of 6n! has the greatest 
effect on the running time of the algorithm; to calculate the computational 
complexity the constant value of 6 is removed leaving n!. Therefore the upper 
limit running time of this reassembly algorithm given a set of n fragments is 
O(n!).  
 
This algorithm will take a significant time to process large data sets, therefore 
pre-processing the data to minimise the fragments being evaluated will assist 
with reducing the potential running time. The running time increases quickly with 
large data sets, this is due to the substantial number of comparisons that are 
required to provide all valid image reassemblies. In Chapter 8 the identification 
method had a relatively high number of false positive image-only file fragments; 
therefore significant computation is required to evaluate the reassembly of the 
large amount of image-only fragments, the running time of this method could be 
reduced by improving the identification of H3 fragments. 
 
9.6 Thumbcache_256 
As described in Chapter 6, the thumbcache_256.db file can contain subrecords 
which contain Unicode strings instead of visual thumbnail data; the string is 
contained within the metadata section of a subrecord. The reassembly of the 
thumbcache_256.db file is very similar to the reassembly of the other Windows 
7 image files; the thumbcache_256.db utilises the same reassembly methods 
as those in Section 9.5 as well as an extra method to take into account the 
records which do not contain visual thumbnails 
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9.6.1 Thumbcache_256 file fragment categories 
As described in Chapter 6, this file type also stores subrecords for the 
thumbnail cache; this file can store both standard and non-standard subrecords. 
Therefore it is possible that if a subrecord header is found near the end of the 
fragment, the proceeding fragment may not contain visual thumbnail data as 
expected; instead after the subrecord header there may be another subrecord 
header. The fragments for this file type are also stored in H2 and H3. 
 
This file type uses the same categories and methods as those described for the 
thumbcache files in the previous section. However Category_3 may contain 
fragments which have non-standard records. These records typically contain a 
larger Unicode string at the end of the header; the subrecord does not contain 
an image so the subrecord header is followed by a new subrecord header. 
 
9.6.2 Thumbcache_256 file fragment reassembly 
These files are reassembled using the same characteristics as Section 9.5; a 
check was performed to ensure a subrecord header was followed by a valid 
image file signature. For this file type the subrecord header may also be 
followed by a subrecord header. Each metadata section contains a field for the 
total size of the subrecord which assists in identifying the potential end of the 
Unicode string. Figure 9.8 shows a fragment join in the middle of a Unicode 
string; the fragment to be joined should start with Unicode data whose size 
completes the subrecord. This should be followed by either a subrecord or if it is 
the last subrecord in the file it will be followed by file slack information.  
 
Fragments that contain solely the Unicode data and file slack can be difficult to 
both identify and reassemble as there is very little structural data available; 
these fragments may not be identified by the identification method which was 
implemented in Chapter 7 and therefore there is a case for performing further 
 
 Page 
257 
 
  
file fragment identification on storage media after the reassembly phase. This 
would be specifically for missing fragments which because of their 
characteristics may not have been identified in the first phase. 
 
9.7 Linux Thumbnail Records 
The open desktop specification used for the thumbnail cache in Ubuntu and 
Kubuntu; this structure was described in Chapter 5. The thumbnail subrecords 
are stored in standard PNG files. The PNG structure uses chunks which contain 
a size and a CRC value for validation. The Linux thumbnail cache fragments 
were identified as H4 and H5. The H4 category represented a Linux thumbnail 
cache fragment which contained metadata; H5 represented an image-only PNG 
thumbnail cache file fragment. 
 
 
Figure 9-8: Fragment reassembly using file structure 
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9.7.1 Linux thumbnail file fragment categories 
Linux thumbnails are stored over several fragments; in Chapter 7 generally half 
the fragments of each individual file contain metadata. In Section 9.3 it was 
determined that this research uses four categories of file fragment for 
reassembly. The categories are described below: 
 
Linux Category_1: 
This category represents a fragment which is a self-contained file. Given the 
structure of the PNG format the chance of a thumbnail cache image in the 
format which is less than 4096 bytes is small. If a fragment fits into this category 
the file size would be less than or equal to the fragment size; the fragment 
would also contain complete chunks which had valid CRC values. 
 
Linux Category_2: 
This category represents the first fragment in a larger PNG Linux thumbnail 
cache file; the fragment starts with a PNG header and may contain thumbnail 
cache specific metadata chunks. The PNG header contains the expected size 
of the image, and each chunk also contains an expected size. It is likely the 
fragment will end part way through a chunk; in this case fragments can be found 
which match with the expected size of the fragment.  
 
Linux Category_3: 
This category represents fragments which are in the middle of a file; these 
fragments may either contain metadata or be image-only. On analysis of the 
training file it was found that the only metadata present in the middle fragments 
of PNG thumbnail images was the IDAT chunk identifier. This identifier would 
be preceded by the CRC value for the previous chunk and the expected size of 
the IDAT chunk. 
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Linux Category_4: 
The last fragment in a Linux PNG thumbnail contains the IEND chunk. The end 
of the IEND chunk is the last byte of the file; the file size should equal the file 
size documented in the header of the file.  
 
9.7.2 Linux thumbnail file fragment reassembly 
As identified in Chapter 5, subrecords stored within the Gnome and KDE 
thumbnail caches are stored in standard PNG format.  The PNG format uses 
data chunks which contain a data size, type and crc value; these provide useful 
reassembly information by indicating both the expected structure of a fragment 
and validation information. The hexadecimal output below shows a breakdown 
of a thumbnail cache specific chunk found during the research conducted in 
Chapter 5. 
 
00000000   00 00 00 1874 45 58 7454 68 75 6D 62 3A 3A 49   ....tEXtThumb::I 
00000010   6D 61 67 65 3A 3A 48 65  69 67 68 74 00 33 35 38   mage::Height.358 
00000020   0F B9 03 29                                        .¹.) 
 
Each chunk begins with a data size value; this indicates the complete size of 
the chunk and therefore can be used to assist in identifying the number of bytes 
in the chunk and specifically identifying the final byte of the chunk. This is 
followed by an identifier, for the example above the identifier is ‘tEXt’, indicating 
the chunk holds a string of data. The identifier provides syntactical information 
to allow the chunk to be interpreted in an appropriate context.  Finally each 
chunk ends with 4 bytes which contain a 32 bit CRC value for the identifier and 
data sections. The CRC value can also assist with validation, and is particularly 
useful during reassembly if a chunk spans two or more fragments as it provides 
a method for validation. 
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In the training set there was only a single image-only fragment between every 
fragment containing metadata. This assists with reassembly; the first fragment 
contains the expected size of the chunk. The size determines the position of the 
end of the chunk which can assist with finding the fragment containing the end 
of the chunk; the next chunk should start directly after the specified chunk size. 
The middle fragment of the chunk is from the H5 fragments. Each fragment in 
the H5 category can be put into the middle of the chunk; a CRC value can then 
be calculated. If the CRC value matches the one stored at the end of the chunk, 
the fragments in the chunk are accepted and added to the reassembly 
sequence. As the last fragment containing the chunk would also contain the 
start of the next chunk the process can be repeated until the end of the file is 
reached. The last fragment in the file would also contain the IEND chunk. If the 
validation of each chunk was successful, the final chunk IEND was successfully 
identified, and the size matches the expected size in the header the reassembly 
is considered successful. 
 
9.8 Results 
The table below shows the final results for the reassembly methods described 
in this chapter. As shown below the thumbcache_idx.db file had 100% valid 
reassembly, whereas the thumbnail caches containing image-only fragments 
had a substantial amount of clashes or incorrectly identified fragments. This is 
due to difficulties in selecting the correct image-only fragment.  
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Table 9-1: Results from reassembly of data set A 
  
Correctly 
Reassembled 
Clashes / Incorrectly Identified 
Fragments Total 
IDX Metadata Image-Only 
Thumbcache_idx 
No. 6495 0 0 0 6495 
% 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Thumbcache_32 
No. 217067 0 0 21254 238321 
% 91.08 0.00 0.00 8.92 100.00 
Thumbcache_96 
No. 2477288 0 6463 495255 2979006 
% 83.16 0.00 0.22 16.62 100.00 
Thumbcache_1024 
No. 7944428 0 7971 964621 8917020 
% 89.09 0.00 0.09 10.82 100.00 
Thumbcache_256 
No. 2046002 0 4831 181409 2232242 
% 91.66 0.00 0.22 8.13 100.00 
Linux PNG 
No. 72817 0 0 280 73097 
% 99.62 0.00 0.00 0.38 100.00 
 
Table 9-2: Results from reassembly of data set B 
  
Correctly 
Reassembled 
Clashes / Incorrectly Identified 
Fragments Total 
IDX Metadata Image-Only 
Thumbcache_idx 
No. 3277 0 0 0 3277 
% 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Thumbcache_32 
No. 10001 0 0 1673 11674 
% 85.67 0.00 0.00 14.33 100.00 
Thumbcache_96 
No. 121896 0 325 27778 149999 
% 81.26 0.00 0.22 18.52 100.00 
Thumbcache_1024 
No. 353024 0 361 50816 404201 
% 87.34 0.00 0.09 12.57 100.00 
Thumbcache_256 
No. 94188 0 232 12628 107048 
% 87.99 0.00 0.22 11.80 100.00 
Linux PNG 
No. 20350 0 0 78 20428 
% 99.21 0.00 0.00 0.38 99.59 
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Table 9-3: Results from reassembly of data set C 
  
Fragments 
Reassembled 
Thumbcache_idx 71 
Thumbcache_32 178 
Thumbcache_96 293 
Thumbcache_1024 176 
Thumbcache_256 531 
Linux PNG 238755 
 
 
9.9 Artefacts from fragments identified in unallocated space 
This chapter has implemented reassembly methods for the thumbnail cache file 
fragments identified in Chapters 7 and 8. This section describes the artefacts 
identified from the reassembled fragments. 
 
All the thumbcache_idx.db fragments were identified and successfully 
reassembled. The thumbcache_idx.db provides the thumbcache ID string, 
identifies the number of records stored in the thumbnail cache and the number 
of subrecords for each record. This information is useful for linking individual 
subrecords together and potentially for forming a relationship with the source 
file. 
 
Thumbcache fragments which contained metadata were also identified and 
reassembled however not all visual thumbnails were successfully reassembled. 
The metadata sections provide information about records containing visual 
thumbnails; for a record only one of up to four possible visual thumbnails needs 
to be successfully reassembled for an analyst to potentially have evidence of an 
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activity. All the non-standard subrecords were recovered providing a variety of 
information about icons, network places and drive allocations.  
 
The thumbnail caches recovered show that it is possible to recover fragments 
from previous thumbnail caches on the system. The caches may be from 
previously installed operating systems, deleted user accounts or from thumbnail 
caches deleted by the system or user to enhance system performance or 
privacy. Whilst the range of thumbnail caches is wide it is difficult to determine 
where the thumbnail cache was originally from. However using the live file set it 
is possible to determine earlier versions of the current thumbnail cache. 
 
For the Linux thumbnail cache PNG visual thumbnails all identified fragments 
were successfully reassembled however they required a significant amount of 
processing time. The visual thumbnails provide the same range of information 
as those detailed in Chapter 5. The visual thumbnails which contain the URI 
assist in forming a relationship with individual source files; the visual thumbnails 
can also be used to form relationships with the system. As with the Windows 
thumbnail cache it is not possible to determine whether the thumbnails come 
from the current or a previous installation of an operating system. It is also 
difficult to determine the user account. Information such as who had permission 
to access a URI stored in a visual thumbnail can assist with forming further 
relationships between the information in unallocated space and the live file set. 
 
9.10 Discussion 
Each of the reassembly methods implemented during this research used 
knowledge of the structure and syntax of the file types; the general method 
provided a structure for the reassembly which was supplemented by providing 
information on the unique characteristics of each file type. Whilst other 
reassembly methods could have been selected the use of file characteristics 
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makes the method simple to explain and repeat; this would assist in 
corroboration and explanation for analysts using the software. An important 
feature of each implemented method are the logs which provide information on 
what reassembly has occurred and the reasoning the software used to reach 
this decision. 
 
The reassembly of image-only fragments proved the most difficult; the large 
number of fragments retrieved for this classification by the identification 
methods meant it was resource intensive to iterate through the complete set of 
fragments during reassembly. On analysis of the reassembled files, the clashes 
occurred on almost every occasion where the subrecord was not contiguously 
stored on the disk. This may be due to the structural similarities between visual 
thumbnails which make it more likely a false positive reassembly of the 
subrecord would appear valid. It is also possible that the number of visual 
thumbnails which were the same had an impact on the number of false 
positives; in a thumbnail cache it is likely that some visual thumbnails will occur 
multiple times in the cache. 
 
This research chose to present all valid image reassembly sequences created 
during this research; this was instead of using advanced image techniques. If 
the subrecord containing the visual thumbnail was fragmented on the disk and 
identified in unallocated space it would be difficult to determine which fragments 
belonged to the image. For visual thumbnails the difficultly lies in the number of 
visual thumbnails stored which would be the same. Every time the thumbnail 
cache updates its file size, artefacts can be found in unallocated space. It is 
difficult to relate individual artefacts together, especially when the image is 
common. Therefore the decision was taken to display every valid combination 
of sequences for a subrecord. This prevents the method from displaying a 
single sequence for a subrecord which may not be accurate; the method puts 
the emphasis on the analyst using the tool to review the results and verify any 
artefacts they feel are relevant. The method only displays valid sequences, 
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which substantially reduces the information the analyst has to review compared 
to viewing every possible combination. 
 
The inbuilt validation used in the Linux thumbnail subrecords provided 
assistance with validating the reassembly. The use of CRC values provided a 
simple validation of proposed chunk sequences. For each image-only fragment 
required every H5 value was tested; however by using the inbuilt file validation 
very few false positives were found. The false positives related to subrecords 
which were the same; therefore whilst the reassembly was valid the file 
fragments put together were not as the system would have originally viewed 
them. This produces significant problems for presenting the evidence in Court 
and reinforces the decision to display every valid combination in cases where a 
clash occurs; allowing the analyst to perform further investigation into the 
results before presenting his results. 
 
The production of a general model based upon reassembling a jigsaw provided 
four categories of file type; the detailed knowledge of the format from the 
research conducted in the previous chapters could be applied to the categories. 
By focusing on reassembling the individual categories into a complete file it was 
possible to establish the characteristics for validation of the file fragment 
reassembly sequences. The results of this research show it is possible to 
successfully reassemble sections involving metadata accurately. By using 
characteristics from outside the fragment such as those from: the file system, 
file fragmentation rates, and general file structures can also assist in 
reassembly for image-only fragments. The additional characteristics provide 
further information to assist with selecting appropriate fragments. 
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9.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the creation of reassembly methods for thumbnail 
cache file fragments identified in Chapters 7 and 8. A general reassembly 
approach was created based upon reassembling a jigsaw; the method was 
personalised for each file type. Each reassembly method focuses on specific 
characteristics of that file type to provide an accurate and repeatable approach. 
One of the most difficult reassembly problems involved identifying the correct 
image-only fragment; in order to correctly reassemble these fragments further 
information about the system was used such as fragmentation characteristics 
for the file type. This research has shown it is possible to both identify and 
reassemble thumbnail cache file fragments located in unallocated space; the 
next chapter discusses the evidential value of the reassembled fragments. 
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10 Establishing the evidential value of thumbnail cache 
file fragments identified in unallocated space. 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research is to establish the evidential value of thumbnail cache 
file fragments identified in unallocated space. In order to achieve this it was 
necessary to establish a set of criteria which could be used to evaluate the 
evidential value of thumbnail cache evidence; the criteria are described in 
Chapter 4.  Structural and behavioural studies were then conducted on popular 
operating system thumbnail caches in order to provide a baseline for evaluating 
the evidential value of the fragments identified and reassembled in the later 
stages of this research. This chapter uses the criteria for evaluating evidential 
value along with the baseline data to evaluate the evidential value of the 
fragments recovered from unallocated space throughout this research.  The 
chapter begins by evaluating the evidential value of thumbnail cache file 
fragments against the previously defined criteria. This is followed by a 
discussion of the comparative evidential value of live and recovered thumbnail 
cache artefacts. Finally this chapter ends with a conclusion. 
 
10.2 Replication, Corroboration and Clear Documentation 
 
“Results are considered replicable when they are documented sufficiently 
that another analyst could conduct the experiment again and achieve the 
same results.” [Chapter 4.3.1] 
 
“A result can be corroborated when the documentation is clear enough to 
allow the process to be repeated and therefore the results can be verified.” 
[Chapter 4.3.1] 
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“Clear documentation is defined as something which another analyst could 
read, understand and use to repeat the described processes.” [Chapter 
4.3.1] 
 
The identification methods implemented were documented in Chapter 7, and 
the image fragment identification was further discussed in Chapter 8; an 
analyst could use the documentation to replicate the experiments. If necessary, 
an analyst could confirm the research results by replicating the experiments; 
however it may be difficult for a typical analyst to implement both the statistical 
and neural network identification methods described in Chapter 7. In Section 
2.2.2 the use of dual tool verification was discussed; if a second tool or an 
analyst working by hand could independently achieve the same result then this 
could be used for corroboration. Each implemented method provides a log 
which contains: the classification of each fragment, the original position of the 
fragment on the disk, and the reason for the classification [Section 7.9]. The log 
provides sufficient information about individual fragments to allow an analyst to 
corroborate the classification by hand or with a second tool; therefore the logs 
can be used to understand the process and corroborate the results.   
 
The reassembly methods implemented in Chapter 9 also provide logs which 
contain: the original location of the fragment, its position in the reassembled file, 
and the reason for its current reassembled position. This information can be 
used by an analyst to identify the fragments of a reassembled file by hand on 
the original disk and follow the information provided in the log to verify the 
reassembled file [Section 9.3]. The reassembly methods described in Chapter 
9 are based on structural and syntactical properties of the individual file types; 
an analyst could use the information provided to replicate the method and 
corroborate the results.  
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The thumbnail cache artefact extractor documented in Section 9.10 uses the 
structures provided in Appendix A that were established through the 
experimentation performed in Chapters 5 and 6. The results of the extraction 
document the original offsets of the artefacts and show the relationships 
between artefacts. The results could be replicated and corroborated by using 
the same experimental procedure to ascertain the structure and behaviour of 
the thumbnail caches using the clear documentation provided in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
 
The documentation provided in both Chapters 7-9 which detail the 
implemented methodologies and the log files utilised by each method [Sections 
7.9, 9.3] provide sufficient information to enable an analyst to conduct their own 
experiments.  
 
10.3 Justifiable Method, Understandable Consequences and 
Scientific Method 
 
“An action is defined as Justifiable if it can be shown how the results were 
obtained and the effects on the original data are understood.” [Chapter 
4.3.1] 
 
“A process is defined as having understandable consequences when at 
each stage of the process the results and their relationship to the original 
data can be explained.” [Chapter 4.3.1] 
 
“The process can be considered to follow the scientific method when a 
hypothesis is formed based on the problem to be solved and tested through 
a process of data observation and experimentation.” [Chapter 4.3.1] 
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As discussed in the previous section the log files produced at each stage of the 
process provide sufficient information to show how the results were obtained 
and their relationship to the original data. For the identification methods each 
log documents the reason a fragment was put in a particular classification 
[Sections 7.9, 8.2]; by documenting the reason for each classification it is 
possible to determine how the results were obtained. The logs also show the 
original location of a fragment which permits an analyst to find a fragment in the 
original data and analyse it in the context of the complete set of data. 
 
For the reassembly methods a similar log is used [Section 9.3] to provide 
documentation for the reassembly process. The log provides a breakdown of 
the reassembled files and the reason for the position of each reassembled 
fragment; therefore it an analyst is shown how the results were obtained and 
how they relate to the original input data. The extraction of artefacts from the 
reassembled thumbnail caches is achieved by using the structures identified in 
Chapters 5 and 6 which are documented in Appendix A. The extraction 
software displays each extracted artefact with a breakdown of the structure that 
was applied to interpret the data, details of the original location, and links to 
other related artefacts [Section 9.10]. 
 
In order to extract thumbnail cache artefacts from unallocated space the method 
created for this research was broken down into stages. Firstly the method 
classifies fragments into types [Chapters 7 and 8]; this allows the removal of 
fragments which are unlikely to belong to thumbnail cache files. Once the 
fragments are classified the thumbnail cache files are reassembled from the 
identified fragments [Chapter 9]; at this stage all identified fragments which 
could not be reassembled are stored for potential hand analysis at a later stage 
[Section 9.10]. Thumbnail cache artefacts are then extracted from the 
reassembled files using the structures and syntaxes identified in Chapters 5 
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and 6. Each stage of the method has been shown to be justifiable earlier in this 
subsection by providing logs which document the effect on the original data 
therefore the process for the retrieval of thumbnail cache artefacts from 
unallocated space has understandable consequences. 
 
The process has a scientific method as it was created based on a hypothesis 
[Section 1.4], based on the justification provided in Section 1.2. A problem 
definition and objectives were described in Section 3.1; the methodology to test 
the hypothesis using both observation of the data and experimentation was 
provided in Section 3.3. Each individual section also contains a detailed 
description of the specific methods used.  
 
10.4 Typical Operation, Behaviour, Relationships and 
Maximising Corroboration 
 
“In order to determine an artefact was created during the typical operation of 
a machine it is necessary to determine the system behaviour which led to an 
artefacts current state.” [Chapter 4.3.2] 
 
“In order to establish the behaviour an artefact represents it is necessary to 
form relationships with other artefacts to identify potential system activity.” 
[Chapter 4.3.2] 
 
“A relationship between artefacts can be defined as an association between 
artefacts; the relationship may provide corroboration or supplementary 
information that enhances what is known about the system activity.” 
[Chapter 4.3.2] 
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“Maximising corroboration can be defined as verifying and providing 
additional information the artefact with other alternative sources of 
information.” [Chapter 4.3.2] 
 
Experiments were performed to identify the structure and behaviour of the 
operating system thumbnail caches [Chapters 5 and 6] to ascertain whether 
the artefacts occurred during the typical operation of the machine.  The potential 
user behaviour which led to an artefact’s current state was documented in 
Sections 5.6 and 6.5; it was necessary to form relationships with other system 
artefacts [Sections 5.7, 5.9, and 6.6].  These relationships provided 
complementary and supplementary information relating to the thumbnail cache 
artefacts and assisted in narrowing down potential user behaviour. 
 
In order to identify the structure and behaviour of the operating system 
thumbnail virtual drives were used to simulate potential user activity; these 
drives were then analysed using forensic techniques [Sections 5.2, 6.2]. The 
analysis method ensured that any changes between the baseline virtual 
machine and the experiment data were analysed; this allowed relationships to 
be formed between the thumbnail cache and system artefacts. Chapters 5 and 
6 maximised the corroboration of the data by evaluating the potential 
relationships with any altered system artefacts and the thumbnail cache; any 
identified relationships were then documented. 
 
The thumbnail cache artefacts retrieved from unallocated space can potentially 
form relationships with the system artefacts identified in Sections 5.7, 5.9, and 
6.6 which are present in the live file set. However neither the thumbnail cache 
artefacts identified in unallocated space or the live thumbnail cache artefacts 
can currently maximise corroboration or form relationships with other system 
artefacts identified in unallocated space. The methodology used for the 
extraction of thumbnail cache artefacts in unallocated space could potentially be 
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adapted to extract artefact from other file types and therefore extract potentially 
maximise corroborating information. 
 
10.5 Maximum Amount of Data 
 
“The maximum amount of data retrieved is defined as the identification and 
reassembly of all thumbnail cache file fragments used during the research.” 
[Chapter 4.3.2] 
 
Fragment recovery is attempted to maximise the data available to an analyst; 
the information recovered may provide additional information relating to the 
investigation. In order to establish if the maximum amount of data was retrieved 
using this method each file fragment in the corpus contained a header which 
provided information about the actual classification of the file fragment and its 
original location on a disk [Section 7.3]. The use of a controlled corpus allowed 
the results at each stage of the process to be monitored and compared to the 
original data.  
 
For the identification methods the results in Section 7.10 show the identification 
of each fragment classification; the results identify the actual number of 
fragments in a classification and provide a breakdown of where the fragments 
were classified using the method. As can be seen from the results of method 5 
100% of the file fragments in classifications H1 and H2 were correctly identified 
with no false positive identifications in these categories. Of the remaining 
classifications the lowest achieved accuracy was 66.84% for H3; this category 
had a substantial amount of false positives.  
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Table 8.2 shows the improved accuracy of image-only JPEG fragment 
recognition with an improved result of 75.5% of this category being correctly 
classified. The hybrid approach took the most successful method for each 
classification from Chapter 7 and continued to develop the approach into a 
single identification method [Chapter 8]. Finally for the reassembly methods, 
Section 9.8 shows the results of reassembly with the lowest result for data set 
2 for the thumbcache_96 file with 81.26% of available fragments correctly 
reassembled; the result was due to the high number of clashes on image-only 
fragments. The thumbcache_idx file was reassembled with 100% accuracy. 
 
10.6 Automation 
 
“Automation is defined as a scientific process which has been implemented 
to minimise the interaction of an analyst.” [Chapter 4.3.2] 
 
This process has been shown to automate the identification and reassembly of 
thumbnail cache file fragments by implementing a selection of methods 
documented in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. The extraction of thumbnail cache 
artefacts is also automated and documented in Section 9.10. As the previous 
section showed both the identification and reassembly stages of this 
methodology have failed to maximise the data available [Sections 7.10, 8.7, 
and 9.8]; therefore the resulting reassembled files may not be completed and 
may require further work by an analyst to identify any missing fragments should 
they exist. In the case of a potential clash of fragments for a position in a file 
during reassembly an analyst would have to perform further verification by 
hand. The extensive log files would assist an analyst by documenting the 
reasoning for each potential fragment and providing the original locations of the 
fragments; the original locations allow an analyst to place the pieces in context. 
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10.7 Discussion 
Both live system and identified file fragments of thumbnail cache can be 
analysed using replicable methods which can be corroborated by an analyst 
either using a second tool or by hand. The clarity of the documentation affects 
the ability of an analyst to replicate the methodology; in this research all 
methods were implemented to produce detailed logs to provide reasoning for 
any action and to maintain a relationship between each artefact or fragment and 
the original data. The use of logs allows an analyst to confirm important results 
independently; although it would be straightforward for an analyst to replicate 
the results of the structural and behavioural studies conducted on live thumbnail 
caches, the techniques documented in Chapters 7-9 may require additional 
cross disciplinary knowledge. 
 
The use of an extensive logging system ensures that any action taken by any 
implemented process during this research can be justified and the relationship 
to the original data can be shown. By splitting the process of extracting 
thumbnail cache artefacts from unallocated space into stages (identification, 
reassembly, and extraction), it assists in ensuring the process has 
understandable consequences; the relationship to the original data can be 
explained clearer if the process is broken down.  
 
By ascertaining the potential behaviour which led to an artefacts current state it 
is necessary to establish relationships between the thumbnail cache and other 
artefacts on the system. The relationships provide corroboration and 
supplementary information about the thumbnail cache artefacts which can 
assist in establishing potential user behaviour and if the system was operating 
typically. Both the live thumbnail cache and the reassembled fragments can 
potentially form relationships with the related system artefacts on the live 
system. However the methods implemented for identifying and reassembling file 
fragments were specifically designed for thumbnail cache files and therefore 
 
 Page 
276 
 
  
fragments of potentially related files were not recovered. Therefore the 
corroboration of external artefacts was not maximised; for thumbnail cache files 
which have been identified and relate to deleted user accounts or previous 
installations this may prevent any relationships being formed with other 
artefacts. In this case the thumbnail cache file would be isolated and may 
therefore only provide a limited subset of information.  
 
A live thumbnail cache is complete and therefore the maximum amount of data 
for the thumbnail cache is available; other live artefacts can potentially form 
relationships with the thumbnail cache to supplement and corroborate the 
information identified in the thumbnail cache. File fragments recovered from 
unallocated space may not potentially be fully recoverable and therefore the 
maximum amount of data may not be available. The process used during this 
research was able to identify 3 classifications of thumbnail cache fragment with 
100% accuracy and no false positives using the test corpus. However it is likely 
these figures would be slightly lower in a less controlled environment as it was 
not feasible to test every piece of software and file type available to a user.  
 
Both the extraction of artefacts and the identification and reassembly of file 
fragments process have automated implementations which aim to minimise the 
potential interaction for an analyst. For live thumbnail caches the process can 
provide a complete extraction of the files and a detailed report. It is possible that 
a reassembled file is not complete or there are potential clashes for some 
sections of the file; in these circumstances an analyst would have to continue 
the analysis by hand. The pre classification of files may assist an analyst in 
narrowing down the potential search for missing fragments. The log file can also 
assist an analyst by allowing them to put the reassembled fragments in context; 
the context may narrow down potential fragments for the missing sections. 
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10.8 Conclusion 
This chapter evaluated the evidential value of thumbnail cache file fragments 
identified and recovered during this research. The methods created during this 
research showed it is possible to recover a significant proportion of thumbnail 
cache file fragments. It has been shown that complete thumbnail caches in a 
live operating system have a higher evidential value as they successfully meet a 
larger selection of the criteria. Forming relationships between the thumbnail 
cache and other artefacts on the system can provide corroboration and 
supplementary information about the systems activity. Thumbnail cache file 
fragments identified and reassembled from unallocated space may not be 
complete and therefore do not maximise the amount of data available. 
Therefore it may not be possible to maximise corroboration by building 
extensive relationships with other artefacts. However forming relationships with 
other file types which may be identified using the same methodology or creating 
relationships with artefacts on the live file system may assist in increasing their 
evidential value.  
 
Finally, artefacts in unallocated space have significant evidential strengths in 
being able to provide information about previous installations of the operating 
system or user accounts which have been deleted. The file fragments may also 
provide significant information in situations where a user has removed artefacts 
from the system which relate to their activity. This chapter has shown that both 
live and deleted thumbnail caches have unique evidential strengths and that 
when used together in conjunction can provide a significant insight into the 
systems behaviour. The following chapter evaluates the research conducted in 
this thesis and discusses the approaches taken. 
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11 Discussion 
 
11.1 Introduction 
The aim of this research was to evaluate the evidential value of thumbnail 
cache file fragments identified in unallocated space; the research to achieve this 
has been documented in this thesis. This Chapter provides a critical evaluation 
of the methodologies employed during this research; it begins by reviewing the 
general methodology for this research [Section 11.2]. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the methods employed for identifying the structure and behaviour 
of complete thumbnail caches [Section 11.3]; Section 11.4 evaluates the 
methods used for thumbnail cache file fragment identification. Section 11.5 
evaluates the methods used for thumbnail cache file fragment reassembly; 
Section 11.6 evaluates the research conducted into solving the image fragment 
identification problem. In Section 11.7 the generalisation of this research is 
evaluated; this is followed by the chapter conclusion in Section 11.8.  
 
This research required a set of criteria for evidential value to be formed to 
enable the evaluation of the research; the criteria were developed by analysing 
existing forensic computing methodologies and the various types of constraints 
placed on evidence. Various categories of constraint were examined to identify 
their potential impact on evidence in a digital investigation; the results of the 
constraint research were combined to create the criteria. This approach resulted 
in a wider range of issues being considered than the common approach among 
practitioners of relying on the ACPO guidelines. The criteria may have been 
improved by further discussion with practitioners to identify organisation specific 
constraints; however it was felt that this research would benefit from only 
considering general constraints to enable the research to be adapted to a wider 
variety of applications.  
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Figure 11-1:  A breakdown of aim of this research into smaller research problems 
 
After the development of criteria for assessing the evidential value research was 
conducted into the evidential value of complete and identified fragments of 
thumbnail cache files; a critical evaluation of this is provided in the sections 
below. Figure 11.1 highlights the key words in the aim and shows how they 
directly relate to smaller research problems which are documented in separate 
chapters. 
 
11.3 Structure and Behaviour of Complete Thumbnail Caches 
In order to evaluate the evidential value of thumbnail cache file fragments 
identified from unallocated space it was necessary to firstly research the 
potential evidential value of a complete thumbnail cache located in a live file 
system. A complete cache in a live file set is likely to provide the maximum 
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evidential artefacts as it has all the parts of the cache and can form 
relationships with other parts of the system which are also complete. The 
structural and behavioural study focused on thumbnail caches in Ubuntu, 
Kubuntu, and Windows 7. An earlier preliminary study of thumbnail cache 
artefacts was conducted during this research to assist in identifying potential 
differences between the Windows Vista and Windows 7 thumbnail cache 
implementations. The Windows 7 operating system also utilises the earlier 
thumbs.db styles of thumbnail cache; each thumbnail cache in this range was 
tested using the same experiments in order to ensure accurate and unbiased 
results.  
 
The experiments were produced to mimic typical user actions on the system; 
since thumbnail caches generally cache user generated files the user action 
involved the creation, modification and deletion of various types of user created 
files on various kinds of storage media. These experiments aimed to 
encompass the likely range of values which would occur in the thumbnail 
caches; however it is not possible to cover all user behaviour which may directly 
or indirectly affect the contents of the thumbnail cache as it is not known. It 
could be suggested that a wider study of potential user behaviour should have 
been conducted before performing the experiments; however since it is not 
viable to perform tests on every piece of potentially relevant software with each 
operating system it was necessary to limit the scope of this research to the most 
likely to be of interest in an investigation. Further, by analysing the real 
thumbnail caches in Data Set 2 alongside the experimental data, there was an 
opportunity to identify and explore artefacts which had not been seen in the 
experiments thereby furthering the structural and behavioural studies. 
 
One consideration of this research was the stage at which to investigate the 
internal structure of the thumbnail cache files. Identifying the structures too early 
may influence the experimentation in an attempt to directly influence the 
variables identified in the structure. By performing a set of experiments before 
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analysing the file type it is possible to concentrate on typical user behaviour 
instead of the bias towards the known information; this could be followed up 
with a set of experiments attempting to alter the known variables. A comparison 
of the results from the initial user experiments and those achieved from the 
second set of experimentation provide a wider insight into the file and potential 
sources of further investigation. 
 
This research has highlighted the importance of contextual analysis of digital 
artefacts by showing the difference small variations in file structures and 
differing methods of storing data relating to the same user interaction can have 
on the artefacts found on a system. This research has provided documentation 
on the structure and behaviour of thumbnail caches for digital analysts which 
was not previously documented in a peer reviewed publication. Whilst the 
research could have gone further into a study of the thumbs.db cache as this 
research has shown it is still implemented in Windows 7 the complex OLE2 
structure was felt to be too time consuming to attempt file fragment identification 
on this type on top of the thumbnail caches already under investigation.  
 
11.4 Thumbnail Cache File Fragment Identification 
A significant contribution of this research was the comparative study of file 
fragment identification techniques which led to the creation of a hybrid 
technique which improved the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments. It 
was necessary to adapt existing techniques to identify single file fragments. If a 
single method had been created for the identification the criteria for maximising 
the data may not have been met; by using the strengths of individual methods it 
was possible to maximise the identification of fragments in each classification.   
 
Whilst several common file fragment identification techniques were compared 
time and resource constraints did not permit the evaluation of every available 
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technique; therefore an open question is do any other existing techniques have 
similar identification statistics when adapted to single file fragment identification. 
It is also possible that the methodologies selected and implemented were 
biased by the creator’s knowledge and or experience; however each method 
was documented to assist an analyst in corroborating the results.  
 
The creation of a hybrid method for the identification of file fragments allowed 
the strength of each individual method to be combined and further modification 
to be made based upon the initial experimental results. The methodology for 
creating a hybrid method could be applied to any file type by analysing both the 
structure and behaviour of that type; the information obtained from this analysis 
could then be used to implement the common identification methods and the 
results could be used to create a file type specific hybrid. This research 
highlighted the strengths of structural and syntactical identification methods; 
some basic file types may only require this type of identification to retrieve the 
maximum number of fragments.  
 
Following the completion of this research, a new challenge was launched by 
DFRWS in 2012, which focused on the identification of single file fragments. 
This challenge showed the change in research interest of the forensic 
computing community towards identifying small pieces of information [DFRWS, 
2013]. Results from the 2012 challenge have not been published; the current 
2013 challenge is also focused on the identification of single file fragments. 
 
 
11.5 Thumbnail Cache File Fragment Reassembly 
In order to ascertain the evidential value of the thumbnail cache file fragments 
identified in unallocated space it is necessary to reassemble the fragments into 
their appropriate files. Reassembling the files can provide further context than a 
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singular file fragment; by combining multiple fragments together into their 
various files it is possible to build up further context on events that occurred. 
This research focused on using the identified structures and syntax for each 
thumbnail cache for reassembly; since there may be multiple versions of similar 
thumbnail caches in unallocated space it was necessary to refine the 
reassembly process. In order to show the reassembled file is an accurate 
representation of the order the fragments occurred in when they were last 
present in a file in the live data set it is necessary to show a relationship 
between the fragments.  
 
A contribution of this research are the methods for thumbnail cache file 
fragment reassemblywhich use the unique traits learnt about each type of 
thumbnail cache file to maximise the potential for valid fragment reassembly.  
This research has shown that by understanding the structure and behaviour of a 
file type it is possible to adapt the reassembly method to take into consideration 
this information and therefore increase the accuracy in the reconstruction.  
 
A strength of this research was the documentation created are the two logs 
created during the reassembly process (Section 9.3.2); providing sufficient 
information to permit an analyst to corroborate the software’s output must be 
balanced with the need to produce logs which are understandable and do not 
require an unreasonable amount of time or resources to use.The logs show the 
provenance of the results produced; an analyst can verify the results of the 
approach using a second technique if required.  
 
This research could potentially have utilised methods from other disciplines 
such as techniques utilised in Computer Science for reconstructing jigsaw 
puzzles for the reassembly phase. For this research it was deemed more 
appropriate in a Forensic Computing context to focus on reassembly methods 
based upon known information about the file and the file system; an analyst 
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could adapt the use of structural and syntactical information to reassemble 
other file types. Using known information to reassemble the files assists in 
showing relationships between the fragments and makes it easier for an analyst 
to explain their results and have them corroborated; as any fragment 
reassembly performed may need to be justified in a Court of law any method 
used must be understandable and have a scientific basis. 
 
11.6 Image Format Problems 
This research found problems with both the identification and reassembly of 
image-only file fragments; this problem resulted from the fact that image-only 
fragments from the thumbnail cache contain the same type of data as image-
only fragments from other file types. This meant that for the identification phase 
it was necessary to have a significant amount of false positive identification in 
the image-only fragment category; it was important to ensure the maximum 
number of thumbnail cache image-only file fragments were identified to ensure 
a maximum number of fragments were available for the reassembly research.  
The methods produced in this research pre-process the storage media to 
provide a relatively small amount of potential fragments; if an analyst identified 
any potentially important artefacts in the data produced by these methods it 
would need to be verified using a second method. Dual tool verification is a 
common approach in Forensic Computing and provides a method for verifying 
the results that were obtained. 
 
The significant number of fragments identified as belonging to the thumbnail 
cache image-only category impacted on the reassembly methods; the large 
number of fragments meant a large number of evaluations were required which 
slowed down the processing time considerably. This research could have been 
improved by further research into refining the identification of image-only 
thumbnail cache file fragments; any reduction in the number of fragments being 
classified in the image-only category would have a significant impact on the 
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processing time of the reassembly method. For this research the identified 
information maximised the data retrieved and provided information which 
assisted in proving the research hypothesis. 
 
In Chapter 8 the research considered the characteristics of JPEG file 
fragments, both from the thumbnail cache and other sources. The research 
considered JPEG start of sequence markers; table 8.1 lists the 8 sequence 
markers found in the visual thumbnails tested. As all 8 sequence markers 
occurred in every JPEG thumbnail cache image tested a decision was made to 
exclude fragments which contained any other sequence starting with 0xFF. This 
meant that other sequences, which were valid markers in the JPEG 
specification, would have resulted in a fragment being rejected. Given the 
number of thumbnails tested it is possible that the 8 markers are the only ones 
which occur in visual thumbnails; however it is also possible that thumbnail 
caches outside the test data may contain other sequences.  
 
The use of observed characteristics instead of the specification made it possible 
to significantly reduce the number of false positive JPEG identifications; this led 
to a smaller number of fragments for the reassembly method. The reduction in 
false positives improved the performance and feasibility of the reassembly 
approach. If JPEG visual thumbnails exist which contain other sequence 
markers they will not be identified; therefore this may significantly impact the 
artefacts available for an analyst to present in his report. Further work is 
required to explore the characteristics of JPEG and JPEG thumbnail cache file 
fragments to assist with distinguishing between them for file fragment 
identification and reassembly. 
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11.7 Generalising the approach to file carving 
The use of the approach on different styles of thumbnail cache highlights the 
ability to generalise this method to other file types. One outcome of this 
research is the improvement which can be made to both the identification and 
reassembly of a file type by understanding the file type. The methodology used 
in this research focused on using file type specific information to improve the 
ability to identify and understand the file fragments; this increased 
understanding of the file type also assists when performing a contextual 
analysis of a complete file in a live data set. 
 
Whilst using a file type specific recovery method may be resource intensive it 
has the potential to identify and reconstruct important file types; it has been 
shown that little research has been conducted into identifying single file 
fragments. A file fragment may potentially add vital information to a contextual 
analysis and provide an artefact which may be of interest to the investigation. 
This research also has a prototype logging system which aims to provide 
enough detail to enable an analyst to corroborate the software’s results whilst 
making it readable and not unnecessarily comprehensive. The logging system 
has the potential to be adapted to the needs of each individual; allowing the 
removal or addition of fields in the logging system would make a more 
customisable environment. 
 
This research used hashes and CRC values which were part of the thumbnail 
cache file structures to assist with both the identification and reassembly of the 
fragments. Both the hash and CRC values permitted multiple equations to be 
formed which enabled the identification of valid file fragments; this method 
proved very effective in validating the results and reducing the number of false 
positives. Therefore a consideration when adapting this approach to other file 
types would be the identification of values which can potentially form equations 
to validate and identify other fragments in the classification. 
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In Chapter 9.5 a decision was taken to present the analyst with all valid image 
reconstructions. The file system information relating to fragments in unallocated 
space may not be available; this can make forming relationships between 
fragments difficult. There may be multiple versions of the thumbnail cache and 
subrecords relating to individual files which may lead to a file fragment 
reassembly which appears valid but was not an actual file on the device. This 
led to the decision to present the analyst with all valid image reconstructions; 
allowing the analyst to review the logs showing the reasoning which led to each 
reconstructed images. The analyst can then verify the information and make 
their own decision about what artefacts to present in their report.  
 
11.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this research has taken a large research question and logically 
broken it down into smaller research goals with the aim of supporting or 
disproving the central hypothesis. This has been achieved by creating a set of 
criteria in order to evaluate the evidential value of thumbnail cache artefacts; the 
criteria were developed by evaluating the potential constraints on digital 
evidence and applying this information to the thumbnail cache. The 
development of the criteria before performing further investigation ensured that 
the criteria were independent of the results of this research. This research has 
described both the structure and behaviour of several popular implementations 
of the thumbnail cache; this research could have been improved by further 
investigation into the thumbs.db format.  
 
This research compared a variety of commonly implemented file fragment 
identification techniques; identification methods independently attempted to 
identify file fragments based solely on their content. Reassembly methods were 
based on the structural and behavioural research performed as this was 
deemed the most suitable method for Forensic Computing. Further research 
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into both identification and reassembly of image-only thumbnail cache file 
fragments may further refine the methodologies produced and decrease 
processing time. Finally since there is no standard implementation of a 
thumbnail cache the methodologies created in this research were kept as 
general as possible; this means the research can easily be generalised to other 
file types to improve identification and reassembly of their file fragments. 
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12 Conclusions and future work 
 
12.1 Research Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis by providing a description of the 
contributions of this research, a description of possible future work and finally a 
summary of the research performed and the conclusions resulting from this. 
 
12.2 Contributions of Research 
Throughout this thesis several contributions have been shown, this section 
briefly describes each of those contributions. Firstly Chapter 4 has developed a 
set of criteria for establishing the evidential value of artefacts from operating 
system thumbnail caches. In Chapters 5 and 6 the structure and behaviour of 3 
common thumbnail caches are described; until Morris [2011a] published a 
paper based on the results of this research only selected part of the structure 
and behaviour were documented in the public domain. Alongside understanding 
the structure and behaviour of the thumbnail cache this research also showed 
how relationships can be formed between the thumbnail cache and other 
system artefacts; each relationship was evaluated to show its strength and 
where possible the ways in which the relationship could be strengthened. 
 
In Chapter 7, this research compared a selection of the most commonly used 
file carving approaches and evaluated their performance against identifying 
thumbnail cache file fragments. This enabled a critical evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each file carving method and resulted in a new 
approach based on a hybrid of the most common methods being developed for 
the identification of thumbnail cache file fragments.  
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In Chapter 9 methods for reassembling file fragments from each thumbnail 
cache file type evaluated during this research were created; this in conjunction 
with the fragment identification methods created in Chapters 7 and 8 allows the 
reassembly of thumbnail cache files in unallocated space which may potentially 
provide useful artefacts to an analyst. The reconstruction methods benefitted 
from an in depth understanding of the file formats allowing each method to be 
tailored to the unique structure of each file type; this resulted in an accurate and 
explainable reconstruction method. 
 
Finally the aim of this research was to establish the evidential value of 
thumbnail cache file fragments identified in unallocated space; this was 
achieved in Chapter 10which compares the evidential value of live and deleted 
thumbnail caches and contributes to the understanding of their evidential value. 
 
12.3 Future Work 
In this research it was noted that whilst Chapter 8 improved the ability of the 
identification method implemented at the end of Chapter 7 to identify image-
only thumbnail cache file fragments work could still be done to further improve 
this. As discussed in Section 11.6 further work is also required into the 
identification of characteristics which can distinguish between JPEG and JPEG 
thumbnail cache file fragments. Image-only fragments are interesting 
challenges as a wide variety of other file formats also create image-only 
fragments which share the same general characteristics. 
 
This research has involved a variety of different thumbnail cache file structures; 
each method used for identification and reassembly was in a format which was 
general enough to be applied to each structure effectively. Therefore the 
methodology could be generalised to any other file format; this provides 
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potential for improving the identification and reassembly of single file fragments 
for important file types.  
 
As well as looking at other file types it is important to note that there are various 
styles of thumbnail cache such as those used with photographic applications; 
each of these thumbnail caches may possess a unique structure and behaviour 
and therefore is an opportunity for further research. 
 
Finally, future work could be conducted on the changes that occur to the 
thumbnail cache overtime; in order to reconstruct the order in which artefacts 
were added to the cache, research could be performed into the creation of 
event timelines for thumbnail cache artefacts. If several thumbnail cache files 
were identified in unallocated space the ability to determine an event timeline of 
the modification of the artefacts would assist in placing the information in 
context. 
 
12.4 Summary 
Thumbnail caches were originally implemented to minimise unnecessary use of 
system resources by storing visual thumbnails and their associated metadata; 
whilst the basic definition of a thumbnail cache is known there is currently no 
standard structure or behaviour for its implementation. This lack of 
standardisation creates an interesting test ground for research as methods 
created to access data from the thumbnail cache are already generalised to an 
extent in order to be applicable to the different implementations.  
 
The thumbnail cache is part of the operating system and users may not 
necessarily be aware of its function or existence; however with the growth of the 
internet and user understanding it is becoming increasingly simple to access 
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information about hiding your actions. This growth of understanding makes it 
more likely that a user wishing to hide information relating to their activities may 
seek to remove sources of potential artefacts such as the thumbnail cache. If 
the thumbnail cache is deleted it can still be found in unallocated space; 
potentially fragments of the thumbnail cache may exist in unallocated space for 
a significant time after deletion. Whilst the evidential value of fragments of data 
recovered from unallocated space may be less than a complete file the 
fragments have the potential to provide information that is not available in the 
live file set and which may provide vital information to prove or disprove a 
hypothesis. 
 
This research has shown that the ability to understand a file format can improve 
the ability to construct methods for the identification and reassembly of file 
fragments. This was highlighted by the creation of proof of concept software 
which implemented a hybrid identification approach which was refined using 
structural and syntactical knowledge about the file identified during this 
research. Further support for the importance of understanding a file type came 
from the use of this information in producing specific reassembly methods; each 
method relied upon unique file characteristics to reassemble the files as 
accurately as possible. 
 
This research has shown the structure and behaviour of common operating 
system thumbnail caches and highlighted the importance of contextual analysis 
of an artefact in order to fully understand the user and system behaviour it 
represents. The methodologies produced for the identification and reassembly 
of thumbnail cache file types showed that there are some forms of information 
which may only be retrieved from unallocated space. Whilst a complete 
thumbnail cache in a live file set gives an analyst the opportunity to develop 
relationships and construct a detailed contextual analysis of the systems 
behaviour deleted thumbnail cache artefacts may also assist in an analysis. For 
example thumbnail caches in unallocated space may belong to previous 
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installations of the operating system or deleted user profiles; this information 
may provide unique artefacts which alter the meaning of a contextual analysis 
of the system. 
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Appendix A Thumbnail Cache File Structures 
 
A.1 Windows 7 Thumbnail Cache Structure 
A.1.1 IDX File Header Structure 
typedefstruct { 
CHAR FileSignature[4];  // 4 bytes 
DWORD Version; // 4 bytes 
DWORD CacheNo; // 4 bytes 
DWORD HeaderSize; // 4 bytes 
DWORD NumRecordsUsed; // 4 bytes 
DWORD HashTableSize; // 4 bytes 
} ThumbcacheIDXHeader7; 
 
The version number is 20 for Windows Vista and 21 for Windows 7 
The CacheNo is 0 for 32, 1 for 96, 2 for 256, 3 for 1024 and 4 for sr 
 
A.1.2 IDX Record Structure 
typedefstruct { 
UQUAD HashTableKey<format=hex>; // 8 bytes 
UINT flags; // 4 bytes 
UINT Position32<format=hex>; // 4 bytes 
UINT Position96<format=hex>; // 4 bytes 
UINT Position256<format=hex>; // 4 bytes 
UINT Position1024<format=hex>; // 4 bytes 
UINT Positionsr<format=hex>; // 4 bytes 
} ThumbcacheIDXRecord7; 
 
The record structure repeats throughout the idx file; the number of records present is 
always a multiple of 101. If a position field contains FF FFFFFF, then there is no 
associated image of that size for the record. If the position is 00 00 00 00 then the 
whole record should be empty. 
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A.1.3 Image File Header 
typedefstruct { 
CHAR FileSignature[4]; // 4 bytes - CMMM 
DWORD Version; // 4 bytes 
DWORD CacheNo; // 4 bytes 
DWORD HeaderSize; // 4 bytes 
DWORD PositionLastSubRecord; // 4 bytes 
DWORD EntryCount; // 4 bytes 
} ThumbcacheImageHeader7;  
 
The version number is 20 for Windows Vista and 21 for Windows 7 
The CacheNo is 0 for 32, 1 for 96, 2 for 256, 3 for 1024 and 4 for sr 
 
A.1.4 Image File Subrecords 
typedefstruct { 
CHAR SubRecordSignature[4];  // 4 bytes - CMMM 
DWORD sizeHeaderAndData; // 4 bytes 
UQUAD HashTableKey<format=hex>; // 8 bytes 
DWORD SizeFileID; // 4 bytes 
DWORD Padsize; // 4 bytes 
DWORD ImageSize; // 4 bytes 
DWORD Empty; // 4 bytes 
UQUAD DataChecksum; // 8 bytes 
UQUAD HeaderChecksum; // 8 bytes 
CHAR FileID[SizeFileID]; // size of SizeFileID value 
CHAR Padding[Padsize]; // size of Padsize value 
} ThumbcacheImageSubRecord7; 
//Followed by image of size [ImageSize] 
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A.2 Linux Thumbnail Cache Structure 
 
Each subrecord consists of the following chunks: 
A header signature  
IDHR (Header chunk)  
SBIT 
tEXt 
IDAT 
IEND  
 
The chunks follow the PNG Specification [Randers-Pehrson, 1999]. A chunk 
consists of: 
 
typedefstruct { 
DWORD DataSize; // 4 bytes 
CHAR ChunkType[4]; // 4 bytes 
CHAR Data[DataSize]; // size of DataSize value 
CHAR CRCValue[4]; // 4 bytes 
} LinuxThumbnailChunk; 
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Appendix B Bayesian probability tables 
 
B.1 SR Position either 0xFFFFFFFF or 0x00000000 
 Probability 
True 0.014847 
False 0.985153 
 
B.2 Valid Thumbnail Cache ID (TCID) values 
 Probability 
True 0.0002 
False 0.9998 
 
 
B.3 Fragment contains CMMM 
 Probability 
True 0.00101 
False 0.99899 
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B.4 Fragment contains a Start of Image (SOI) marker 
 Probability 
True 0.01553 
False 0.98447 
 
B.5 Fragment starts with “IMMM” 
 Probability 
True 0.000000001 
False 0.999999999 
 
B.6 Fragment contains an IDAT marker 
 Probability 
True 0.004407 
False 0.995593 
 
B.7 Fragment contains a TEXT marker 
 Probability 
True 0.001646 
False 0.998354 
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B.8 Fragment contains the ASCII string “thumb” 
 Probability 
True 0.00317 
False 0.96828 
 
B.9 Fragment stored in valid PNG chunks 
 Probability 
True 0.06726 
False 0.93274 
 
B.10 Each byte frequency is less than 2 % 
 Probability 
True 0.0549 
False 0.94509 
 
B.11 Valid JPEG start of sequence markers 
 Probability 
True 0.062757 
False 0.937243 
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B.12 High text frequency (Ascii) 
 Probability 
True 0.34485 
False 0.65515 
 
 
B.13 High text frequency (Unicode) 
 Probability 
True 0.09664 
False 0.90336 
 
B.14 Known header signature NOT thumbnail cache 
 Probability 
True 0.985742 
False 0.014258 
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B.15 32 byte record structure 
SR position either 
0xFFFFFFFF or 
0x00000000 
Valid TCID values Probability 
True True 1 
True False 0 
False True 0 
False False 0 
 
B.16 Subrecord header structure 
Valid TCID values Fragment contains 
CMMM 
Probability 
True True 0.965548 
True False 0.025903 
False True 0.008549 
False False 0 
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B.17 H1 
32 byte record structure Fragment starts with 
“IMMM” 
Probability 
True True 0.0916 
True False 0.9084 
False True 0 
False False 0 
 
 
B.18 H2 
Subrecord header 
structure 
Fragment starts 
with CMMM 
Start of Image 
marker 
Probability 
True True True 0.07407 
True True False 0.018518 
True False True 0.876242 
True False False 0.0307 
False True True 0 
False True False 0 
False False True 0.00047 
False False False 0 
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B.19 H3 
Each byte frequency is 
less than 2 % 
Valid JPEG start of 
sequence markers 
Probability 
True True 0.821516 
True False 0.05057 
False True 0.12202 
False False 0.005894 
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B.20 H4 
IDAT marker TEXT marker Ascii string 
“thumb” 
Valid PNG 
chunks 
Probability 
True True True True 0.16807 
True True True False 0 
True True False True 0 
True True False False 0 
True False True True 0 
True False True False 0 
True False False True 0.82415 
True False False False 0 
False True True True 0.00778 
False True True False 0 
False True False True 0 
False True False False 0 
False False True True 0 
False False True False 0 
False False False True 0 
False False False False 0 
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B.21 H5 
Stored in valid PNG 
chunks 
Each byte frequency is 
less than 2 % 
Probability 
True True 0.77184 
True False 0.22816 
False True 0 
False False 0 
 
B.22 H6 
High text 
frequency (ASCI) 
High text 
frequency 
(Unicode) 
Known header 
signature NOT 
thumbnail cache 
Probability 
True True True 0.0000001 
True True False 0.0000001 
True False True 0.049962 
True False False 0.10672 
False True True 0.020005 
False True False 0.0997 
False False True 0.0524279 
False False False 0.6711849 
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